Electoral Politics in U P: A Study of BSP Since 1992 by Saqib, Fareeda
imlCSINUhA 
bi>r SINCt '" 
ABST^ 
OF THE 
THESIS 
JR THE AWi.. "n shj**" >>-{••• 
I hi 11 
IN 
FAREE 
a 5 « f ' I I A S 
ABSTRACT 
This research work, "Electoral Politics in UP: A Study of BiSP Since 1992" aims at to 
investigate the electoral politics going on in Uttar Pradesh specially since 1990s a 
period when states politics became fragmented and polarized due to the political 
assertiveness of Backward Castes and Lower Castes (Dalits). Infact, this period is 
characterized with transformed nature of electoral politics when caste and community 
became as a major mobilizing factor leading towards the upsurge; in political 
participation in North India by socially and economically underprivileg€d in the caste 
and class hierarchy. This transformed nature has given birth to new entrants into the 
politics who make appea^ Is to mobilize these underprivileged sections on ethnic basis 
' • . . . . , • ' ' . . ;•. . ' . , , , \ ' • • y 
that also may be said as 'poirtics of recognition or identity'. Caste and religious 
identities have become so strong and basic mobilizing factor that it hsis ignored the 
division among the populace, whenever one particular community is mobilized 
against another one, it lead the society or nation towards distortions and 
fragmentations. If political scenario of UP is analysed it can be seen thjit since 1990s 
the state's system has been destabilized This instability in political sphere grew when 
one party dominance (Congress) came to an end, and its vacation waii filled by the 
various newly emerged castes and religion based political parties like BJP, a party 
with Hindutva ideology while SP and BSP parties of distinct electoral constituencies 
based on caste identity such as OBCs, among them Yadavs particularly, and Dalits. 
The development of such kind of electoral mobilization strategy on undemocratic 
bases created a situation of uncertainty, instability in the form of lack of majority 
party in the Legislative Assembly of the state, and because of this state has to face 
Hung Assemblies and Presidential Rules during 1990s for several times. Significantly, 
the early 1990s happened to be a period in country's post independence era when it 
1 
was believed that caste could provide the basis against communaiism and hierarchical 
order in society and politics. 
After analyzing state's electoral politics we find two significant aspects of this 
transformed nature: on one hand there is an upsurge in political participation by 
deprsjssed and marginalized sections of society with a hope that political power is a 
means by which they can break the tyranny of the traditionally dominant castes and 
communal groups in social as well as political sphere and would be helpful in 
improving their lower strata in society to live as a dignified human beings like others 
who belonged to the upper castes ranked above them in caste hierarchical order. For 
this purpose people provide their support to those parties who represent them and 
their cause. But second aspect of this transformation is that political parties 
representing these sections do not fulfill their real job to work for their cause. Though 
they mobilize their electoral constituencies on castes and communal basis, yet such 
mobilization strategy do not reach its real objective becauise these parties only use the 
castes and religious sentiments of these sections only to fonn their vote banks to come 
into power for their own welfare not for the community's interests and upliftment. 
However, these undemocratic electoral mobilization shows that election, that 
is a very significant part of democracy, has become only a competitive one where sole 
objective of political parties has become to be victorious one by any wsiy whether it is 
an the interest of the state or nation or not, whether it would strengthen political 
system or not, and whether it is of secular nature or not? Such tyi)e of electoral 
politics can be seen in UP where electoral constituencies have been divided by 
political parties on castes and religious line and it has created a type of electoral fight 
between distinct parties: BJP, SP and BSP specially, after the decline of the Congress 
Party which transformed the one party dominance system into a multi party 
competition that was characterized by several issues like IVIandir, Mandal etc. In the 
early 1990s Samajwadi Party became dominant but BJP emerged as :stronger party 
which displaced Congress and emerged as a national contender by espousing the 
cause of Hindutva while SP under Mulayam Singh was attempting to consolidate his 
own power base by extending reservations for the Backward Ciistes in state 
educational institutions and administrative services. Besides these two the third 
contender is the BSP representing Dalits, the lower strata of society. For this section it 
was tiie period of 1993 when they got an opportunity to come into the main stream of 
politics or administration and to strengthen Indian democracy. With the formation of 
the govenmient of this outcaste section on their own majority basis in the country's 
most populous and largest parliamentary constituencies state UP, Dalit politics 
developed enough to challenge the very definition of Hinduism. Its sole objective is 
the pursuit of power which is proved by the wordings of Kanshi Ram, the pioneer of 
the Bahujan Movement in UP, "We have a one point progfamme to take power". And 
"Bahujan Samaj Party" (BSP) founded by Kanshi Ram, defines Dalits as a 
community of humiliated who could be liberated only by gaining political power of 
their own. To achieve party's objective, it passed through varioufi mobilization 
strategies centered on Dalits themselves. For most its strategy was of isolationist 
nature when it entered into politics during 1980s. But soon it became familiar with the 
electoral politics of the state where end of the one part^ dominance has created a 
fi-agmented situation in the state. Electoral competitiveness among these fragmented 
groups did not proved any single majority party wliich could iform a stable 
goveimment. Such a lack given birth to the coalition politics in the st£ite in which in 
the absence of any party to be able to form the government on its own absolute 
majority basis then one party has to be aligned with another party or paities in order to 
come; into power or to fomi the government. So, during Ihis prevailed situation BSP 
also became opportunistic one and moved from its isolationist strategy,? to coalitional 
one by which it became able to enjoy political power in the state. First chance for it to 
form a Coalition Government was of 1993 Assembly elections in UP after the 
demolition of Babri masjid in 1992 led to the fall of BJP government ol" state, and BJP 
joined Samajwadi Party (SP) and both by eliminating the gap between them 
urespective of their ideological differences and opposed electoral constituencies: 
Dalits and Yadavs (OBCs). Though a political attempt was made by them, yet their 
alliance could not survive longer due to the lack of the social alliance between these 
two opposed constituencies having hostile relationship since a long time. After the 
failuie of the bahujan alliance, party adopted another strategy by forming post-
bahujan alliance with the BJP, the party of upper castes or a manuwadi party, of 
which BSP had always been anti because of its manuwadi ideology and of 
exploitative nature who have exploited the Scheduled Castes since ages. The devotion 
for seat of power could not stop it to go ahead in the way of coalition politics. So, it 
was mid 1990s when BSP did not hesitate to compromise its ideology, upliftment of 
Dalit bahujan sections, by aligning itself with BJP in 1995. Political power was the 
only main point which made it ready to enter into the post-bahujan alliance for several 
times: 1995, 1997 and 2002. To make justification of this move it was described by 
Mayawati as a temporary and tactical method to gain power. It shows that the pursuit 
of political power is the sole objective for any party whether BJP, SP or BSP and 
Congp-ess, the major parties of state. 
Such type of coalition politics in state was not only characterized with 
compromise on ideological basis but the game of split or defections, distrust on each 
other. These negative features of coalition politics could not brought stability in 
state's political structure due to which administration has to come under the 
President's Rule several times in 1990s as from December 4, 1992 to June 3, 1993, 
October 18, 1995 to October 17, 1996 and October 17, 1996 to March 21, 1997. 
Again it was the 2002 Assembly elections when Hung Assembly arises due to the lack 
of majority party in the Lower House. It was followed by negotiation among parties to 
come to the point to form tlie Coalition Government. Such type of negotiation ended 
with the fonnation of BSP-BJP alliance. Here if we analyse the on g;oing coalition 
politics, we will find a type of bargaining strategy. It means, a party in Coalition 
Government has as much strong hold as it has its strength. 
Another significant part of UP's electoral politics is that for a certain period of 
time the identity based parties like BSP and SP remain exclusivist in nature, means 
they were confined to their particular vote-banks such as OBCs (Yadavs) of SP and 
Dalits of BSP. But soon it was realized by these parties that their confinement to an 
exclusive vote banks could not provide a strong base to come into power without any 
support from outside. Then this realization changed their exclusivist attitude towards 
inclusive by which they attempted to extend their support base to other castes and 
communities. Because it's the demand of ongoing electoral fight where every party 
wants to come in power by getting majority of votes that is only possible when it has 
the larger support of castes and communities. And the reality is that population is 
divided into various castes, sub-castes and communities, and are being represented by 
distinct parties of their own caste and community elites. So, no party is able enough to 
place itself of winning position only with its particular section of society unless it woo 
other sections also. Therefore, every party is in competition with each other to woo as 
many sections as be possible. One of the example of such type of mobilization 
strategy is presented by BSP in UP. At its initial st^;es of politics, it remained 
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confined to the Dalits, particularly and other bahujan sections like OBCs, STs and 
Minoiities but since late 1990s it realized that to win ele<:tions it's essential to woo 
other sections also. However, it moved towards the upper - castes particularly 
Brahmins and Banias by giving them election tickets in order to extend its social base. 
Gradually, since 2005, party started to approach these upper castes sections, directly 
throuj>h organizing various sammelans like 'Brahmin Sammelans and 'Bania 
Sammelans' throughout the state to mobilize these people within pauty's fold by 
assuring them their share in the administration who were neglected by their parent 
parties like Congress and BJP. This historic move of the BSP in UP's political sphere 
became successful in providing a five year full term majority government of BSP in 
UP from 2007 to 2012. And it was seen as a revival of old Congress's Social Alliance 
of Bnihmins, Dalits and Muslims. Here it may say that electoral politics of the state 
having socially heterogeneous constituencies have forced the political parties to 
transformed their strategic position of demobilizing and excluding other social 
categories to the strategy of the maintaining a type of electoral tie bet^ veen included 
and excluded sections. 
This present research work based on the descriptive research strategy is 
divided into several parts: introduction and four chaptere with conchiding part. In 
which introductory part deals with the nature of electoral politics in Uttar Pradesh 
during one party system, means Congress rule after independence till the emergence 
of other political parties those were in opposition to it and led the Congress Party 
towards at end in terms of its domination. While first chapter deals with the aftermath 
of Congress's domination in UP and how its vacated position was filled by other 
political parties which were emerged as identity based parties. Among them one was 
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). However, in this chapter the aspects of BSP's origin is 
discussed and even before its emergence as a political party, the stage from where it 
started its journey as a 'Social Movemenf in the form of BAMCEF: "All India 
Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation", to a qujisi political 
body, DS-4 "Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti", and finally the formation of 
BSP 'Bahujan Samaj Party' a political one. This chapter describes each and every 
stage of BSP's formation by Kanshi Ram, the fiinder of it who is known as the 
architect of BSP and after him another leader Miss Mayawati whose objective behind 
party's formation is the pursuit of political power through which tlie miserable 
condition of Dalit could be ended and they could strengtl'ien then* Dalit identity in 
societ}'. Apart from this Dalit's consolidation, there are other castes and communities 
also that are the part of BSP and what was the reasons which made it possible for 
them to align with BSP, and by coming closer with each other how they carved a new 
political identity, "Bahujan identity". 
Second chapter entitled as "Coalition Era of Bahujan Samaj Party" describes 
those aspects of BSP from where it left its isolations policy and changed its image as 
of a 'Secular Dalit party' to a new strategy of coalitions or alliance that were the 
requirement of the competitive nature of politics and lack of single majority party in 
which each one was dependant on other's support. Such a dependency on aligned 
party created instability in politics for a long period. During this era BSP came closer 
to its enemy party (BJP) well, that was an impossible one before the coalitional 
politics. During such politics nothing was certain. And after this politics BSP adopted 
another mobilization strategy in order to expand its political base by wooing upper 
castes people: Brahmins and Banias within its fold. This aspect is discussed under 
third chapter of the thesis. This turning point in BSP's mobilization strategy may be 
say as the ideological shift of BSP fi-om Bahujan to Sarvajan' in which it has 
represented as a party of Sarvajan not of hahujan only. By adopting tfciis inclusive 
strategy, instead of exclusivist as was earlier, it still believes in the pursuit of political 
power, a master key to all problems. 
After discussing these aspects at the end of the thesis various policies and 
programmes of the BSP government are mentioned with its positive imd negative 
aspects. To what extent these policies were implemented and which sections of 
society were benefited fi-om these programmes. 
In this way plan of this work focuses on BSP's emergence, its core electoral 
constituencies and different mobilization strategies in accordance to the requirements 
of the electoral war in Uttar Pradesh. Though, this work is mainly based on Bahujan 
Samaj Party's electoral politics, yet it put light on other parties' affairs and their 
ideologies also because the game of electoral politics may not be confined to a 
particular one, it needs other players also. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Being the largest democracy of the world, India has a great record of elections. 
Existence of a close relationship between democracy and elections iis clear from the 
words of Abraham Lincon about democracy is that it is "Government of the people, 
by the people and for the people" which means, it is the democratic form of 
goA'emment in which people forms the government themselves through electing their 
representatives who work for their welfare. Democratic govermnent is formed 
through election procedure that is why it may be said that 'election is the expression 
of democratic process in any parliamentary and presidential form of governments.' 
Political Parties are the integral part of any democratic country that takes an 
active participation in elections. It is the political parly or parties which form the 
government, not the individuals. It creates competitiveness among political parties to 
win elections in order to achieve political power. An outgrowth of modernization 
process are parties, the instrument of collective action and creatures of political elites, 
eithier politician trying to control government or govenmient elites ixying to control 
the masses. In fact, in a competitive system parties are organized by pioliticians to win 
elections. In India, elections held time to time to achieve its true purpose but with the 
pasisage of the time, elections are being manipulated by \he power elites for their own 
ends, not for the welfare of common citizens; and communities are being mobilized 
on various undemocratic bases: region, religion, caste ;and class etc only to prepare 
vot(;- banks for distinct power seeking parties on the cost of breaking the imity and 
integrity of the nation and state. 
In spite of Constitutional provisions to bring ]3olitical eqmility, social and 
economic inequalities still survive and produce a contradiction in Indian democracy 
which was also realized by B.R. Ambedkar as he stated, "In political life we have 
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equality but in social and economic life we have inequality. This is a contradictory 
reality of Indian structure". These social and economic inequalities still persist and 
have affected democraitic system and institutions that can be seen in the form of a 
fundamental transformation in democratic politics of our country. This changed 
scenario is characterized with the upsurge in political participation in North hidia by 
socially underprivileged in the caste and class hierarchy, who have been mobilized 
und(;r banners of ethnicity, caste and religion. This ethnic strategy to mobilize these 
peo])le has brought new groups into the political arena and a relationship between 
these marginalized groups as well, who have brought transformation with an upsurge 
in political participation, and political parties" dependency on etlmic appeals to 
motdlize these sections. Tliis transformed phenomenon may be said as the 'politics of 
recognition or identity' that foster participation. 
Politics of identity has given birth to a number of political parlies representing 
these underprivileged jfections of society. One of them is the 'Bahujain Samaj Party' 
(BSP) in Uttar Pradesh that is located in the Northern India and is economically one 
of the most deprived states of India. Despite being backward, it sesnds eighty five 
members to the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament), out of total of 
545, making it a politically crucial region, in terms of the formation of the central 
government. This is tlie region where non-Congress groups play a competitive role, 
and is also characterized with inter-caste conflict, assertive lower castes and Hindutva 
politics influencing the democratic politics in Nortli India. Such a caste and 
conmiunity politics is to be seen in Uttar Pradesh, which covers an area of 2, 40,928 
km, is the fifth largest state of India; according to tlie census of 2001 the total 
population of the state is 16,61,97,921. Hmdus and Muslims are the two major 
religious communities which are found in Uttar Pradesh, They are flirther divided in 
to CEistes and sub-castes. One of the fundamental principles of the Hindu caste system 
is that it ascribes a status to human beings on the basis of their birth. That is why the 
Brahimins are at the top of the pyramid and the rest are beneath the Brahmins. An 
individual's place on tliis pyramid, ascertained on the basis of his or her birth which 
determines the nature of his or her occupation also. 
The Scheduled Castes (SCs), treated as outcastes in Hindu religion, are the 
part of Uttar Pradesh and their proportion in the population according to the 2001 
census was 35,148,377 constituting 21.1 percent of the total population (166, 197, 
921) of the state. Uttar Pradesh holds 1^ ' rank and 4* rank in terms of absolute number 
of SCs population and its proportion to total population respectively among all the 
states and Union Territories. The decennial growth of SC population has been 25.3 
percent, which it comparable with the growth of total population (25.8 percent) of the 
state. The state has a total of sixty six (66) SCs; all of them have been enumerated at 
2001 census. The SCs are prominently rural as 87.7 percent of them live in villages. 
District-wise distribution of SCs population shows that they have the highest 
concientration in percentage term in 'Sonbhadra' district (41.9 percent) followed by 
'Kaushambi' (36.1pecent) and 'Sitapur' (31.9 percent) districts. 'Biighpat' has the 
lowcjst proportion of SC population (11 percent). 
Out of sixty six (66) SCs, Chamar has the highest number (19, 803,106) 
constituting 56.3 percent of the total SC population. Pasi is the second largest SC 
having a population of 5,597,002 formmg 15.9 percent of the SC population. Three 
other SCs in the descending order are Dhobi, Kori and Balmiki. Along with Chamar 
and Pasi, these five SCs constitute 87.5 percent of the total SCs popluaiton. Gond, 
Dhanuk and Khatik have population in the range of 443,457 to 764,765 and together 
form another 5 percent. Nine SCs viz. Rawat, Baheliya, Kharwar up to Kol with the 
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population ranging from 109,557 to 331.374, constitute 4.5 percent, the remaining 
forty nine (49) SCs along with the generic castes constitute the balance 3 percent of 
the state's SCs population. As many as seventeen (17) SCs have population below 
5000. Of them four SCs namely, Gharami, Lalbegi, Bajgi and Khorot are very small, 
each having population less thanlOOO. At the level of the individual caste, Chamars 
are primarily concentrated in Azamgarh, Jaunpur, Agra, Bijnor, Saharanpur, 
Gorakhpur and Ghazipur districts. Pasi have the highesi number in Sitapur district 
followed by Rae Bareli, Hardoi and Allahabad districts. Other three major groups, 
nan:iely, Dhobi, Kori £tnd Balmiki have maximum population in Bareilly, Sultanpur, 
and Ghaziabad districts respectively. Being at the top of the caste hierarchical order 
upper castes: Brahmins and Rajputs enjoyed dominant pasition in political, economic 
and social life but in recent years their dominance has been challenged by the middle 
and Backward Castes who had got opportunity to come in power. On other hand 
lower castes have also challenged their hegemony of power. This challenge has aided 
a new feature in Uttar Pradesh's electoral politics i.e. 'caste-based mobilization'. 
Before this transformation Uttar Pradesh's electoral politics has passed 
through various stages of mobilization imder distinct puties. Uttar Pradesh the state 
of North India, 'Hindu-speaking region, was once the baiiis of Congress rule, the party 
which enjoy a great position in the history for being the oldest political party in Asia 
and one of the oldest and largest non-Communist political parties; in the world.^  
Congress Party remained dominant in Uttar Pradesh for a long period. It was 
successful in controlling Uttar Pradesh's political system till 1989 through the 
strategy of aggregating the interest of different sections of society, v.'hich was based 
on the inclusive ideology of nationalism, secularism, and Nehnivian socialism. 
Congress Party managed to rule with the support of Brahmins. Muslims, and 
Scheduled Castes and claimed itself to be the custodian of the interesits of Dalits and 
Backwards. In its first Five Year Plan it put forward policies which appeared to 
accommodate the interests of a large section of the people. This was reflected in the 
adoption of the 'Community Development Programme', 'Cooperatives and 
Panchayati Raj' which was attempted in rural areas to spread the exisling resources to 
all classes of farmers rather than to any selected section. In return, people of these 
sections gave their whole hearted support to the Congress Party, enabled it to remain 
in power for decades, both at centre as well as in the states but later on these sections 
of society began alienating themselves from the party because of its failure in 
fulfilling its promises to these marginalized sections. In fact, all the prominent leaders 
of the Congress were not from these people who could strengthen them but from 
upp3r castes. 
One of the major reasons for the decline of the Congiress Party was 
'factionalism* which led to the division in Congress followed by the rise of agrarian 
interests and issues in Uttar Pradesh politics during 1952 to 1977. The growth of 
personal and factional politics had been the most important development in the 
Congress Party organization in state since independence. Between 1952 and 1969, 
Congress politics in p^ irty and in government in Uttar Pradesh were characterized by 
inteimal group factionalism which focused around the activities of three leading 
personalities: C.B. Gupta, Charan Singh, and Kamalapati Tripathi. These three 
principal groups remained different in their leadership stj'les and composition, in their 
regional support bases and in the social forces supporting them. Th(; core group of 
Gupita came from urbsin groups, especially from Bania caste category Its leadership 
forged an alliance with powerful rural leaders from the leading rural castes and it 
established a state wide network which remained the strongest in the Congress until 
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the split in 1969. The social base of the group proved to be narrow and the Gupta 
group did not emerge as a powerfiil opposition force in its reinciamation as the 
Couigress (O). 
Second one was Charan Singh and his closest allies and followers who were 
identified with rural peasant interests and values. He developed a network of 
relationships in the districts, particularly among the middle caste groups in the state: 
Jats and Yadavs especially. Charan Singh left the Congress to form his ovm party 
BKI), "Bharatiya Kisim Dal" formed in 1969 which emerged successive in two 
elections as the second strongest party in the state with a strong rural base and with 
urban support also. Charan Singh evolved a different approach by jbcusing on the 
defense of the peasants as an identifiable group- the 'Kisan.' However, 'Peasant 
MoA'ements' developed under the aegis of Charan Singh who projected himself as the 
true advocate of the Kisans and wished to emancipate them from the domination of 
the landlords as well as the states, which he accused of not providing the cultivators 
withi regular or fairly priced electricity and of offering unremuneralive agricultural 
prici;s. Though inaugural convention of Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) held in Indore, 
Maclhya Pradesh in 1967, the party mostly relied on its Uttar Pradesh branch, of 
which Charan Singh himself was the leader. In 1969, Charan Singh became president 
of the Bharatiya Kisan Dal and after this the Bharatiya Kisan Dal appeared to be a 
regional party, confined primarily to Uttar Pradesh. In his way, Charan Singh 
concerned with reaching out to the lower castes that formed the bulk of the cuhivating 
castes. 
Thkd one was Tripathi, who became Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1971 
only after both Gupta sand Charan Singh had departed from Congress and only on the 
bacldng by Mrs. Gandhi. He remained in power for more than two years, the period 
from 1967 to 1969 that formed a major divide in the post independence history of the 
Congress in Uttar Pradesh. Congress base in the countryside was severely damaged, 
and a new party was formed, the 'Bharatiya Kisan Dal' (BKD) of Chiiran Singh, that 
later formed the core of the Janata coalition that defeated Congress in 1977 
parliamentary elections while the Congress pursued a political strategy of squeezing 
the middle peasantry between the former land lords and rich peasants on the one hand, 
and the rural poor, on the other hand. The Congress has increasingly mobilized the 
support of the dominant castes of Brahmins, Rajputs and Bhumihars, who continue 
to tte the most powerfiil landed castes in the North Indian countryside, while 
providing ameliorative measures to the rural poor and landless of which the latest in a 
long series of such measures in the a 'Integrated Rural Development' (IRD) 
programme. Under this programme grants, subsidies, and loans were provided to the 
poor and landless for purchase of buffaloes, establishment of piggeries, purchase of 
carts etc. In these struggles, the Congress, with its dual base among the elite landed 
cast3S and former land- lords and the rural poor has continued to hold ithe edge against 
the Bharatiya Kranti Dal/Lok Dal, with its base primarily among the middle peasant 
castes. However, the Congress lost its power when the Janata coalition was able to 
reverse the Congress advantage by capturing some of the Congress's own support 
among poor. 
Thus, between 1967 and 1970 Congress underwent a series of crisis but in the 
1971 elections the Congress Party become able to come back to power in Uttar 
Pradesh because of its different ideology and strategy iidopted for the mobilization 
which remained its characteristic during 1970 and 1980s such as to counter the 
challenge from the rich peasantry and the middle castes, the party under Mrs. Gandhi 
adopted a radical image and made efforts to mobilize the lower castes/classes in order 
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to strengthen its base among them. Its main example was the 'Garibi Hatao' policies 
which were reflected in the 1971 election manifesto. While during the period of 1971-
1975 the Congress laid great stress on land reforms and redistribution of surplus land 
to tlie rural poor and during the period of Congress rule during 1971-77, the Uttar 
Pradlesh and the central government followed polices to help the rural poor. 
Besides Congrtjss and its factional groups, other political parties had also 
played a significant role in Uttar Pradesh's political scene, which included 'Jan 
Sangh/Bharatiya Janata Party', 'Janata Party', and 'Communist Parlies' etc. About 
'Jan Sangh', an imporlant point is that it is the only party in North India, which did 
not develop out of the Congress. In Uttar Pradesh it originated in 1951 and stood as a 
major opposition party by the early 1960s having different stand from all other parties 
in UP m its organization, nature and outlooks. It did not represent the rural poor or 
the lower castes but Largely based on urban and constituted by mostly upper elite 
castes but by 1967 the Jan Sangh underwent a sharp chjmge which could seen in its 
expEinsion of the masjs base vdth the inclusion of a nimiber of Backward and 
Sch(;duled Castes MLAs. From 1967 onwards it made efforts to mobilize the 
emerging rich and attempted to broaden its rural base also. Later on, in 1977 the Jan 
Sanj^ merged into the Janata Party and was part of the Janata Government in Uttar 
Pradlesh during 1977-79 but with the breakup of the Janata Party the Jan Sangh was 
able to regain its earlier identity. Now the party renamed itself as the Bharatiya Janata 
Party. 
Another one was Janata Party which was formed in 1977. It was in power 
during the same year. It came to power both at the centre; as well as in Uttar Pradesh, 
on two broad platforms: 
a) To change the focus of economic activities from urban to rural and; 
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b) To make the Indian polity free from the excessive degrees of centralism and 
authoritarianism. 
In its election manifesto both in 1977 and 1989, the party claimed that it stood 
for Gandhian path of giving priority to agriculture. State governments undertook 
me i^sures which suited the interest of the richer farmers. The reason for the failure of 
the Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh to carry its agrarian programme and emergence of 
nev/ party with a distinct rural base, lie in the fact thait various constituents of the 
party has diverse class bases leading to different economic interests which were 
bound to clash, however, this was the main cause of the downfall of the Janata Party 
in 1979 and the reason for the decline after 1980. 
In Uttar Pradesh's political scenario the name of Communist Parties also came 
into light, though the two Communist Parties have never been very important in Uttar 
Pradesh. In the 1960s the Communist Party unit in Uttar Pradesh was among the 
wefikest state units in India, the Socialist Groups were in fact much stronger. After the 
split of the party in 1964, CPI has been important in North India specially, in Uttar 
Pradesh's rural areas while the CPI (M) has been negligible. In the 1950 the party 
began with a programme clearly different fi'om that of the Congress Party which 
could be seen in a document adopted by the party in 1951, later on incorporated into 
the first election manifesto. Indian society in this document was described as feudal 
and the state as committed to defending the small land lords. In its various election 
manifestoes up to the split, the party concentrated on demanding speedy completion 
of land reforms specially ceilings and distribution of land to landless labourers. The 
party wanted liquidation of debts, minimum wages for agricultural labourers, 
cooperatives and other schemes for the rural poor. After the split, the CPI took the 
stand that land reforms had been a step towards 'curbing feudal land relations' and 
that capitalist relations in agriculture had emerged in parts of rural India. The CPI has 
been less critical of Congress's agrarian policies and in the 1970s moved closer to it 
while the Communist Party of India (M) adopted a more radical stand and accused the 
Congress of allying with landlords and defrauding the tiller of thie right to land. 
However, based on this outlook these two parties have attempted to mobilize the 
smaller peasants and agricultural labourers in Uttar Pradesh and have always been 
elected from the high density districts of Eastern Uttar Pradesh where land holding 
ha\'e always been small characterized with narrow resouirce base, floods and famines. 
Gradually, Congress vote began disintegrating in Uttar Pradesh, where it won 
83 out of 85 seats with 51 percent of total votes in general elections in 1984, while it 
won only 15 seats with 32% of the votes in 1989 elections and in 1991 elections it 
voted 18 percent and won 5 seats and same in 1996. 
Table No. ]: Number of Seats Won by Congress during General Elections in Uttar Pradesli 
Year 
1984 
1989 
1991 
1996 
Seats 
83 
15 
5 
5 
Percentage of Votes 
51% 
32% 
18% 
18% 
Source: Oliver Mendelsohn and MarikB Vieziany, "The Untouchable: Subordination, Poverty and the State in Modern India" 
Syndicate, Cambridge, U.K. (1998), p. 218. 
Above data shows the decline of the Congress Party duiing general elections of Uttar 
Pradesh from 1984 to 1996, in its number of seats and percentage of votes and since 
the period of 1989 general elections Congress dominance came to an end. 
After the end of the hegemony of Congress, the party system moved from a 
on<; party dominance system to a multi party competition, from social cohesion to 
fragmentation, from a stable pattern to fluidity, and from order to chaos as the 
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princnple Congress Paity competition. In initial years, the decline of the Congress 
Party was assumed as a crisis but it produced an opportunity to revitalize the 
democratic political competition and such a competitive political structure was 
marked by certain issues like Mandir, Mandal etc and another development also took 
place that was the rise of Dalits and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in Indian 
politics. According to Zoya Hasan, Uttar Pradesh's politics has become fragmented in 
which major players are: 
i. The political groups representing the newly emergent 'farmers' of western 
Uttar Pradesh; 
ii. The Samajwadi Party representing the OBCs (Other Backward Classes) 
and, the Muslim Minority alienated from the 'secular' Congress after its 
failure to protect the Babari masjid from demolition; 
iii. The Dalit based Bahujan Samaj Party; 
iV. The Bharatiya Janata Party, espousing the cause of Hindutva. 
Thus, with the failure of Congress Party, political transformation took place in 
late 1980s in Uttar Pradesh because new social forces emerged who challenged it. The 
main social conflict in Uttar Pradesh started since 1977, between upper castes and 
Backward Castes, represented by Congress and Socialists respectively. But with the 
fonnation of 'Janata Dal' in 1989 by V.P. Singh, Backward Castes mobilized under 
its banner. On the ideological basis of social justice, he promised the Backward 
Cajites, reservation in education and government service. During the period of 1989 to 
1990, Janata Dal led government adopted the ideology based on the dual demands of 
the rural majority: one was for greater opportunities through investments in 
agricultural infrastructure and employment, and the otheT higher social status through 
quotas for lower castes and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in recruitment to the 
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elite all India services but soon the state and local leaders of the Backwjird Classes did 
not axepted the need of any mediation of national parties such as the Janata Dal and 
they attempted the direct participation. 
In the early 1990s, it was not the Janata Dal or its successor, ithe Samajwadi 
Party, that became dominant, but "Bharatiya Janata Party" (BJP) emerged as stronger 
party which displaced Congress and in 1991 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, BJP 
got ein extraordinary success and emerged as a national contender to the Congress. 
The most significant factor responsible for its electoral defeat was the piarty's inability 
to reitain its traditional support base, and Ayodhya issue was also a reas;on while at the 
national level, the political ground shifted in 1990 when the recommendation, of the 
Mandal Commission to establish reservation, was adopted by the central government. 
Whereas in Uttar Pradesh Mulayam Singh was attempting to consolidate his own 
power base by extending reservations for the Backward Castes in state educational 
institutions and administrative services. This raised a conflict betAveen Mulayam 
Singh government and the upper castes in 1999. However, upper castes, who had 
voted for Congress in past, transferred their support to the BJP. In this way, Uttar 
Pradesh experienced a different pattern of social mobilization. Though OBCs and 
Schsduled Castes constitute more than half of its population and just over 20 percent 
of Uttar Pradesh's population belong to the upper castes, yet they have dominated 
UttJir Pradesh society and politics; and ruled on the disadvantaged groups including 
the Scheduled Castes that constitute more than 20 percent of the population of Uttar 
Pradesh. 
It was the period of 1990s when the Indian fianchise got its fiill and true 
meaning when Dalits, the lower strata of society recognized its strength and became 
aware about the real meaning of democracy and the formation oi' government on 
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majority basis, a numerical strength. This encouraged the Dalit voters l;o prepare their 
own platform and a contributive role has been played by the Dalit elites who are 
better educated and more assertive towards the hierarchy of castes, "^ fhey perceived 
that a real change or improvement in their lives could only come through the political 
pow(;r and organization. Thus, Dalit politics involved three important points: 
• A challenge to the very defmition of Hinduism; 
«' An extension of this politics beyond Dalits to include all sections of oppressed 
and marginalized through the process of exploitation; 
«> And a synthesis of economic and political issues with the need for cultural 
recognition. 
However, remairkable feature of the lower caste politics is the 'pursuit of 
power' as in the words of Kanshi Ram, the pioneer of the movement to politically 
organize the Bahujan Samaj, "We have a one point programme - take power. " The 
new leadership wants to construct a new political order based on the active 
participation of deprived groups in government and public administration. They 
believe that by controlling power, members of lower castes would secure jobs and 
plac:es in educational institutions. Lower castes got an opportunity to come into power 
when Congress in UP declined and with its disintegration, caste - conmiunity become 
major mobilizing factors by non-Congress parties, specially, Samajwadi Party and 
BaJiujan Samaj Party. Thus, Bahujan Samaj Party was formed by Kanshi Ram in 
1984. The factors which proved helpful in its origin were: 
• Kanshi Ram found an opportunity to form it because of the seat vacated by 
Congress Part}/; 
• BSP started growing because it stood for the welfare of Chamar community, 
the vote bank of BSP, is the largest single caste in Uttar Pradesh and largest 
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untouchable caste in India. Kanshi Ram's strategy has been to join the Chamar 
vote bank with other Scheduled Castes, Backward Castes and Muslims to form 
Bahujan Samaj with a purpose to achieve political power. Since it started as a 
movement, the journey of Bahujan Samaj Party to a political party crossed 
several stages; 
•' Firstly, the creation of BAMCEF "All India Backward and Minority 
Communities Employees Federation" in 1973; 
•' Secondly, DS-4 "Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti" in 1981; and 
* Thirdly, BSP "Bahujan Samaj Party" in 1984. 
With the emergence of BSP, politicized lower castes succeeded in 
undermining the domination of upper castes and by the mid - 1990s, this force 
became able to form elected government in the Uttar Pradesh. 
BSP success siignificance lies in its mobilization strategy, centered on Dalits 
themselves. At its initiial stage, BSP adopted an "isolationist" policy but before the 
199.3 Assembly elections, Kanshi Ram thought to enter mto an alliance, this strategy 
whii^ h proved successfol when he entered into an alliance with Mulayam Singh for 
access to power. With the support of each other, Samajwadi Party with 109 seats and 
BSP with 67 seats formed the government in Uttar Pradesh. Since their alliance was 
not a natural alliance as both communities were engaged in violent conflicts over 
land and wages in the villages. So, the alliance was dogged by differences over the 
distribution of benefits and this alliance fell in May, 1995. With tliis failure, BSP 
moved towards BJP to form a new alliance that helped Mayawati in becoming Chief 
Minister of Uttar Pradesh in June, 1995 but this phase of coalition also proved short 
lived, hi accordance mth this strategy, the BSP advocates a one point programme: 
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'proportional representation for all groups in government, bureaucracy and 
educational institutions.' 
Table No. 2: Caste and Conimunity of the BSP Candidates in the 1996 Assembly Elections in 
Uttar Pradesh 
Caste & Community 
Upper Castes: 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Baniya 
Khattri 
Bhumihar 
Kyastha 
Others 
Intermediate Castes: 
Jat 
Other Backward Classes 
Backward Castes 
Kurmi 
Yadav 
Lodh 
Most Backward Classes 
Pal / Gadariya 
Teli 
Kachhi / Kushwaha 
Gujjar 
Percentage 
17.5 
4 
8.2 
1.3 
1.6 
0.6 
0.9 
0.9 
1.6 
1.6 
34.4 
11.8 
6.3 
1.9 
1.9 
22.6 
1.9 
0.3 
2.3 
0.9 
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Nai 
Nishad 
Baghela 
Kumhar 
Sunar 
Chaurasia 
Rajbhar 
Shakya 
Kashyap 
Prajapati 
Chaukan 
Vora 
Saithwar 
Bair 
Saini 
Maurya 
Others 
Scheduled Castes 
Chamar / Jatav/ Dhore 
Kori 
Pipil 
Dhobi 
Khatik 
Dusadh/ Pasi 
1.9 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
2.3 
1.6 
0.6 
1.3 
0.9 
0.3 
0.9 
0.3 
1.6 
2.3 
1.3 
28.3 
19.1 
0.9 
0.3 
0.6 
0.3 
4.2 
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Katheriya 
Kuril 
Chilpkar 
Balmiki 
Others 
Muslims 
Christians 
Non -identified 
0.3 
0.6 
0.3 
0.9 
0.3 
17.5 
0.3 
0 
Source: Christophe Jaflielot, "Religion, Caste and Politics in India", Primus, New Delhi (2010), pp. 569-574, 
BSP's electoral strategy of 'proportional representation' aimed at to become more 
than a Dalit party so tliat it can acquire political power and its electoral politics can 
be seen in the following table of BSP MLAs representing different castes and 
communities since 1989 to 2002: 
Table No. 3: Caste and Community of the BSP MLAs (1989 - 2002) 
Caste & Community 
Upper Castes: 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Bania 
Bhumihar 
Kyastha 
Intermediate Castes 
Jat 
OtherBackward Classes 
Yadav 
1989 
22.8 
7.6 
1991 
91.4 
16.6 
1993 
1.5 
1.5 
44.7 
14.9 
1996 
13.5 
4.5 
6 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
42 
1.5 
2002 
16.2 
6.^ 
6.8 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
39.7 
2.7 
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Kurmi 
Lodh 
Koeri 
Shakya 
Rajbhar 
Ssiini 
Pal/ Gadaria 
K;ashyap 
Kushwaha 
N/[uraon / Maurya 
Nishad 
Bhagel 
Gujar 
Other 
Scheduled Castes 
Jatav 
Passi 
IChatik 
Other 
Muslims 
Non Identified 
7.6 
7.6 
38.4 
30.7 
16.6 
8.3 
8.3 
41.6 
8.3 
7.5 
1.5 
2.9 
1.5 
1.5 
14.9 
34.3 
16.4 
2.9 
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1.5 
1.5 
3 
6 
6 
3 
4.5 
1.5 
1.5 
27.2 
16.6 
7.6 
1.5 
1.5 
16.6 
10.9 
4.1 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
2.7 
2.7 
1.3 
2.7 
2.7 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
2.7 
25.9 
20.5 
4.1 
1.3 
10.9 
Source: Christophe Jaflrelot, "Religion, Caste and Politics in India", Primus, New Delhi (2010), pp. 569-S74. 
Thus, in order to broaden its social base of a party's political structure, the 
BSP leaders have approached the upper castes also. Since mid 1990s a significant 
number of upper castes candidates have been given tickets. However, in the 1999 Lok 
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Sabha elections, Kanshi Rarn nominated the candidates fiom Brahmin and Rajputs. 
Among them, five were fi-om Brahmin and five fi-om Rajputs while in 2002 Uttar 
Pradesh Assembly elections 37, Brahmins and 36 Rajputs were given tickets. 
BSP defines Dalits as a community of 'humiliated' who could be liberated 
only by gaining political power of their own. This principle of proportional 
representation contributed in party's retention of Dalit loyalties in the form of 
incrcised representation of Scheduled Castes. Thus 'caste- identity!' is the sole 
criterion of BSP for distributing tickets and posts. This resulted in the political 
empowerment of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh. And the empowerment is nothing but 'self 
help.' This depends on self effort and psychological mobilization of p€;ople, deprived 
people in this case. It is a state of mind and it reflects self confidence, self- reliance 
and the determination to fight for one's rights and interests. This can only be acquired 
through self cultivation and be sustained through action. Through their political 
outfits, they are trying to capture political power. This awakening has not only helpfiil 
in establishing their self respect, self determinism and honour, but has Jilso led them to 
protest against the domination of upper castes and classes in India. It was the 
empowerment of Dalits which made possible to establish a goverrmient of Scheduled 
Castes with the help of other bahujan castes in an upper castes dominated political 
structure of Uttar Pradesh and whenever this government came into power, it has 
always worked, primarily, for the benefits and advancement of the depressed sections 
of iiie society such as Mayawati's initial two terms are characterized with this 
phenomena specially, during her second tenure, she made efforts to empower Dalits 
politically, by filling tlie reserved quotas for Scheduled Castes and appointing them to 
imi>ortant positions in the government for which she transferred a large number of 
bureaucrats including civil and police officials in 1997. Besides it, the major work in 
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this context may be said to 'Ambedkar Village Development Scheme' consisted of 
15000 Ambedkar Villages, with a 30 percent Dalit population, which were provided 
development funds. These preferential treatments, given to Dalits by their party, 
provided to BSP, its support base to come in power in Uttar Pradesh, several times. 
Thus, Uttar Pradesh's changed political experience shows that on one hand, Dalits 
used their votes to affirm identities and avenge past humiliations; and on other hand to 
secure instrumental benefits. Although the benefits of empowerment have been 
captured only by small elite among the subordinate groups, yet Uttar Pradesh's 
political system has been transformed. The emergence of the BSP has added vital 
dimensions to the ground level economic and political development of the lower 
castes. 
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Cfiapter- (First 
Origin of^aHujan Sdmaj <Party 
in Vttar (PradesH 
ORIGIN OF BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY: FROM SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT TO POLITICAL PARTY 
Bahujian Samaj Party, which was formed by Kanshi Ram in 1984 in Uttar Pradesh at 
the time when Congress was collapsed because of disintegration; and won the support 
of Chamars, Backward Castes, and Muslims etc. It has its roots in Ambedkarism. It 
means this was Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as first untouchable leader who fought against 
untouchability, Hinduism and the Brahmin caste, specially. He was concerned with 
the reform of the caste system m society and the creation of such a society based on 
the tliree fundamental principles: justice, liberty, equalitj' and fraternity. For this he 
may be said as the architect of Dalit politics in India with party building. He founded 
a paity aiming at the mral and urban workers, "Independent Labour Party" (ILP) in 
1935. Af^ er it, he founded the "Scheduled Castes Federation" (SCF) in 1942 to focus 
the DalWs status. Finally, he initiated "Republican Part)' of India" (RPI) in 1956 to 
woo all the depressed categories of the lower castes.' 
In the same way, Kanshi Ram with the legacy of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar followed 
a similar political trajectory by estabHshing DS-4 in 1981 for the struggle of the 
community of the oppressed and exploited. And finally, Flahujan Samaj Party with the 
electoral symbol of the parties of Ambedkar, the elephant on a blue base; and its 
activities greet each other with 'Jai Bhim' means victory to Bhim ie. y i^mbedkar's first 
naffie and BSP's slogan proclaims "Baba (Saheb Amb€;dkar) Tera Mission Adhura, 
Kanshi Ram Karega Pura." It means, Baba: your mission remains unfulfilled Kanshi 
Ram; the founder of the BSP will complete it. All these activities reflect the 
connection of Kanshi Ram with Ambedkarism, which were forged when he was 
posted to Poona where he felt that the condition of Mahars (untouchable community 
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of Maharashtra) and Mongs were miserable and worse than that of untouchables in 
Punjab; and he read two Ambedkar's classics: 
« Annihilation of caste; and 
o What Gandhi and the Congress have done to the untouchables. 
These two classics influenced him and he became close to RPI "Republican 
Party of India" but very soon he was demoralized by factional squabbling and 
alliance. Therefore, a new party m North India, specially, in Uttar Pradesh appeared 
BSP, '^ Bahujan Samaj Party" with aim of the upliftment of the Dalits and 
downtrodden section of society which could be possible only when the strong hold of 
Bralmiins and Banias on the society would be completely finished and Dalits will be 
free from the clutches of the upper-castes (Brahmins). Such Dalits are in majority in 
India, therefore, their rule can be the basis of true democracy in the coimtry.^  
Hovk^ ever, BSP has raised various slogans which show the aggressi\^ e nature of the 
depressed classes against upper castes such as.- "Brahmin, Bania, Thakur Chor; Baki 
Sab Hain DS-4", "Tilak, Tarazu, Kalam, Talwar; Maro Inko Joote Char", "Mat 
Harnara Raj Tumhara:Nahin Chalega, Nahin Chalega". Therefore, BSP's main aim 
is the upliftment of the Dalits by establishing their ov/n rule'' who are facing two 
kinds of social oppression: 
1. Caste-system in India which is based on the privileges for higher and 
disabilities for the subordinate classes and castes; 
2. The majority of Scheduled Castes in India in rural areas exist among the 
landless agricultural workers who are exploited by the landowning classes. 
So, Dalilts aj-e involved in social and economic struggle with aim at 
improvement of their status.^  BSP originated v^th this objective as a Bahujan 
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Movement, earlier, under the leadership of Kanshi Ram., who is knovm as the foxmder 
of Bahujan Samaj Party. 
Kanshi Ram: As an Architect of Bahujan Samaj Parly 
Kanshi Ram may be said as the architect of Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). He was a 
Dalit activist and devoted himself in organizing Dalits. He organized "All India 
Backward and Minority Community Employees Federation" and "Dalit Shoshit 
Samaj Sangharsh Samiti" (DS-4). He was much different from the ether social elites 
who occupy a strong and comfortable position by raising important issues like-
po^ e^rty, human rights, secularism, environment issues etc. And by presenting their 
welil reasoned issues, they get media attention but people do not trust such elites as 
they have not lived such a life with negligence and discrimination etc. In India, mostly 
lea<lers have come from political background, from within existing party and by split 
or defection from the party. Kanshi Ram was different from such type of political 
leaders; in fact, he caime out of adverse circumstances. He was a man who lived and 
suffered much in such circumstances that "as a child, a boy, a man" he lived with the 
feeling of inferior caste. To be a Dalit child in village is be up-braided every now and 
theiti by the upper castes.* 
Kanshi Ram was bom in 1934 in Khawaspur village of Ropar district in 
Punjab as a Raedasi Sikh, a Chamar community converted to Sikhism. His family had 
4 or 5 acres of land, some of it inherited and the rest acquired through government 
allocations, after independence. Kanshi Ram's father was slightly literate and 
educated all his four daughter and three sons. Kanshi Ram was eldest one and he was 
the only graduate. After graduation, he was given a reserved position in the survey of 
India but in 1958, he transferred to the department of "Defense Research & 
Development Org^ization" (DRDO) as scientific assistance in Kirkee munitions 
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factory in Poona. Social oppression and economic exploitation of Maharashtrian 
Scheduled Caste by upper casts shocked him. Seeing such type of exploitation Kanshi 
Ram did not remain silent spectator, he feel their pain of humiliation so, he decided to 
figtit against such inhuman activities. In initial stage he only participated in various 
agitations for the rights of SCs employees in government jobs. He became caught up 
in a struggle initiated by Scheduled Castes employees to prevent the abolition of a 
holiday on Dr. Ambedkar, Valmiki and Buddha birthday, This event brought a sudden 
change in his life. Md he became more radicalized after reading Ambedkar's 
'Annihilation of Castes', in one night. During his government service, he always 
thought about the better future of Dalits who were exploited by upper-castes. And he 
worked alone on his own basis, feeling the ground at first with Scheduled Castes 
org;inizations, before launching his own political party, Bahujan Samaj Party.'^  
In this way, Kanshi Ram's political ideas st£irted with tlie formation of 
Scheduled Castes orgjinization. Firstly, he formulated thiese ideas with his colleague, 
in IVIunitions factory, D.K. Khaparde, to establish an organization, by organizing 
educated employees from Scheduled Castes, which would work against the 
harjissment and oppression by high castes. Thus, in 1971 he and his colleagues 
established the, "Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and 
Minorities Employees Association", which was registered under the Poona Charity 
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Commissioner. Within one year, 1000 members joined it. Its office was in Pune. This 
association was based on Ambedkar's ideology and limited to the SCs employees 
fi-om departments of Defense & Post and Telegraphs. Scheduled Ciistes, Scheduled 
Tril)es, Other Backward Classes and Minorities Employees Association turned into 
BAMCEF in 1973 to create a national platform. 
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Second one was BAMCEF an organization founded by Kanshi Ram in 1973. 
As an employee in "Defense Research and Development Organization" (DRDO) in 
Pune, he realized that the formation of a Dalit bureaucracy was imf)ortant if Dalit's 
interest were to be served. He thought to form the federation through which he 
woirked his way of bureaucracy with some officers and through them influencing the 
low^ er staff. The motto of organization was "Pay Back to Society" to inspire Dalit 
bureaucrats to do for their Dalit masses. BAMCEF undertook collection of fiinds for 
the purpose of supporting agitation and trainmg Kanshi Ram appointed State level and 
Mandal level conveners to act as links between state and districts. It was so effective 
that; it brought revolution in the country.^  This BAMCEF "^// India Backward and 
Minority Contmunities Employees Federation'" had an office in Delhi. It relaunched 
on 6* December, 1978, the anniversary of Ambedkar's death, when 2000 delegates 
joined procession. Its motto was to "Educate, Organize and Agitate" which was 
adopted from Ambedi:ar and its activities were divided into a number of welfare and 
proselytizing objects. Therefore, Kanshi Ram by mid 1970s got success in 
est£iblishing a broad base and contacts throughout Maharashtra and other regions like 
Najg)ur.'° However, BAMCEF means, *'a« organization of the educated enq)loyees, 
'by' the educated employees but 'not for* the educated." On this basis BAMCEF 
may be described as a non-religious, non-revolutionary and non-political 
orgianization. And because of this, BAMCEF has not been registered still it functions 
as 'brain bank', 'talent bank', and 'financial bank' of oppress&d and exploited 
section of society." 
To run side a huge organization certain problems were coming in its front as: 
lack of ftmds became a challenge before BAMCEF, so, to tackle tliis Kanshi Ram 
asked to his own cadres to contribution 2% of their salaries. But this strategy also did 
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not prove as well as its own comipt leaders use this fund for their personal 
requirements that was also noticed by the public. 
In spite of fiind problem, another one recognized by him, was the organization 
as 90 percent membeirs were SCs mainly Mahars from Maharashtra and Chamars 
from North India while 10 percent were Tribals and Backward Castes, Though SCs 
educated elite formed the majority of the BAMCEF membership but iJiey were not in 
direct contact with the rest of their community members. This limited reach only to 
educated ones could liamper the organization's progress or achieving its target. Its 
remedial measure was feh by him in organizing and forming a coalition of oppressed 
communities which could mobilize 85 percent society. This measure resulted into 
mobilizing Bahujan Samaj as educated Kurmis, a backward caste came into the 
influence of its success of BAMCEF in North India, particularly and Kanshi Ram's 
believe in just and equitable society for the oppressed started its journey with 
BAIVICEF, an organiiiation for social movement, and transformed into a political 
movement gradually v/ith Kanshi Ram's believe in political power as a tool to ftilfill 
his ideological mission. The target to achieve political power needed a state with 
broad base and a perfect leader such a research was completed when he decided to 
chose UP, being largest state and nerve centre of politics with a huge population of 
Chamars and support of Kurmis also. Another research for efficient fulfillment was 
achieved when Kanshi Ram met with Mayawati in 1977, at that tune she was a law 
student in Delhi University and was preparing for civil services. 
During this first meeting of Mayawati and Kanshi Ram, she was influenced by 
him and agreed with him in providing the right type of political leader. But such a 
decision of Mayawati created a fight between her and father who wanted to see her as 
an "Indian Administrative Services" officer. Rift resulted into the Mayawati's 
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decision to leave her home and took shelter in BAMCEF office in Karol Bagh, 
temporarily. Again Kanshi Ram inspired with her uncommon courage and dedication 
towards her community. Mayawati gave him courage to move on frorai BAMCEF. 
DS-4 was a synonym for the Bahujan Samaj to mobilize a larger body of 
Dalits, Backwards and Minorities on major issues. Its first event was "People's 
Parliament" on the lawns of Boat Club in New Delhi in 1982, a platform to discuss 
their problems. People's Parliament was held after the publishing of Kanshi Ram's 
ideological treature 'Chamcha Age'- a booklet was an attack on SCs elite who were as 
an agent or instrument for Congress Party. He continuously tried to broaden base of 
high movement by an alliance with Other Backward Castes. For the mobilizing 
pur]X)se he adopted 'mild to wild' strategy but non-violent. But solution was seen by 
him in formation of a ipolitical party that would end one chamcha age, Such a thought 
was followed by companies as 40 days long 'Cycle March' in March 1983, called 
"The miracle of two feet and two wheels,"^^ in Jabalpur, Bhopal, Punjab, Haryana 
and Uttar Pradesh as well as in Madhya Pradesh to recmit them to the organization. 
Kanshi Ram also presented the teachings of Ambedkar before a wider audience. Such 
as he put a road show, which was an oral and pictorial account of Ambedkar's life and 
vie>vs on oppression, atrocities and poverty, this show was called "Ambedkar Mela 
on Wheels" in 1980. Thus, he talked about Ambedkar's struggle for the downtrodden 
classes, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backwards and Minorities who ail were 
victims of Brahmin. By organizing these road shows, he organized the people of these 
classes and developed the concept that these people are in a great nuE;iber, so they had 
the potential to convert themselves from beggar to rulers. These activities reflects the 
BAMCEF motto- "educate, organize and agitate ". Because of these road shows Jang 
Baliadur Patel, belonged to Backward Castes, joined BAlvlCEF.'^  
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These agitation activities brought him into politics. And he organized 'Dalit 
Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti' (DS-4) in 1981, which was a political organization 
and may be said as the quasi- political party, because government servants were 
forbidden to take pajrt in electoral politics. This was organized to struggle by 
mobilizing the Dalits against oppression. Kanshi Ram was President of both 
BAJVICEF and DS-4. The slogan coined by DS-4 waij, "Brahmin, Bania, Thakur 
Chor;Baki Sab Hain DS-4". At the same time, Kanshi Ram launched his own 
political party, 'Bahujian Samaj Party' in 1984. And Kanshi Ram announced that he 
would remain the President of BSP and to work only for it, m 1986. In this way, he 
beciune a politician from a social worker.'"* 
Kanshi Ram's strategy, of social change, also transformed into a political 
strategy, so he no longer believed in social change. His jjolitical strategy was that the 
oppressing upper castes, the 'Savarna' are a minority and all other castes with Muslim 
added constitute the Bahujan Samaj, over whelming majority. So, the Bahujan Samaj 
should unite and take power. He said that the policies like liberalization of Indian 
economy or land reforms, literary and class are irrelevant to gain the political power. 
So, he came with an objective, 'power'. He said Dalits should seek power and other 
thiiiigs shall be added to them. His idea was that it is the ]power (administrative power) 
which will bring about desired social change. Political power brings about desired 
social change. Political power has been the main concern of SCs leaders and Kanshi 
Ram. They believed thiat'^  "Political Power Is the Master-Key to All Problems"}^ 
Kanshi Ram vi^ as much concerned about the rij^ts, dignity and interests of 
Dalits. He knew that because of the century's oppression, Dalits had lost their self-
respect and suffered grievous physical damage. So, Kanshi Ram wanted to break the 
psychological fetters of Dalits, which was only possible by attaining power. Thus, as 
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a politician, his first move was in a direction to achieve political power by uniting 
Depressed Classes (Dalits) with Backwards, Minorities £ind STs as Bahuj'an SamaJ. 
According to the office secretary of BSP, "we have one point programme- take 
power". And under the leadership of Kanshi Ram, EJSP was a party of Dalits, 
Backwards and Minorities, and power was within its grasp, it was believed by Kanshi 
Ram. Because the Dalits and Shudras together constitute 85 percent and we do not 
need to form any alliance. We can rule on our own. So, BSP projected itself not as 
Dalit Party but as Bahujan Party, as it is a party of Dalits, non-Brahmins and 
Minorities, which have a solid base of Chamars in North India and OBCs and 
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Minority Commumties. 
Thus, with the establishment of BSP rule in UP, enthusiasm generated among 
Dalits because, for Dalits, this was the independence in true sense wkich Kanshi Ram 
brought from grass root level. Initially, he conducted his public meetings by get up 
and before beginning his speech, he announced that all. Brahmins, Kshatriyas and 
Vaishyas should leave the meeting because it was not for them. He convinced Dalits 
by identifying his enemies repeatedly. His hard work of mobilizing Dalits with 
another oppressed castes and Minorities succeeded when BSP's government was 
formed in Uttar Pradesh with Mulayam Singh's Samajwadi Party. And to achieve his 
main objective the pursuit of political power, he has not hesitated to seek the support 
of "Bharatiya Janata Piuty" (BJP) even.'^  
However, Kanshi Ram was the architect of Baliujan Samaj Party (BSP) of 
SCs, STs, OBCs and Minorities, with one objective, acliievement of political power 
that brings desired social change. And he has followed some of Ambedkar's line but 
he lias been criticized on various grounds for this. Such as: An:ibedkar as only 
election symbol for BSP and, for its caste- politics. On 17* birthday anniversary on 
29 
14* April, 2008 various political parties paid tributes to Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar in 
Luc;know. On this occasion, a function organized by ''Dr. B.R Ambedkar Mahasabha' 
Co-operative Minister, Swami Prasad Maurya said that it was the drejim of Ambedkar 
to establish a caste-free society and this dream was realized by late Bahujan Samaj 
Party leader, Kanshi llam. But state BJP president Dr. Ramapati R£im Tripathi said 
that Dr. B.R. Ambedl^ ar was a great leader, and an architect of Indian Constitution 
and freedom fighter. So, he belonged to the entire nation. But efforts are made by the 
Baiiujan Samaj Party to make its election symbol to cash in on his name and 
popularity. He said the Bahujan Samaj Party supremo Mayawati has continued its 
casle agenda for political gains. The circulation of literature containing filthy 
language against 'Ram' and other God and Goddesses has increased since the 
installation of the Mayawati government. All these activities show the caste-politics 
agenda of Bahujan Samaj Party. Though he has followed Ambedkar., yet he has been 
criticized on various grounds. Such as: BSP has been blamed for not trying hard and 
neither has analyzed caste society nor it has enough emphasis to education as a 
priority for the emancipation of the Dalits as Ambedkar has done. He has been closely 
concerned with the achievement of power. Bahujan Samaj Party has been closely 
identified by only one leader. Earlier, it was Kanshi Ram, and now with Mayawati for 
example, one of Bahujan Samaj Party's slogans has been ''The BSP is Kanshi Ram 
and Kanshi Ram is the BSP ". 
Kanshi Ram's main aim was power for the Dalits. But his understanding of 
pov/er-ofBcer was exti'emely superficial. Because he thought power does not arise out 
of the activity of an awakened people but power is a mysterious essence inheres in 
office of SP, DM, CM, and PM. So, his party lacks the new spirit, seriousness, 
enthusiasm and dedication to the cause of the downtrodden. There are various 
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aspects of Dalits' problems, which need more attention becaxise their problems are 
usmilly not as presented as to be available. So, this needs systematic involvement with 
them and prolonged pressure to overcome the problem. But Kanshi Ram's party is 
base;d on the idea of power. 
Therefore, it may say that Kanshi Ram was not motivated by tlie deep love for 
his own people Dalits. But he was motivated by a hatred of their oppiressor. Another 
aspcict in that he emerged from adverse conditions by the force of his personality and 
by creating awareness in the minds of Dalits. When he came into pov.'er, his aim also 
becfime to acquire and enjoy power like other politicians. Howevcir, Kanshi Ram 
remained in power without any clear vision of an egalitarian society. In spite of 
Kanshi Ram's and Baitiujan Samaj Party's weakness, it is a fact that he has brought 
Dalits, the oppressed section of society, to the centre stage of Uttar Pradesh politics. 
Caste Equation as an Objective of Bahujan Samaj Pai'ty: 
Bahujan Samaj Party, which was formed by Kanshi Ram on 14* April 1984, started 
as a Bahujan Movement. This is concerned as Bahujan Movement by academicians, 
activists and politicians who have contributed in promoting bahujan ideology. This is 
a movement against Brahmin or Hinduism. Kanshi Ram, the leader of this movement, 
stat(;d that SCs, STs, OBCs and Minorities as well ais the converted from these 
categories to Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Sikhism all are equally oppressed 
under the Brahminical order, which has given privilege position to Brahmins whereas 
above mentioned categories are underprivileged. So, these people should form a 
socio-political block together as they are in majority i.e. 85 percent of total 
population. Therefore, they started with the aim to forai a 'Bahujan Samaj' which 
would be only possible by Vati Todo Samaf movement (means caste-annihilation) 
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because of the presence of untouchability. However, the main aim of Bahujan 
Movement has been the struggle against unouchability?"* 
But the main aspect i.e. closely related with untouchability is the caste 
structure in India. Untouchability has its roots in caste system. Though India is the 
world's largest democracy with 16% of the world population, hiiving sufficient 
agriculture, increased literacy rate from 18.33 in 1951 to 55.21 in 1991, world's tenth 
industrialized country and sixth nation to have gone to outer space, yet in spite of all 
these development India is still facing the caste problem which is a threat to ideals of 
Indian constitution: "'Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity". ' Indian society being 
a caste-ridden society, represents a social hierarchy whereby restrictions or privileges 
may be afforded to diflferent classes of people according to their heredity. Caste as the 
syst3m of social and economic governance is based on principles and customary rules 
that: 
ii. Involve the division of people into social groups (castes) where 
assignments of rights are determined by birth; 
iii. The assignment of basic right among various castes is unequal and 
hierarchical with those at the top enjoying most rights coupled with least 
duties and those at the bottom performing most duties coupled with no 
rights; and 
iii. The system is maintained through the rigid enforcement of social 
ostracism iii case of any deviations. 
This shows that the doctrine of inequality is the core and heart of the caste system. 
Caste system was established by Hindu Priests (Brahmins) 3,000 years ago. 
This system gave dominant position to upper castes and has divided the people into 
foui- 'Varna' (castes): 
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1. Brahmins •• The highest caste 
2. Kshatriyas - Soldiers and Administrators 
3.Vaishyas - Artisan and Commercial Class 
4. Shudras • Farmers and Peasant Class 
This Varna system is based on the iimate qualities of tJie man, such as. Brahmin is 
educated, wise, pure and a master of himself. So, they are engage in studying, 
teaching and protecting the Vedas. While Kshatriya has the courage i.e. why they are 
the guards of wealth, iind protect the masses and are engage in politics. But Vaishya 
perform the duty of agriculture and trade while Shudra work for other as slaves. But 
not everyone has a caste. There is a section of society who is out of this caste-system 
or \^ama order. They aire known as untouchables. Thus, the primary feature of caste is 
the idea of hierarchy. Here hierarchy means inequality. And untouchability is an 
inecjuaiity because they are excluded from the society since ages and have been the 
most downtrodden and oppressed people.^^ However, being the out of the castes, they 
are termed as 'Outcastes* and also known by different names such as: 'Harijans' by 
Gandhi, means children of God, 'Avarrim' meaning worst of the earth, 'Depressed 
Class' given by British during colonial days in 1919, and the 'Scheduled Castes' given 
by the Indian Constitution. But now, a new term as been included 'Dalit', it is derived 
from Sanskrit word 'Dal' which means split, break and crack etc. This word was 
firstly coined by Dr. B.R Ambedkar. Now, 200 million untouchable people, today 
they call themselves Dalit, a new name for those who demand their share in the nation 
building. This is not only a name but 'an expression of hope and identity' for the 
recovery of their past identity which has been lost because of the oppression by upper 
castes for centuries. Thus, the term Dalit has a positive meaning. Dalits constitute the 
20 percent of Indian population, are considered as untouchables as a result of the 
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Hindu concept of "ritual pollution and purity". In Varna system Brahmins are 
considered as most ritually pure while Dalits are not, in the category of pure one they 
are considered as the most polluted. 
In fact, untouchability has been a matter of shame for centuries which is the 
greatest curse of Indian social system. The practice of untouchabilit]>' is based on the 
idea of touch. The creams of the twice-born are sacred or pure because they are 
insulated from the touch of the 'other'. On the other hand the idea of touch assigns 
negative power to the untouchables who are subjected to be untouched. For them 
untouchability has become like a poison weapon because it creates anxiety among 
them for the sacred or pure bodies. Untouchables are not only excluded from the 
society but lack many of the basic services and legal protection which are available to 
the rest of the society like they are treated worse than animal. Denied access to water, 
food, health care, housing and clothing etc. Those, who fall outside the caste system, 
are' considered "lesser human beings", "impure" and thus "polluting" to other caste 
groups. They are known to be 'untouchable' and subjected to so called 
'untouchability' practices in both public and private spheres.^ ^ Here, it may said that 
"God made man, and men made boundaries''.^ ^ 
Therefore, vaiious efforts have been made by government for the eradication 
of the practice of untouchability, and to protect the Dalits from atrocities. In post 
independence period, for which constitution promised equal protection of laws to the 
lowliest and has forbidden untouchability and made free access to all places of public 
resiorts, a fundamental right. Some articles, which deal with the removal of 
untouchability and provide special provisions for the welfare of this section of 
society, are: 
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ARTICLE 15 (2): slates that citizens will not be disable, liable, restricted or 
conditioned on the grounds of religion, race, sex, place of birth or any of them with 
regard to shops, public restaurants, hotels and public entertainment places, and use of 
wells, tanks, roads and public resort etc which are maintained by the state funds 
wholly or partly. 
ARTICLE 17: has abolished the practice of untouchability in any form and it shall be 
punishable offence in accordance with law. 
ARTICLE 19: states that no one will he denied in getting admission, in any 
educational institutions which are receiving aid out of state funds, on the basis of 
religion, race, caste, liuiguage or any of them. 
ARTICLE 23: prohibits the beggar and forced labor. 
Besides these articles, there are other Acts made by the parliament also, for the 
removal of untouchabilitj^ : 
Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955 (PCR): made by Parliament known as 
'Untouchability Offences Act" 1955 to give effect to Article-17. But this act was 
amended in 1976 and renamed as ''Protection of Civil Rights Act" 1955. 
Prevention of Atrocities Act (POA) 1989: is known as "Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes (PCR) Act- 1989" which came into effect from 30 December, 1990 
to stop the atrocities on SCs and STs.^ "* Atrocities are an official category of crime in 
India defined by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act, 1989. The act defines atrocities as crimes such as: 
• Forcing Dalits to eat obnoxious substances; 
• Dumping excreta or carcasses in Dalit premises. Assaulting a Dalit woman 
with intent to dishonor or outrage her modesty; 
• Using a position of dominance to sexually exploit a Dalit woman; 
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• Parading Dalits naked or with painted face or body; 
• Forcing Dalits to do forced or bonded labor; 
• Dispossessing Dalits of their land and forcing Dalits from their homes; 
• Preventing Dalits from voting etc.^ ^ 
The recent example of this act is of 'Mahendra Singh Tikait 's arrest under 
?0A. act in April 2008, when Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) leader, M. Singh Tikait 
passed the casteist remarks against Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, Maiyawati that her 
democracy as 'Rifsaltanfra'. And he criticized her for reign of terror ajjainst her rivals. 
She does not allow ainyone to talk openly and characterized her govenmient as 
'dictatorship'. Because of majority rule she is behaving like a dictator. We (farmers) 
are not getting adequate prices for sugar crop and do not get electoricity and water 
facilities. All these hsive been said by Tikait in a farmer's rally in Bijnore on 31 '^ 
March, 2008. So, a case under SCs, STs, and Afrocities (Prevention) Act was 
registered against him and arrested on 2"** April, 2008 afler his surrender admitted that 
this was a mistake, Mayawati is like my daughter. 
Thus, untouchability related offences are to be registered under the PCR Act 
while atrocity related offences are to be covered under the POA Act, Besides these 
two Acts Constitution has also a provision under Article-338 to appoint ^Special 
Officer' to investigate all the matters which are related with the safeguards provided 
to the SCs and STs. Md after investigation he has to report to the President of hidia. 
However, on November 18, 1950 a special officer for SCs and STs was appointed as 
'Commissioner'. But in 1978 a broad based multi- member bodj^  was thought to 
re]3lace the Commissioner. However, in 1990 Article-338, which was already 
amended two times:46* Amendment Bill 1978 and 51*' Amendment Bill 1979, was 
once again amended as 65th Amendment Act-1990 and came into effect on March 12, 
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1992 and government became enable to setup the "National Commission For SCs 
and STs." In this way, it has been compulsory for the union and states governments 
to consult the commission on all major policy matters which affect the SCs and STs, 
according to Article-338(9). And under Article- 338 (5) (c) it is said that commission 
is required to participate and advise on the planning process of socio-economic 
development of SCs and STs and to evaluate it.^ ^ 
However, under these special Constitutional provisions, a number of special 
practices which are considered proper under Manu's laws (Hindu Law Giver) became 
illegal. Such as he denied the access to education for untouchables but now it is a law. 
Under Article-46, it is said that 'State shall promote the educational and economic 
interest of the weaker section particularly of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
and protect them from social injustice and exploitation.' 
Though a number of provisions and laws, have been made under Indian 
Constitution, for the protection of Dalits (SCs) from untouchability and for their 
upliftment, yet atrocities are still continued on them. They are still exploited, 
oppressed and discriminated, even after the social and political mobilization of 
untouchables. Dr. Ambedkar, Kanshi Ram and Mayawati etc. are the great examples 
of untouchable leaders. And their government has been formed in states like Uttar 
Praidesh. Mayawati, a leader of BSP which won 91 seatf» out of 403 £tssembly seats in 
the 2002 elections with a share of 33.6 percent, has been Chief Minister for two terms. 
Now in 2007 Assembly elections BSP has won 206 majority in Uttar Pradesh, yet 
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Dalits still suffer from social and economic backwardness. They are being exploited 
physically also, of wliich the recent example is of a six years old girl who was thrown 
into a fire by a 18 years old youth as she was passing through a road which is 
supposedly to be used only by upper castes people in Mathura on 30* April, 2008.^ ^ 
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Another recant example of caste based discrimination is, of a survey or finding 
of education resource society, partner organi:jation of CRY "Child Right and Youth" 
of 22 primary schools in eight districts of Uttar Pradesh, including Allahabad and 
Kaushambi in 2006-07. In this survey it is found that caste based discrimination is 
still exists in schools. At Manjhanpur blocks in Kaushambi district and three schools 
in Shankhargarfi and Jasra in Allahabad district, children were forced to face caste 
based discrimination on the basis of which they were allotted seats in the classroom. 
The caste factor is very prominent in these schools. Suich as the general category 
children were made to sit in the front row, followed by OBCs and Scheduled Castes 
(SCs). This discrimination has resulted into the dropout rate of children 46 percent in 
200 schools including Allahabad and Kauskimbi districts.'''^  
Thus, according to the SCRB- "State Crime Records Bureau" the crime 
against Scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh has been 2821 in 2003 and 3785 in 2004 
whereas ""National Crime Records Bureau^ (NCRB) has estimated that in 2005 
Uttar Pradesh recordol the highest number of crimes against Scheduled Castes in 
country with 4, 397 crises which is 16.8 percent of all crimes committed against the 
SCs in the country. '^National Scheduled Castes Commission*' (NSCC) has 
estimated 45 percent incidents of poverty among SCs in Uttar Pradesh. 
Table No. 4: Number of Cases/ Crimes against SCs in Uttar Pnidesii 
Bureaus 
State Crime Records Bureau 
National Crime Records Bureau 
Year 
2003 
2004 
2005 
No. Cases 
2821 
3785 
4397 
41 Source: Frontline, D&xmbet 29,2006, pp. 12-13. 
38 
An important aspect which is related with untouchability is the Dalit's quit 
Hinduism and their conversion to other religions: Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and 
Sikhism. The practice of untouchability or discriminatory nature of Hindu religion is 
responsible for this phenomenon, because untouchables see conversion as a means of 
escapijig from the caste-system. They are so discriminated that when a Dalit attempts 
to buy a drink from a street vendor, he or she is often forced to purchase a separate 
clay cup so that it cannot be reused. Even to get water from the well they have to wait 
for a higher person. The Dalit Human Rights Monitor gave one account of 30 Dalit 
homes which were burned by mob because government had given them land.'*'^  
However, in protest of their treatment by hij>her castes, thousands and 
thousands of Dalits have been converted. Many untouchables have been converted to 
Buddhism. The great example in this context is of Dr. B.R. Ambedkjir. In his views, 
religion should be judged by social standards and be based on social ethics. But Hindu 
religion is nothing but a multitude of commands and prohibitions. He belonged to the 
Mahar Community of Maharashtra, an untouchable. In initial yeairs, he criticized 
Hinduism and wanted to reform it rather than reject it ais he worked for temple entry 
for untouchables in 1920s. According to Ambedkar, "Religion should be judged by 
social standards and be based on social ethics. But he said, "What is called religion 
by the Hindus," he noted, "is nothing but a multitude of commands and prohibitions." 
But in 1935, he declared that "/ was born in Hindu religion but J will not die as 
Hindu." So on 14* October, 1956 he converted to Buddhism in Nagpur. He said that 
Buddhism as an excellent for untouchables because it contained all communism's 
violent methods. In converting to Buddhism, imtouchables reject all Hindu Gods and 
ritiials. However, like Ambedkar many untouchables have converted to Buddhism. By 
1951, Ambedkar urged his followers to convert to Buddhism. Conversion to 
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Buddhism was an attempt to build a conscious non-Hindu identity for depressed 
classes (SCs),'*^  its example is the case of the Chamars of Uttar Pradesh. They clahned 
that they are descended from Kshatriya (warriors) caste. On the old logic of 
'Sanijkritisation,' they gave the logic that their name 'Jata^'' is a deformation of Yadav 
which is the name of the Kshatriya dynasty founded by Krishna. Thus, they believe in 
this myth history and they did not reject tlie caste system but they wanted to seek 
recojpiition as Kshatriya within this caste-system. But they did not get recognition. At 
the same time they were influenced by Ambedkar in 1940s so much that they took 
initiative to form new parties like 'Jatav Mahasabha' in Agra, 'Chamar Mahasabha' 
in Kanpur etc. and they converted to Buddhism which brought the feeling of solidarity 
among them."^  
Besides Buddhism, many untouchables have been converted to Islam because 
Islam is an egalitarian reUgion through which they want to escape from the cruelties 
of the Brahminical order. Yet despite their conversion, their overall economic 
condition did not improve much. Regarding the conversion to Islam, there are two 
views; 
Firstly, Islam was forced by Muslims rulers who spread the Islam; 
Secondly, conversion to Islam took place by Sufis, Saints who sanctified and 
legitimized folk religious and cultural practices.'*^ 
Thus, Dalits have been converted to Islam and had voiced their rebellion 
against oppressive Brahminical system by converting to Islam. "Sacliiar Committee" 
(organized by Manmohan Singh Government to examine the social and educational 
status of the Muslhns Community) on the basis of its research, it identified three 
social segments of Indian Muslims: 
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l.Ashraf: Muslims who converts from Hindu upper castes or have 
foreign blood. 
2. Ajifafs: These Muslims are similar to that of Hindu OBCs. 
3. Anals: They are converts from 'untouchables' Hindu communities. 
However, the term *DalU Muslims' is used to denote these Muslim castes 
converted from Hindu untouchables.'*^ Ali Anwar has used the words like 
Pasmanda'- downtrodden and backward; and 'Dalit' for Dalit Muslims. And he 
included the castes like: Bhatiyara, Tikyafarosh, Itafiirosh, Halalkhor, Khakrob, 
Magalzada and Chirimars. Thus, an overwhelming majority of Indian Muslim 
population come from the lower Hindu castes to escape from social prosecution and 
the oppressive socio-economic disabilities. However, they attracted towards Islam 
because of its egalitarian nature. Though they gave up' their religion (Hindu) and 
adopted Islam, yet they could not get social equality because Indiaji Muslims also 
have castes in practice. When Muslims came to India then Indian casites system also 
influenced the Muslims in this way that converts from Hindu untouchables brought 
castes system with them in Islam. Though their socio-economic conditions improved 
but remain worst than the SCs, because after independence the backward section of 
society was identified by the government and the provisions were made in the 
Constitution for the special treatment to improve their socio- economic conditions. 
These sections are: 
• Scheduled Castes (SCs) 
• Scheduled Tribes (STs) 
• Other Backward Classes (OBCs) 
In this context various compensatory (positive) discrimination policies are 
made for these categories in the sphere of job, education and development. But the 
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problem towards Dalit Muslims is that they are not included in the SCs list because it 
is restricted to the Hindus, BuddMst and Sikhs, not for Muslims and Chiistians.'*^ 
Untouchables have not only converted to Buddhism and Islam but Christianity 
also. Because of their Scheduled Castes origin they are known as Dalit Christian in 
Chris;tian Community. So, they are denied equal status among Christians. Dalit 
Christians are twice discriminated group: 
Firstly, they are discriminated in general as they are not original Christians; 
Secondly, they are not benefited from those provisions which are made for Hindu, 
Buddhist and Sikh SCs in the Constitution, whereas people of Christiiin origin claim 
that Dalit Christians are benefiting from Christianity. But it is not true because they 
are still treated as untouchables and are known as Dalit Christians'^ Christianity is a 
part of Indian society which is predominantly Hindu. Moreover, the Scheduled Castes 
com'erts constitute to about 80% of around 21 million Christians in India. All non -
Hindu religions of India profess egalitarianism. But the practice differs widely from 
the preaching. However, the most important reason responsible for the prevalence of 
caste structure among Christians is conversion from Hinduism. The untouchables, 
whoi constitute aroimd 80% of the Christians, are not treated as equals by the converts 
from the upper castes. They are underrepresented in the church which is dominated by 
the upper castes converts. 
However, the caste evil though originated from Hinduism has infiltrated into 
Islam, Christianity and Sikhism and other communities, although it has no place in 
them. About this prevailed caste- system, the Supreme Court, in its historic verdict in 
Mandal Commission case, observes that "Even among Sikhs, Muslims, and Christians 
casteism prevails in varying degrees in practice, their preaching notwithstanding. 
Casteism has thus been the bone of the entire Indian society, the difference is its 
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rigidity being of a degree varying from religion to religion and from region to 
region/^ Though they have been converted, yet they continue to be referred to by 
tiieir caste names. 
Thus, various untouchables have been converted to Islam and Christianity but 
they are not included in the category of 'Scheduled Castes' and demsinds have been 
mad(; for this. But there is a difficulty related to Scheduled Castes converts to Islam 
and Christianity, because 'Scheduled Castes' is a legal and administrative term 
denoting castes among Hindus, Sikhs and Neo-Buddhists who possess some 
attributes: 
1. Those who are engaged in traditional defiling occupation; 
2. Those who are excluded from the main residential areas within localities; 
3. Untouchability is practiced against them by other castes people who are 
ritually superior. 
However, Muslim Dalits and Christian Dalits axe not included in the SCs 
categories, which create various problems for them. Such as, there is a case of Mukesh 
Kumar who converted to Islam and changed his name as Mohanumad Sadiq and 
whose wife elected as Sarpanch on a reserved seat in village in Uttar Pradesh and she 
wanted to follow her husband's religion and became a Muslim. But the problem arises 
when she would have to resign from her post because as per law Dalit Muslims and 
Christians are not considered Scheduled Castes (SCs) by the state. Therefore, this 
case shows that how Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians are not benefited from the 
SCs provisions. They are not only denied for reservation benefits but also from other 
benefits such as development programs, scholarships and hostel for student, reserved 
seats in educational institutions, special laws against atrocities on Dalits such as, PCR 
Act, POA Act etc.^ " 
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However, Muslims (15%), Christians and Sikhs (5%) did not come from 
outside the India. At least 90% of its followers are untouchables, Tribals and 
Backward Castes because they see conversion as the powerful weapon to liberate 
them and after conversion they feel liberated and powerful. This feeling has created 
fear among the Brahmin rulers that, "their majority religion would become a micro-
minority religion." So, because of this fear Hindutva forces are opposing the 
reservation of Dalit Muslims and Dalit Christians. This fear is that if SCs, STs 
reservation are extended to the converts, it not only leadl to the majority conversion 
from Hindus, but converted Dalits would join hands with non-converted Dalits and 
this would pose a threat to the Brahminical rule in India.^ ' 
In this way, the issue of untouchable's conversion to other religion is much 
mor<j related with the practice of untouchability by upper caste Hindus and the 
removal of unouchability has been the objective ofBahujan Samaj. It is only because 
of untouchability and inequality in Hindu religion that great political leaders like 
Amijedkar, Kanshi Ram, and Mayawati etc. have converted to Buddhism and Sikhism 
and their conversion has been followed by other untouchables in majority. 
Caste Based Mobilization: AS A Strategy to Gain Political Power: 
Caste is a very peculiar aspect of Indian society and it is a very old and 
prominent basis of social, stratification. It has influenced the political process from 
top to bottom as it plays a centi-al role in Indian politics which has two aspects such 
as: 
1. Castisation of politics 
2. Politicization of Castes 
Castisation of politics means the influence of caste on politics which is 
reflected in various forms: the alignment of castes with political parties, political 
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awar(;ness and participation of castes in politics, voting behavior of different castes, 
emergence of various political parties to serve the interests of a piirticular caste, 
mobilization of party workers on caste lines and emergence of caste leaders etc, 
whereas the politicization of castes means the influence of politics on castes. Politics 
has siffected the castes through the utilization of politics for furthering the interest of 
castes, raising social status through political mobility and securing various benefits for 
caste; members through political connections. Thus, in this way, a kind of relationship 
exists between caste and politics as both help each other. Such as castes help the 
political parties in winning seats in the elections while political power helps castes in 
achieving higher social, economic, educational and occupational status in society. 
The role of castes may be divided into two phases after independence: 
1. In first phase, upper castes dominated the political power; 
2. In second phase, lower castes and masses in general mobilized.''^  
The most important feature of second phase has t>een that it h£is expanded the 
democracy through the participation of lower castes in political affairs. Besides it 
their interests are also articulated which could not be articulated under the Nehru era. 
And the main factor, which is responsible for this participation of lower castes, is the 
mass mobilization, particularly in Uttar Pradesh which is the site of the most recent 
phase of political democratization in India. 
Uttar Pradesh is the largest state in India and one of the most socially and 
economically backward states in North India. The caste and class structure of Uttar 
Pradesh is also different such as: twice bom castes are of 20 percent of the population, 
indeed, Brahmins alone account for over 10 percent of tlie entire Bratimin category in 
India and they dominate the caste hierarchy. The backward and other backward 
claijses (OBCs) account for 35-40 percent of the population. They are divided into 
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various sub-castes including one extreme and dominant landowning peasant castes 
and at other extreme, the many poor artisani and service castes living just above the 
poverty line. These include the wealthy Yadavs, and the poor service castes. The 
poorer jatis among them are known as the 'Most Backward Classes' (MBCs), they 
constitute 26 percent of population. At last at the bottom of hierarchy there are 
untouchables known as Scheduled Castes (SCs) who perform the most menial jobs 
and the majority of them are dependent upon wage labor.^ ^ However, the caste 
comjjosition in Uttar Pradesh is as follows: 
Brahmins - 11 percent 
Thakurs - 9 percent 
Vaishyas - 4 percent 
Kayasthas - 1 percent 
Jats and Bhumihars - 4 percent 
Muslims - 16 percent 
Scheduled Castes - 22 percent ^^ 
Uttar Pradesh is a highly politicized state where politics means capture of 
power. There are two forces which influence the state politics are: 
1. Hindu Nationalism 
2. Parties of lower castes and classes 
In Uttar Pradesh lower castes and classes have been mobilized politically in 
three different ways: peasant politics, reservation politics and social engineering of 
strategy of Hindu Nationalism to counter the influence of lower ca5>te challenge of 
upper castes control. Hindu nationalist party is BJP in Uttar Pradesh which try to win 
pov/er by exploiting division between lower castes parties in Uttar Pradesh. 
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Uttar Pradesh was dominated by upper castes earlier. Nearly 20 percent of the 
upper castes population was over-represented in political sphere, education and 
professions, business and in employment etc. But the increased participation of lower 
castes started and the decline of Congress also took place which was only because of 
the mass-mobilization. This process of mass mobilization was started since 1960s 
with economic and political shift. At this time government shifted its attention of 
development policy from industrial growth to the ajjricultural production with 
technological change and price incentives. The effect of this shift was the rising 
prosjperity of sections of the peasantry who belonged to the intermediate and 
backward castes. In 1970s these groups began to enter legislative assemblies in large 
numbers and posed a serious challenge to the Congress power. This was the first type 
of mobilization of lower castes. And second type of mobilization took place in the 
form of reserved quotas in government. Reservation was seen as the only way of 
securing representation for groups m political process and public employment. The 
strategy, which was associated with these reserved quotas;, is caste politics. This caste-
politics was strengthened with the influence of BSP which was found in 1984 with 
aim to mobilize the lower castes by promising them a shsire of political power by their 
own caste or community members.^ ^ 
The emergence of Bahujan Samaj Party in electoral politics iji Uttar Pradesh 
has introduced a new discourse as Kanshi Ram the founder of BSP put the caste in 
politics because earlier caste influenced the ticket distiibution, reservation for SCs, 
STs and OBCs. But with the origin of BSP, caste has tecome as an ideology of the 
party. Here, Kanshi Ram's new paradigm is based on the notion that SCs, STs and 
OBCs constituting 'bahujans' (majority). Therefore, they should unite to come into 
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power. In this way Kanshi Ram's Bahujan Samaj Party came into existence on the 
'bahuijan' formula based on castes on 14th April, 1984. 
But at its initial stage, tliere was a problem of 'Other Backward Classes' 
(OB(^ s) in projecting this new formula of Kanshi Ram because OBCs were not 
conscious of its political potential. They did not have faith in this bahuji-in formula and 
its possibility of electoral constituency but few factors, which changed the OBCs 
perception towards bahujan ideology and forced them to fonri the bahujan 
constituency, these are: 
1. Implementation of Mandal Commission Report in 1990 by V.P. Singh 
Government; 
2. The Anti-Mandal response of the upper-castes youth supported by interested 
political parties.^ *' 
OBCs constitute the largest chunk of the society nationally and in most of the 
states and Union Territories. The OBCs "Other Backward Classes" are legal-
constitutional category who is striving to obtain acceptance of the independent social 
identity. The term 'OBC was not used in the Indian Constitution until the amendment 
of i'^icle-SSS until OBCs were a part of Weaker Sections (Article-46) or SEBCs 
Article 15(4) under Article-15(4) or BCCs under Article-16(4). Several consideration 
have been made that only communities which are above the SCs, STs and below the 
twice bom in ritual hierarchy among the Hindus termed as 'Shudras' are OBCs. But 
this consideration has been criticized that only Shudras constitute the OBCs category. 
Most middle castes in most of the states are termed as OBCs, yet it is not universally 
applied in the case of all states and Union Territories. However, identification of 
castes and communities as OBCs and their listing in OBCs list has been a matter of 
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debate;. In post-independence period Commissions have been setup to indicate criteria 
of identification of OBCs. These Commissions are: 
1. Kalelkar Commission 
2. Miindal Commission 
Thus, the reactions, aroused fi-om the decision of VP Singh Government to 
implement the Mandal Commission report gave an opportunity to OBCs and SCs to 
come closer. Because the caste based identities play an important role in democratic 
India in the formation of identities and alliances. And provision of reservation, for 
particular castes for which backward commissions were established, turned to an 
instnmient for the fight against 'social injustice' and advance of the weiik.^ ^ 
However, Kanshi Ram strategy of bahujan unity based on caste ideology came 
into (2xistence with OBCs inclusion in Post-Mandal Commission period. And Bahujan 
Samaj Party has supported OBCs for their reservation also. Such as 104* 
Coastitutional Amendment bill 2005, passed by both Houses of Parliament, (Rajya 
Sabha and Lok Sabha) for amending the Article 5 and has included clause (5) to 
provide reservation for OBCs, SCs and STs in unaided educational institutions other 
than minority educational institutions. During the debate on this bill BSP Members of 
Parliament (MPs) have supported the Bill. Favoring this bill, MP fi-om BSP, Satish 
Chandra Mishra said during debate in parliament that this Bill aims to ensure social 
justice to the SCs, STs and Backward Classes people. And unless social justice is 
given, there is no question giving political and economic justice to them. If proper 
education, is not given to these people, they would be deprived of god and proper jobs 
and livelihood and also be deprived from political justice etc.^ ^ 
Another issue, which proved helpftil to Kanshi Ram's new concept of bahujan 
unity was the Mandir- Masjid issue i.e. Ayodhya issue. This Masjid- Mandir issue is 
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related with the Babri masjid i.e. one of the largest mosque in Ayodhya in UP. This 
was constracted by the first Mughal emperor of India, Babar in 16* century. Babri 
masjid has been a source of Hindu extremist mobilization for the last 20 years. But 
Hindus claim that Babri masjid was built where the Ramjanam bhocmi temple was 
once located. Mosque has been used by Muslims as a prayer site for hundreds of 
years. In 1949, Hindu activists replaced it with Rama temple and pilaced status of 
inside the mosque. And state government sealed it but in 1986 mosque was reopened 
by a lower court at the request of Hindu Nationalist "Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)" 
to allow Hindu to worship. In 1990, Lai Krishna Advani, a top member of the 
Bhajratiya Janata Peuty (BJP) began a campaign tour a Rath Yatra build support for a 
Ran-ia temple at the mosque site. However, mosque as destroyed on 6th December, 
1992 by a crowd of nearly one million activist (Karsevaks) of thie VHP, which 
occurred at the end of Advani's Rath Yatra. This destmction was followed by the 
Central goverrmient rule in UP at 6 pm on 6* December, 1992. This demolition of 
Babri mosque led to the communal riots between Hindus and Muslims across India. 
During the following weeks riots spread throughout the countryside, killing some 
1700 people. Since then, the militant "All India Babri Masjid Movement Action 
Cotnmittee" (AIBMAC) and other extremist Muslims groups have been campaigning 
to rebuild the mosque at the same site whereas "Vishwa Hindu Parishad" (VHP) has 
been moving with the plans to build a Rama temple there. 'In December, 2002 the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad announced that it would constnict the temple in a year and a 
half. Even Prime Minister, Vajpayee said during election campaigning in Himachal 
Pradesh that he believed that Babri mosque is existed on the site of a temple, in 2003. 
While the Congress Party was continues stance so that the Hindu vote could not be 
aliiiate.^ ^ However, the Babri mosque is central issue which has left thousands dead in 
50 
India in the last 50 years. And the Ramjanam bhoomi temple mobilization divided the 
BJPs remarkable growth of support in North India in the 1991 elections. 
Thus, because of the Mandir- Masjid issue, the Minorities (Muslims) have 
realized that they are not secure in aggressive Hindutva politics. Muslhns in Uttar 
Pradesh closely linked with Mulayam Singh party for their security from Hindu 
commercial politics. The BIP's Hindutva politics- Ram Rajya -contributed in 
strengthening SP and BSP in UP politics. Samajwadi Party of Mulayam Singh Yadav 
based on OBCs support and Bahujan Samaj Party of Kanshi Ram (BSP) combined 
together to form the government in UP against BJP and Muslims joined SCs, STs and 
OBClls party in order to got security from BJP's Hindutva politics because Muslim did 
not have any other option. 
This situation dividend between Hindu- Muslim; and Mandir- Masjid issue 
gav<; an opportunity to Kanshi Ram's formula of bahujanisation. Because India is 
basically a caste society and because of the Hindutva slogan of one religion, one 
nation provide enough ground to the Dalii- Bahujan to assert their autonomy from 
Hindutva as Dalit- Bahujans were never an integral part of Hindu religion. And 
Kanshi Ram understood reality that caste is much more emotional issiue than rehgion 
in India. So, he gave the slogan of "Jail Todo, Samaj Jodo " (break the caste and unite 
the society). It is the caste on the basis of which one is being treated as untouchable. 
Knjishi Ram said that caste must be made a double edged knife, in first phase, lower 
castes must achieve power by creating socio-economic base for than which is possible 
only through capturing political power through elections. Kanshi Ram has used tiie 
concept 'bahujan' rather than 'Dalit' in order to create the bjise for political 
empowerment. Thus, converting caste into an ideology and capturing political power 
by the bahujan through parliamentary means is an important development in Indian 
.51 
political system. This new formula of caste ideology hjis challenged the Hindutva 
School which is trying to appeal to the sense of religious community whereas Dalit-
Bahiijan force is trying to appeal to the sense of caste community.^ '^ ' Thus, Kanshi 
Ram began a new phase in Indian political history with the concept the only through 
the mobilization of Dalit- Bahujan forces with caste annihilation objective, fast 
spreading Hindu ideology can be contained.*' 
Bahujan Samaj Party's ideology is caste, based on Dalit- Bahujan unity, BSP 
is a party of not only Dalits (SCs) but STs, OBCs and Minorities. The growing 
support of BJP reflects the important of caste based politics. BSP's strategy is 
building support among Backward Classes, Scheduled Tribes and Muslim as well as 
Dalits. It is a Dalit based political party in UP where a number of Dalit castes exist: ^^ 
Table No. 5: List of Scheduled Castes in Uttar Pradesh 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Agaria/Agariya 
Badhi/Badi 
Bhalia/Bahaliya 
Baiswar 
Bajaniya/Bajania Nat 
Bajgi 
Balahar 
Balahi/Balai 
Bandi 
Bansphor 
Barwar 
Basor 
Bawaria/Bauria/Bawariya 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
Bhantu 
Bhui)'a Boria 
Chamar, Ramadaria 
Jatava/Chamar 
Chero, Chura 
Debgar 
Dhanuk/Dhanak 
Dharkar 
Dhaba/Dhupi 
DomTDumar/Mahasha 
Domar 
Dosadh 
Dusadh/Dusadh 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
Gond 
Habura 
Hela/Mehtar 
Kandra/Kandra 
Karimpalan 
IGiawar 
Kol 
Korama 
Kori/Koli 
Korwa 
Lalbegi 
Majhwar/Manjhi 
Mushhar 
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14. 
15. 
Bedia/Beriya 
Pari 
29. 
30. 
Pankha/Panika 
Ghari/Ghariya 
44. 
45. 
Neo-Buddist 
Pimkha Parahiya 
Pasi 
~5r 
Source: Swapna H. Samel, "Ri^t of Dalits", Serial, New Delhi (2006). p. 206. 
A Meeting of 'Gond Adivasi Committee' far Increasing Reservation Quota: There 
was a meeting of 'Gond Adivasi Committee' on Sunday 14* July, 2008 as per the 
news of Amar Ujala 14* July, 2008. In this meeting it v^ a^s said that 8% reservation 
provision has been given by the administration to the Scheduled Castes people. And 
two castes: Gond and Kori and after that Kharwar were included in the list of 
Scheduled Castes in 1997. This increased the number of Scheduled Castes up to 66. 
But in spite of increased number of Scheduled Caste, the reservation percentage is not 
incrfjased. Because of this the people from this section aire not benefited from various 
gov(;mment schemes. Such as the students from Gond caste are not receiving 
scholarship which is affecting the education of these student.^ "* 
Though Bahujan Samaj Party is Dalit based political party, yet is has been 
most successful in building support among the Dalit Chamar leather worker caste ui 
North India. Apart from various Dalit (SCs) castes in Uttar Pradesh, BSP's core group 
has been the Chamar which is the largest untouchable class of North India. 
Kamshi Ram, the leader of untouchables, was also a Chamar. He was bom in a 
Raedasia family m rural Punjab in Khwaspur village in Ropar District, converted to 
Sikhism. Another example of Chamar leader of BSP is Mayawati who belongs to 
Badalpur village of Ghaziabad district in Uttar Pradesh. But she studied in Meerut a 
town of UP where she completed her BA and B. Ed and L.L.B from Delhi. She was 
also a school teacher in 1997. During this year, she met with Kanshi Ram who 
persuaded her to enter into politics. In 1984 she left job and joined BSP. And she has 
been successfiil as a politician as she has been Chief Minister (CM.) of UP two times 
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in IS'95 and 2002-03 and in 2007 election also. However, because of her successful 
career, she is projected as a source of pride by BSP. She 'lias become am icon and she 
also adept at manipulating symbols especially the pan Dalit symbol i.e. Ambedkar. 
Agra. University has been renamed as Dr. Bhim Rao Amibedkar and Mahamaya (the 
motlter of Buddha) and Agra stadium has been renamed as 'Eklavya.' These two 
examples of BSP leaders from Chamar Community in UP who are also known as 
'Jatav' in UP. 
Being the largest untouchable caste, Chamars constitute 56.6 percent of 
population of UP in 1991. They have given the namie, Jatav from 'Yadav' the 
founding father of Kshatriya dynasty. This reflects their craze for sasnkritization. 
They wanted to the acceptance of their identity within the caste structure, not 
destroying the caste system. This was the 'Jatav Moveiment', but Ambedkar had a 
great impact on this during 1940. This Ambedkar's influenced lead to the conversion 
from Hinduism to Buddhisim. However, this Buddhist identity hiis replaced the 
Sanskrit kshatriya identity. And they became the strong support of RPI (Republican 
Party of India) of Ambedkar. But later, BSP recaptured the same segments of the 
Dalits population: Chamars (Jatav) which is reflected from this slogan of BSP: 
"Tilak, Taraju Aur Talwar; Inko Maro Jute Char." This slogan states that the 
"Tilak'-Brahmin's symbol, the 'BaIance'-s)Tnbol of merchant castes and 'Talwar'-the 
symbol of warrior castes: hit them with shoes that is the symbol of Chamar who are 
the leather workers. UP's Chamars form the BSP's main group because of their elite 
group, education and modernization. Among various Dalit castes, only Chamars are 
more benefited than any other Dalit castes jmd have been educationally progressed. 
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Table No. 6: Literacy Rate Among Scheduieil Castes 
Years 
1961 
1971 
1981 
1991 
Literacy Rate in Percent - ' 
7.14 percent 
10.2 percent 
15 percent 
27 percent 
Source; S.M. Michael, "Dalits in Modem India", find Edition, Sage, New Delhi (2007), p. 264. 
In this education progress of SCs the most benefited caste is Chamar who are 
not only educationally progressed but modernized also. Earlier, they were mostly 
leather worker but now they have become artisans and traders. And in post 
independence India, the reservation system has lead thousands of Dalit to join 
university and the public service in large number. In UP among h\S> cadres, SCs 
officers form the largest number only after Brahmins and Kyasthas. But these officers 
are denied important posts in the districts as well as the stete level. This denial has led 
the emergence of BSP cadres as Dalit elite who belong to new generation of young 
educated Dalits. Such as in 1993 out of 66 BSP MLAs: 16 had B.A., 7 had M.A.,15 
had an LLB and 1 Ph.D. But three years later out of 67 MLAs, 24 had B.A., two had 
an MA., had LLB and one had M.A. Ph.D. in view of Kanchan Chandra these young 
Dalit elites joined BSP as they find better economic opportunities and higher status in 
politics. Among these new Dalit leaders who captured the most important posts 
within BSP were Chamars. 85 percent of state level posts of BSP in UP were captured 
by Chamars in 1995-96 not by other Dalit castes like Pasis (Pigherders), Balmikis 
(S^veepers), Khatiks (meat-cutters) etc. they also dislike the Chamars because of their 
socio-economic and political potions. In UP Balmikis supports the Congress or the 
BJP. Not only the Chamar leaders joined BSP but most of BSP voters come fi-om 
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Chamars which is reflected from the BSP's voter's percentage in 1996 Vidhan Sabha 
(Legislative Assembly) elections and 1999 and 2004 Lok Sabha elections: 
Table No. 7: Castes and Communities of BSP Voters 
Castes and 
Communities 
Upper Castes 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Bania 
Other 
Intermediate Castes 
OBCs 
Yadav 
Kunni 
Koeri 
Pal/Gadaria 
Other (Lower OBCs) 
Scheduled Castes 
Chjimar 
Pasis 
Others 
Muslims 
Muslim (Low) 
Muslim (high) 
Other 
1996 
Vidhan Sabha 
Elections 
— 
— 
— 
— 
-
4 
27 
— 
19 Peasants 
Artisan 
Others 
65 
5 
Lok Sabha Elections 
1996 
— 
— 
2.9 
2.9 
1.9 
4.3 
— 
24.7 
11.8 
16.7 
14.9 
20.6 
73.8 
45.7 
60.6 
6.5 
3.1 
23.1 
1999 
2 
1 
5 
4 
13 
74 
39 
5 
2004 
5 
4 
10 
11 
9 
Other OBC: 16. 
MBC:17 
71 
10 
Source: S.M. Michael, "Dalits in Modem India", llnd Edition, Sage, New Delhi (2007), p. 266. 
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However, this data shows that in I 996 and 1999, three fourths of Chamar 
votes given to BSP. Though Chamars are the largest untouchable caste and is main 
group of BSP, yet BSP is not confined only to this group. There are other Dalit castes 
also which votes for BSP, such as Pasis voted for BSP more than 45% in 1996 Lok 
Sabha elections and others 66.6 percent. 
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is a paily with Dalit base. But viarious attempts 
have been made by BSP leader for constructing Dalit vote bank in UP, these efforts 
include the special treatment granted to the Dalits by Mayawati, supremo of the BSP. 
These special treatments are: Ambedkar Village Scheme and she has allotted special 
funds for socio-economic development for one year to those villages, which had 50% 
of Scheduled Castes population and Mayawati extended this programme in June 1995 
to thiose villages having 22-3 percent SC population. In 1997-98, 10 were related with 
30 ]3ercent SC population or more, in each assembly constituency. Thus, 25434 
villages were included in the Ambedkar Village Scheme, and in villages roads, hand 
pun:ips and houses etc. were built. When Mayawati came back to power in 1997, the 
Ambedkar Villages Programme (AVP) was revived under the direct supervision of 
Chief Minister (CM) with this statement that she was focusing her attention on "one 
section of society, 'Dalits' under this AVP, Rs: 3500 million covered 11, 000 
villages.^ ^ 
Lack of Developmental Work in Ambedkar ViUages: 
After coming into power BSP government has issued various orders for the 
developmental work in Ambedkar Villages in UP In spite of these orders the 
conditions in Ambedkar Villages are not satisfactory. Such {ts in Belwania 
Kishunpali, village in Deoria district, where Indira Awas, drinking water, clean 
toilets, roads and ration cards are still not available to the poor families. There is also 
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the problem of electricity in the village and they live in darkness. Besides these 
students do not get any scholarship, labourers do not have any job card etc.^ ^ 
Construction and Condition of the Roads in Ambedkar Villages: 
Government provides finance for the construction of roads in Ambedkar 
villages. But in reality, the construction works has not completed in most of the 
Amttedkar Villages Uke 'Dehri' in Salempur. In this village department was given 66-
40 kikh rupees for the construction of 3.90 km road. But it is not completed till today, 
while this village was selected as Ambedkar village in 2002-03 and the construction 
was to be completed in December 2007. This is only because of improper functioning 
of thie Department. 
On other hand, government granted 4 lakh 86 thousand rupees for the 
reconstruction of the road in 'Semri' village which was selected as Ambedkar village 
in 2002-03. This work was to be completed in December 2007 but this has completed 
in i4,pril 2008. But the poor condition of the road has proved the comipt construction 
of fhe road because of which it was ruined within two months fi-om the date of its 
completion.^ * 
Ambedkar Vishesh Rojgar Yojna: 
This kind of scheme was started by government, known as 'Ambedkar Special 
Employment Scheme.' Under the provision of this scheme the candidates are given 
36,000 rupees by the department for doing business of paper-plate, decoration, 
funaiture, hak-cutting, clay-pot, dairy, saree-weaving etc. 2% candidates from 
Sclieduled Castes are to be included in this scheme smd administration has given 
12.75 lakh rupees to the department during 2007-08. But only 15 people are benefited 
from this scheme and rests are struggling still for this. It is only because of officer's 
ignorance towards their job that unemployed people, who claimed for receiving 
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money to start their business, are still making efforts. All these reflect that department 
is not working properly. '^ 
Besides these special provisions, 15,000 Ambedkar statues were installed 
throughout UP like Lucknow which cost of Rs. 25,000. ]^ . 1200 Million Ambedkar 
Udhayan (park) with 12 feet tall bronze Ambedkar statue was made in Lucknow. 
'Bahujan Samaj Party is not only the party of Dalits but Other Backward 
Classes (OBCs) and Minorities also as reflected from the party's name. It means BSP 
is the party of OBCs too is proved by their vote and support to BSP in elections. Such 
as in 1996 Lok Sabha (House of Representatives) elections in UP 24.7 percent Koeris 
and 27 percent Kurmis voted for ii Even 9% Yadavs, voted for it in 2004 general 
elections, which are the vote bank of SP ' Samajwadi Party' of Mulayam Singh 
Yadav. Not only Yadav's but non-Yadav and most backward castes (MBCs) also 
voted for BSP 16 percent and 17 percent respectively. In 1999 non-Yadav OBCs 
supjwrted BSP-13 percent. 
Table No. 8: Other Backward Castes (OBCs) Votes for Bahujan Samaj Party 
OBCs 
Yadavs 
Koeris 
Kurmis 
MBCs 
Non Yadav OBCs 
General Elections UP 
1996 
24.7% 
27% 
1999 
13% 
2004 
9% 
17% 
16% 
Source: S.M. Michael, "Dalits in Modem India", llnd Edition, Sage, New Delhi (2007), p. 267. 
From above data it is clear that BSP has also its vote among OBCs. Because it 
is the party of OBCs also who constitute Bahujan Samaj, Kanshi Ram the leader of 
the BSP came with this bahujan formula because he I^ elieved that in a democratic 
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country 'nothing can be achieved only with a particular community. Any organization 
based on one community would fail because democratic processes need majority. This 
strategy of Bahujan Samaj is based on his inspiration from Arabedkar and Phuie; such 
as ^.rabedkar considered that Dalits, Tribes and Backward Castes were 'natural 
allies' against the 'Savarna' upper castes. However, Dalits needed to make alliance 
with these castes. On other hand, Kanshi Ram also influenced with Phule's theory of 
Aryetns from whom upper castes descended Aryans conquered India and brought their 
culture - caste system with them which was not the cultuie of people of Indian origin, 
to whom he called 'Bahujan Samaj' the low castes people. However, Kanshi Ram's 
strategy to come to political power was that, 'in a democracy number of vote form the 
government. And it is Bahujan Samaj who constitutes 85% of vote but the foreign 
Aryijns (upper castes) with 15% vote are ruling over Bahujan Samaj. So, Bahujan 
Samaj should rule as they are in majority. He defined Bahujan Samaj in opposition to 
twice bom upper castes the Savarnas whom he called 'manuwadi.' However, Kanshi 
Ram, the founding leader of BSP, formed the 'Bahujan Samaj Party' of SCs, STs. 
OBCs and Minorities. Kanshi Ram has always defended the interest of OBCs. Even, 
when the debate on the Mandal Commission report was going on, Kanshi Ram 
emphasized the claims of OBCs. For example, during election campaign for Vidhan 
Sabha of Haryana in 1987, he said OBCs are the part oi Bahujan Samaj, even after a 
long period of India's independence this section of society (OBCs) has neither 
recognized nor have been introduced in the legislation for the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. Government is not ready to recognize them. On the basis of 340 
section of the Constitution for the welfare of these people, Kaka Kalelkar and Mandal 
Commissions were appointed but the reports of these Commissions were not 
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recognized by the Central Government on the basis that they had identified 3,743 
castes as OBCs who cannot be recognized as OBCs. 
Kanshi Ram also admitted that the conditions of SCs are better tiian OBCs, in 
some respect because of reservation provision. He said in our country out of 450 
district magistrate more than 125 are from SC/STs but OBCs are very few, though 
they are 50 to 52%. So, reservation is needed m the go\'emment and administration 
because if 52% people cannot participate in government administration then where 
they can participate. This is not true democracy. He also said that in 1994 among 500 
IAS officers in UP, 137 were SCs only 7 OBCs - six of tliem were Yadavs. However, 
by supporting the interest of OBCs, Kanshi Ram wanted to constitute Bahujan Samaj 
by getting support fix)m OBCs. His strategy for getting support of OBCs was 
benefited in such a condition, when Mandal Commission affair was going on. This 
atmosphere helped Kanshi Ram in his strategy of bahujanisation by getting OBCs 
votes during elections in UP. So, one of BSP's slogans has been "Mangal Ayog Lagu 
Karo, Kursi Khali Karo". It means, Mandal Commission's rejjort should be 
implemented or vacate the seat of power. After coming into power Mayawati, in 1995 
announced that OBCs would be benefited from 27 percent of the state budget. Some 
castes at lower stratum of the OBCs known as Most Backward Classiss (MBCs) were 
included in the OBCs list and Nishads (Mallahs or Kewote) were given the privilege 
of hiring plots of sandy land alongside the river.'*^  Another most important recent 
example is of "Rs. 200 crore fee waiver for UP students" by Mayawati government in 
UP 2008, May. Mayawati (then Chief Minister of UP 2008) on Saturday, 24 May said 
that the state cabinet had decided to pay fee of general category students along with 
OBC students who are enrolled in government institutions fi-om class 10* onwards. 
But the government would extend the benefit only to those students with an annual 
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family income is upto Rs. 1 lakh. State government has meide a budgetary provision of 
Rs. 200 crore for this purpose. '^ 
The reason behind this provision was of electoral politics. It means to get the 
votes by these sections of society in coming general elections of 2008 in UP. Thus, 
OBCs constitute a major and important part in BSP which is reflected from their 
presences in party as MLAs from 1989 Assembly elections in UP till today. In 1989 
elections when for the first time BSP MLA were elected, among them 3 were OBCs 
out of 13. Majority of BSP MLAs were not Dalits but Muslim and other castes 
whereas in 1991, the number of BSP MLAs from OBCs increased imd became 11 
ML^ Vs. And in 1993, OBC MLAs of BSP was 44.7 percent more than SCs MLA i.e. 
34.3 while in 1996 elections the percentage of OBC MLAs was 38.6 as against the 
29.5% SC MLAs. In 1996 Assembly elections in UP 34% BSP's candidate were 
OBCs while SCs candidates were only 29%. 
Table No. 9: BSP MLAs from OBCs in UP Assembly Elections 
Years 
1989 
1991 
1993 
1996 
MLAs 
3 (No.) 
11 (No.) 
44.7% 
38.6% 
Source: S.M. Michael, "Dalits in Modem India", Und Edition, Sage, New Delhi (2007), pp. 271-272. 
Not only, BSP MLAs have been OBCs more than SCs but OBCs share in state 
office bearer has been more than Dalits. Even the president of BSP party of UP has 
been OBC for years. Such as Sone Lai Patel (Kurmi) was replaced by Shagwal Pal 
(Gadariya) who was replaced by Daya Ram Pal also a Gadariya. Thus, it is clear that 
most of BSP leaders came from MBCs, not from the dominant BCs like Yadav. 
Thiough Yadavs were important till 1990s but they become the vote bank of BSP's 
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rival party SP 'Samajwadi Party' led by Mulayam Singh Yadav. Samajwadi Party is a 
Yadav dominated party. For the first time BSP and SP came closer in 1993 Assembly 
elections in UP and formed a Coalition Government in UP 1993. But the hostile 
relations were developed between SP and BSP soon because of some reasons firstly, 
BSP felt that there had been Yadavisation of the state by Mulayam Singh Yadav. 
Secondly, Yadavs were improving their social status by keeping SCs in their place. 
So, Dalits agitated which was reacted violently by Yadavs. This led to the fall of SP-
BSP Coalition Government in UP. 
Dalits and OBCs relation has been hostile for years. Because both' interests 
are mostly contradictory in some regions of UP such as in east UP the OBCs and SCs 
labourers have a common enemy, the upper castes elites ex landlords. Untouchables 
in their region are often landless laborers who work for OBC farmers. This raises the 
issue or conflicts about the wages for agricultural laborers and disputes regarding the 
ownership have always been among them.^ ^ The hostile relationship has its roots in 
various land-reforms measures introduced by government after independence. This 
resulted into the absentee land- iordism by 1970s. However, fourth Varna Shudras or 
the resent castes (OBCs) emerged as owner, cultivators whereas untouchables 
remained landless. However, OBCs became a dominjant castes and due to their 
acquired ownership and control over land led to the conflict with the Dalits who 
remained as agricultural landless laboure.'''' As this long run OBCs and Dalits hostile 
relations created and improved the rivalry between SP and BSP; and influenced the 
working of coalition between them in 1993 which is proved by various incidents of 
atrocities or Dalits by OBCs in 1994. Such as on 21'^  January, 1994 a Dalit woman 
was stripped and paraded naked in Dauna, a village 45 km from Allahabad, by gun-
toti'mg gangsters who belonged to OBC community of Kurmis a part of SP vote bank. 
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The reason behind this case was the plot which was allotted officially to Dalit woman 
but it was illegally occupied by Kurnii family. The incidence took place when son of 
Dalit woman claimed for it. And after two days police arrested the K'urmi who was 
guilty. Another incidence was of mass rape of Dalit woman in Hamirpur in Uttar 
Pradesh which led to the clash between Dalits and OBC Kurmis at Fatehpur, followed 
by tlie casteist conflagration in Banaras by killing of a ESP leader. In jjpite of making 
effort by Kanshi Ram and Mayawati to create a socio-political base of SCs and OBCs 
in p£irticular, the clashes and conflicts between them still exist.^ '* 
Besides Dalits and OBCs BSP also represents the Minorities (Muslims) as 
they also suffered from the upper castes oppression. For example Dr. Mahsood 
Ahmed, a temporary lecturer at Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) joined DS-4, 
'Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti' in 1983 to attract the votes from Muslim 
community. Mayawati designated Muslims for receiving the same grants as SCs 
chihiren and she also implemented the recommendation of the UP Backward Classes 
Commission which insisted that low caste Muslims should benefit from reservations 
in tlie state government of 11 July, 1994. Mayawati h&s granted the Muslims 8.44 
percent of the 27 percent of OBCs and 8 percent of police officer posls were reserved 
for Muslims. 
However, Kanshi Ram the founding leader of BSP founded the party with 
casle as an ideology, by uniting these sections of society', known as bahujanisation to 
achieve political power against the Brahminism. Though it is a party of Bahujan 
(Majority People), yet the dominant caste is of Chamars. This hegemony of Chamars 
has divided the SCs votes as Balmikis and Pasis voted for other political parties 
because of the fear fix)m Chamars hegemony in the party, BSP. Though BSP stood 
against the manuwadi (upper castes), yet it changed its caste politics based on the 
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bahuijan castes to broaden its base including the upper castes also. For this party gave 
tickets to the upper caste candidates. Such as during 1999 Lok Sabha elections, it 
nominated 10 upper castes candidates according to their proportion i.e. 12 percent out 
of 85i candidates. As Kanshi Ram believed in the theory of 'Mirror Representation*, 
means assemblies should reflect the composition of the society. That is why he also 
nomiinated the candidates from others castes and communities, duiing 1999 Lok 
Sabha elections, 17 Muslim candidates (20 percent), 20 SCs (23.5 percent) and 38 
OBCs (45 percent). Among 10 upper castes candidates five were Brahmin and five 
Rajputs. In 2002, UP elections tickets were given to 37 Brahmins, 36 FLajputs while in 
200^ [ Brahmins who voted for BSP were only 5% and Rajputs 4%. 
Table No. 10: Upper Castes Candidates of BSP: In Lok Sabha Elections 
Casites 
Bralmiins 
Rajputs 
Bralimins 
Rajputs 
Brahmins 
Rajputs 
75 . 
Year 
1999 
1999 
2002 
2002 
Candidates 
5 
5 
37 
36 
Upper Castes Vote to BSP 
2004 
2004 
5% 
4% 
Source: S.M. Michael, "Dalits in Modem India", Ilnd Edition, Sage, New Delhi (2007), p. 278 
Therefore, to form the vote bank among upper castes, various efforts have 
been made by the party supremo, Myawati like Brahmin Sammelans which were 
organized across UP and in Lucknow, Brahmin Maha rally marked the culmination of 
'Brahmin Jodo Sammelan' (Brahmm Enrolling Conferences). As BSP leaders believe 
th£it 'Bharatiya Janata Party' (BJP) led by upper castes; bent over backwards to woo 
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Dalits and Muslims votes; and divided the BSP's vote bank. So, Mayawati also 
adopted the similar strategy of caste- politics to woo the upper castes votes 
particularly of Brahmins by organi2dng various sammelans. BSP had organized a 
Brahmin Sammelans at various places in the state particularly in such states where 
Samajwadi Party had stronghold. Recently BSP has coined a new slogan of 
"Brahmin- Dalit bhai bhai' to connect with upper caste Hindus, in May,2005 and 
Mayawati decided to setup "Bhai Chara Samiti" (brotherhood committee) in all the 
assembly constituencies with Brahmins as presidents and Dalits as secretaries. 
Another strategy, to woo the OBC.s votes, has been the 'Yadav Sammelans' in UP. 
The party has setup a "Yadav Vikas Manch"^^ 
Thus, from above discussion it has been clear that BSP has been successful in 
achieving the support and votes apart from Dalits to OBCs, Muslims even of 
Bralunins to broaden its base for political power. All these have been possible by 
mobilizing people on castes basis which can be termed 'caste- polities'. But this 
success of BSP is praised because it is Dalit based political party. 
Khushwant Singh said in his article in Hindustan Times on 31 '^ May, 2008 that 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was the messiah who wanted to change the caste liierarchy and he 
exhausted his followers to opt for another religion and persuaiied his Mahar 
conununity to covert en mass to Buddhism. He is the most respected icon of the 
Dalits?^ Kanshi Ram inspired by the philosophy of Dr. Ambedkar Kanshi Ram came 
from a Dalit Sikh family of Roper and he became aware of the humiliating 
discrimination suffered by other Dalits after passed out of college and go into 
govenmient service. During his service, he studied Dr. i^ onbedkar's vidtings, travelled 
Mc'tharashtra and met other Dalit leaders. However, like Gautam Buddha, he took 
sanyas to devote his life to serve Dalits by making them aware of their rights and 
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power potential. He travelled all over country, meeting Dalits and organizing them. 
And he became popular among the poor and downtrodden Hindus, Muslims, 
Christians and Sikhs. 
Once, Kanshi Ram heard about Mayawati and tunied up at Mayawati's home. 
At tliat time she was busy in the preparation of Indian Administrative Services (IAS) 
examination to become collector of a district. He spent over an hour wth her family 
and said to Mayawati that her courage, dedication to Dalit cause and his other 
qualities could make her such a big leader that whole row of collectors will line up in 
waitiing for her orders. Then, in true sense, you can serve the constituency and get 
things done. However, she moved with Kanshi Ram. ITiough in initial years both 
Kanshi Ram and Mayawati lost few elections but BJP helped her in becoming Chief 
Minister of UP for the first time. Since then, Mayawati h£is been the CMef Minister of 
UP four times. 
The credit for turning the Scheduled Castes officers, working in different 
orgamization at lower level into political power, goes to Mayawati and her master 
Kanshi Ram. Mayawati now, become a identifiable personality for Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP). The credit of being Mayawati an icon to the downtrodden and oppressed 
community goes to her master Kanshi Ram; she may be; aid as the search of Kanshi 
Ram who gave her a way to reach on the top of the st£ite politics. Though she may 
have shown a path by her master but her inner talent too helped in her path of success 
as it was her courage, self-respect and respect for human dignity which raised an inner 
voice against social injustice, caste system and undignified behavior or attitude 
against them (Dalits). In her early childhood stage, she thought that it is only 
education that, could give her a position or status or dignity in the unequal order of 
society. Education, the way of achieving respected attitude for them was shown by 
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her father Prabhu Das. This was the stage also, when Dr. Ambedkar became for her a 
role model because of his efforts for humanity specially, for SCs by giving them an 
identity in Indian society; and from him she learned the lesson of social justice. In this 
way, BSP's journey of success started in the form of social movement ;and turned into 
political one because of restless efforts of Kanshi Ram and Mayawati, and a number 
of SCs devotees also. It was being noticed by media, political leaders and their 
political parties when BSP in 1984 Lok Sabha elections contested first time. During 
this election BSP still did into recognized by the Election Commission and not 
allotted a symbol too. So, both Mayawati and Kanshi Ram contested elections 
indejpendently, Mayawati from Kairana, parliamentary constituency in Muzaffar 
Nagar district in Western UP while Kanshi Ram from Jahangir constituency then in 
Madhya Pradesh. Though Mayawati was a debut but came on third position in number 
of vote preceded by Congress and Lok Dal. For second time, she contested by-
election for parliamentary seat from Bijnor (reserved) in 1985, again she came on 
third number winner but with the increase in number of votes over sixty thousand. 
Though with such a high number of votes, yet her party remained unrecognized by 
Election Commission. Again in 1987 her participation in parliamentary by- elections 
from Haridwar (reserved), her vote percentage increased to over 1 lakh 30,000 and 
this time her party got recognition. 
Because of BSP's rapid progress or development it was being noticed by 
national media and also faced criticism from other national political parties like 
Congress because it, the party of downtrodden community, created a fear in Congress 
Party, "Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh" (RSS) etc. Congress on one hand questioned 
the source of BSP's fimding while RSS was worried about BSP's progress which 
pos;ed a threat for it. As RSS was planning for reviving the BJP in North India. Kanshi 
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Ram in April 1985 said, "The measure of the BSP success in uniting fjuch victims of 
Brahminism can be assessed from the fears of the RSS". This may also be proved 
right when RSS chief Balasaab Deoras was quoted illustrated weekly of India in 1988, 
pointed out BSP as one the real problem for the RSS in North India.^ ^ 
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chapter - Seconcf 
Coafition £ra of^adujan Samaj 
(party 
COALITION ERA OF BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY 
World's largest democracy and comparatively having stable and efficient government 
than its neighboring states, India is governed by a parliamentary form of government 
witti federal structure. In such a state, political system was dominated by a secular 
party, 'Congress' till 1989. But it was the period of 1990s since when Indian political 
system, whether it is of central level or state level, is going to be frequently: 
• Fractionalized, and 
• Polarized 
Existence of a number of political parties is referred by 'Fractionalization' and 
'Polarization' refers to the ideological position of various parties in terms of their 
interactions and competition with each other. But the characteristic point of such a 
development is that it has given birth to the 'alliance'or 'coalition' system. However, 
alliiinces or coalitions, as a major product of fragmented and polarized political 
system, may be described as, 
"Formation of a group by two or more persons against some threat which may 
be actual or potential".' 
The term 'coalition', in Political Science, is a phenomenon of a multi-party 
government where a number of minority parties join hands for the puirpose of running 
the government, which is otherwise not possible in a democracy, based on majority 
pally system. A coalition came into existence when many splinter groups in the House 
agree to join hands on a common platform by sinking their broad differences and 
cobble a majority in the House. 
Such an alliance in politics may be categorized on the basis of: 
• Institution of operation 
• Organization of constituents 
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• Political ideology 
« Comparative strength 
« Political power 
« Area of operation 
« Institutional reach 
• Willingness of partners, and 
• Party affiliation? 
With the clear meaning and bases of coalition term in politics, now, it is to be 
clear the types of party system and coalitional system at state level in India. As being 
a federal state a political system is functioning in different states of India. So, party 
systems in Indian states are categorized in three types: 
• Bi-party system 
• Bi-coalition system 
• Multiple - coalition system 
Bi-party system is operational in states like: Gujarat, Delhi, Rajasthan, 
Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Oiissa, Kamataka, 
Janamu & Kashmir and Punjab etc. In all these states, mainly two parties dominate the 
electoral proceedings and form the government. In most of the state BJP and Congress 
dominate while in other, Telugu Desam Party, Assam Gana Parishad., Janata Dal, Biju 
Janata Dal, National Conference and Akali Dal etc. 
Second category party system i.e. Bi-coalitional system is operational in 
Kerala, West-Bengal, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu etc. The essential features of this 
system functioning in some Indian states are: 
• Existence of two polarized formations each having led by two different 
parties. 
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• Constituents of each political formation have electoral understanding among 
themselves for jointly contesting elections or sharing seats and forming 
Coalition Government, when voted into pov^ e^r. 
« Each of two coalition groups works on the basis of "Common Minimum 
Programme" (CMP) irrespective of different ideological stands. For e.g. in 
Kerala 'Left Democratic Front' and 'United Democratic Front' are led and 
dominated by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and Congress Party 
respectively. 
• Shifting, of the smaller parties allegiance from one coalition to another, is 
another feature. 
• Coordination Committee, of the coalition partners is another feature of this 
system, which resolves the internal contradictions among the parties that arise 
despite a Common Minimum Program (CMP). 
Third category of the party system, 'Multiple Coalition System' is operational 
in states like Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. These Multiple 
Coalitions of parties, which exist along wilh many other major parties, contesting the 
elections independent of any coalition. The parties outside the coalitions may enter 
into 'limited electrical adjustments', friendly contests or constituency specific 
understanding with one another. In this system, there are more than two important 
power contenders aiming to form the government but not powerful enough to do it at 
their own or dictate terms to smaller parties neither powerful enough to electoral wipe 
them out as to happens in bi-party coalition system. 
• In this system, smaller parties are powerfiil enough to challaage the dominant 
contenders through their own coalition. 
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• Or within a coalition if there exist a large party, they extract more number of 
constituencies in their favor for contest. 
• The polarization of forces does take place and it primarily veers around/ 
against the ruling coalition or with /' against the dominant contestant. Yet, the 
forces are not so polarized or there is no sharp division among them as it takes 
place in the Bi-coalition system. 
• That is, in this system once the elections ends and result is declared reflecting 
Hung Assembly or simple majority for any coalition, reconfiguration of 
political forces begins a fresh breaking all the proceeding alignments that 
existed during the election period. 
• In fact even if an electoral coalition is placed in governmental power by the 
voters, the government may collapse within short duration for ahead of its 
scheduled term under different pulls and pressui'e leading to the beginning of 
another political/ electoral permutation and combination. 
• Only in rare cases an electoral coalition or a coalition formed, after election or 
a single placed in power by voters have completed their tenure. As for 
example m Uttar Pradesh in 1993, Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj 
Party (BSP) had formed alliance whereas "Bharatiya Janata Party" (BJP), 
Congress and "Janata Dal" (JD) had contested the Ai;sembly election 
independently. Subsequently BJP and BSP had formed alliance and again 
parted ways and contested the last election independently. 
• Thus, due to electoral compulsions the parties keep on forming different 
number of coalitions mth partner's changing. Even electoral opponents may 
join hands in government formation. 
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«' Or the parties split with a faction joining the government against the electoral 
stand of their parent parties. Splits in: the BSP and Congress in UP are cases in 
point. The breakaway factions jomed the BJP led government. 
« Another characteristic is that irrespective of changing number of coalition and 
number of parties contesting the elections, lliere are broad but sharp 
polarization either in favor of or agmnst the single largest party. For example 
in UP there is polarization in favor of or against tlie BJP."* 
As for as Uttar Pradesh is concerned, here Multiple-coalition functions since 
the period of 1990s when UP's politics came into the picture of fragmented and 
pohirized system, along the lines of class, castes, religion and region etc. In such a 
system major players are: Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Part)' and Bharatiya 
Janata Party. 
However, in order to know the Bjihujan Samaj Party's contribution role in 
coalition politics in UP's political scenaiio, it has to be categorized BSP power 
politics into two phases f and If'' in terms of its Coalition Government: 
A. BSP's f' phase of coalition politics in Uttar Pradesh. 
B. BSP's 11 phase of coalition politics in Uttar Pradesh. 
A. Bahujan Samaj Party's 1st Phase of Coalition Politics in Uttar Pradesh: 
Bahujan Samaj Party's f* coalition phase starts with 1993 Uttar Pradesh Assembly 
elections when it came in 'Pre-poU alliance' with Samajwadi Party, ft's the period of 
1993 in UP politics, which is characterized by the starting of BSP's coalition era that 
wais a move of BSP's "Isolation Politics" to coalition politics.^  Another main point of 
this coalition was its position of "Historical Alliance" as it was the first time in UP 
political history when two rival parties c;ame closer to each other to the extent that 
Coalition Government came mto existence and marked a historical point. And it was 
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the ]3SP which has credit to move first step forward towards the starting of political 
relationship with Samajwadi Party. 
Since then these parties have got viirious opportimities to become players in 
power politics and to hold and exercise political power sometimes thirough coalition 
arraagement between them or sometimes in isolation having the other parties support 
as BJP's support to BSP in 1995 and 1997 elections. 
But in order to understand the SP- BSP coalition of 1993, it should be clear 
that what were those reasons which transformed the UP's political picture from single 
majority party governance to the Coalition Government in UP. In its background 
context, it is the period of 1990s when foigmentation amd polarization, as the main 
pohit, has changed the whole political activities in UP since last decade. Till now, UP 
is in the process of fragmentation since 1990s. But the unique point in this process is 
its 'undemocratic base': 'castes' and 'communities'. Undemocratic characteristic of 
UP's political fragmentation has produced two major political parties representing 
different castes and communities: 
• Bahujan Samaj Party 
• Samajwadi Party 
Another pomt related to this process is that it has marginalized Congress 
domination in UP's political scene, automatically. Now, politically mobilized 
depressed community, (Dalits) under the leadership of Mayawati, blamed Congress 
Party for their deprivation and exploitation. Indeed Gandhiji's denial of Ambedkar's 
demand for a separate Dalit electorate in 1932 is perceived by Dalits as a original sin 
by him even Mayawati in her autobiogi:aphy, has considered him as one of the 
perspectators of the ancient social stratification of Hindu society by Manu. And this 
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was Gandhi who became a hurdle in becoming Dalits an independent political force 
b]^  threatening fast unto death against Ambedkar's demand. 
Besides these at initial stage of BSP, Mayawati in her electoral campaign to 
mobilize Dalits or bahujan community always questioned about the Congress's 
scheme for Dalits such as about the advantages of various economic welfare schemes 
lilce- pig-herding, rickshaw pulling, leather tanning etc, initiated by Congress over 
pjist 40 years. Another question raised by Mayawati was that since 1952, 95% of 
Congress votes have been from Dalits while only 5% from Brahmins but in Congress 
ruled state only 5% Mmisters are Dalits while 55% are Brahmins. Tltius, through these 
campaigns, Mayawati created awareness among Dalits as a resuh of this Congress 
started losing its hold on this depressed community as a vote- bank.^  
Besides these two major contenders of power politics another is BJP, 
Blliaratiya Janata Party with Hindutva Politics. So, the period after 1992 elections till 
2007, UP Assembly Elections lack single majority party and it represents a number of 
political alliances that proved short lived and fragile. But before this alliance 
formation certain political developments took place or a situation raiised which helped 
in the SP-BSP coalition formation m 1993. The ongoing situation of that time which 
contributed much in SP-BSP coalition formation, ajid acquisition and exercising 
power by coalition formation were: 
• BJP's "Rath Yatra" to Ayodhya in 1990s: This led the communal 
polarization of BJP beneficial to the electoral politics.^  Demolition of Babri 
masjid on 6 December, 1992 created such an atmosphere in UP and other 
states that Dalits, Muslims and Backwards organized togethier politically and 
by forming an "electoral alliance" they wanted to curtail BJP from coming 
into power. Such prevailed situation gave origin to the: "unsecular power 
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politics" in the form of political mobilization of people on communal and 
caste lines termed as: 
• Caste-based mobilization 
• Religion-based mobilization 
Caste-based mobilization was made by SP-BSP alliance with anti-BJP 
sentiments among Dalits, backwards and Muslims to serve their piupose of alignment 
of political power, BSP was anti BJP because of its assertion that BJP is the 
manuwadi party of upper castes who are the exploiters of SCs while SP, as a party of 
backwards and Muslims, mobilized Muslim vote-bank by claiming its stand as the 
protector to the interest of Muslims from BJP threat of Hindutva ideology and 
Backward Castes interests jfrom upper-c£istes Hindus. While BJP aimed to unite the 
entire Hindu community on ideological biisis, religion-based mobiliiiation. 
• Opposition to Mulayam Singh Government: 
At that time, Janata Dal Chief Mmister; Mulayam Singh of UP cracked down the 
agitators which resulted into the opposition to Mulayam Singh Government and was 
being criticized as 'Mullah Mulayam' by the BJP. As he stood with the favor of 
Miuslims in Babri masjid cause, as he wanted to woo tlie Muslims' vote in his party's 
favor, they were the Congress vote bank till then. Apeirt from Muslims, Yadavs also 
formed support base to Mulayam Singh Party who accoimts for 10% of UP's 
population. 
• BJP convinced some part of MBCs: But it also true that some of the 'Most 
Backward Castes' (MBCs) among OBCs did not supported Janata Dal as they 
were convinced by BJP on this basis that they were not going to be benefited 
with Mandal Commission's recommendations implementation. However, BJP 
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mobilized them in its favor for its Ram Temple issue. Thus, a four-comered 
fight started among: 
• Janata Dal 
• BJP 
• Congress 
• BSP 
Fall of V.P. Singh Government: Janata Dal split with the faill of V.P. Singh 
Government and SJP- "Samajwadi Janata Party" was formed by Yadavs and headed 
by Chandra Shekhar who replaced V.P. Singh with the Congress support at Centre, as 
a P.M. While Ajit Singh remained the head of Janate Party as a leader of Jats in 
western UP and Haryana, with this split Janata Dal became weak and dependent upon 
Congress. So, it was the main Congress Party which was supporting Janata Party 
government both at Centre as well as state level in UP. 
\^ ''ithdrawal of Congress Support: It wthdrew its support from the "Samajwadi 
Janata Party" (SJP) at Centre which automatically fell down the UP Government. As 
it was perceived by the Congress that Yadav's firm standing for Yadav/ OBCs would 
alienate upper castes from the party. Congress and divert to the BJP and was a 
perceived threat to the Congress's Muslim vote banlc. All these political activities 
resulted into the 1991 UP Assembly elections with the BJP's expectation as a winner 
of the election because of certain points: 
• Split in the Janata Part)' 
• Ram Temple Issue 
• Kalyan Singh, a person of Lodh Commimity (OBC) whose projection as the 
Chief Ministerial candidate. This helped BJP to win over a section of Non-
Yadav OBCs particularly, Lodhs and Kurmis. All these rewarded BJP, a 
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victory with 221 seats in the 425 member assembly in mid-term UP Assembly 
Polls 1991. But BJP government lasted in December 1992 with Babri masjid 
demolition, followed by the imposition of 'President's Rule' in UP till fresh 
elections to the UP state Assembly held in 1993.^  
Thus, all these political activities in UP from the early of 1990 resulted into 
the end of single party majority govemument and the lack of single majority party 
started a new-chapter of "coalition era" in UP Politics. 
Bahujan Samaj Party's (BSP) chapter of coalition era in Uttar Pradesh with 
Siunajwadi Party (SP) of 1993 Assembly elections is staited with an electoral strategy 
adopted by Kanshi Ram even before the elections. That strategy was the formation of 
an "electoral alliance." Kanshi Ram entered into an alliance with Mulayam Singh 
e\'en before the Assembly elections 1993. But the unique point of this alliance was 
that the primary vote banks of the two men were contrary: the Yadavs and the 
Citiamars; so this was not a "Natural alliance", as these two communities had always 
b€«n in violent activities or conflicts in villages."* 
The points, which made the BSP to acknowledge the possibility of such type 
oi" unnatural alliance between BSP and SP, parties of rival sections of society, were: 
• Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) as a party of Dalits realized the impossibility of 
capturing power in the absence of support of thie Backwa-ds and Muslims. Its 
base (Dalits) constitute only 21% of UP's popidation and such a Ihnited base 
could not help BSP in its achievement of power. In 1993, BSP moved closer to 
the SP and as an Ambedkarite psirty it tried to construct a 'Bahujan Samaj' 
based on the support of Dalits, Backwards, Tribal and Minorities. And with 
the SP- BSP Coalition Government formation, its realization to broaden its 
base during 1993 Assembly elections, such a thought came into practice." 
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However, with all political activities as unsecular mobilization strategy on 
castes and communal lines, pre-electoral alliiuice, UP Assembly elections 1993 started 
with sub-regional politics. In varied sub-regions of Uttar Pradesh, the electoral 
competition, among parties, were different in terms of number of seats and votes 
perc(;ntage, as: 
«• Uttarakhand: Competition was between Congress and the "Bahujan Samaj 
Party" (BJP), but BJP lost 1.8% votes. 
« Upper Doab: Jat land where BJP was in improved position v/ith 2.7% votes 
and 13 seats. 
» Bundelkhand: A highest Muslim populated region where BJP lost 2.8% votes 
and 10 seats while Mulayam Singh was supported by 7.9% votes and 13 seats. 
• Avadh: Both BJP and SP-BSP polled same share of votes. SP-BSP 52 seats 
while BJP 37. 
• Poorvanchal: BJP gained 3% votes but lost 16 seats. SP-BSP Alliance 
captured 55 seats. 
With unsecular mobilization, 1993 elections result put BJP out of power when 
BJJ* defeated in three states out of four except Rajasthan. Though BJP won only 177 
seats less than 1991 elections- 221, yet Bi? gain increased number of votes from 
31.6% to 33.4%. In this situation of unfavorable condition towards BJP; SP-BSP 
joined hands with each other and gained 28.7% votes and 176 seats together, 109 (SP) 
and 67 (BSP).'^  Thus, the SP-BSP alliance and the BJP emerged as the largest groups 
wilJi 176 members each in the 425 state assembly, through short of a majority by 
about 37 seats. Janata Dal managed to win just 27 seats and the Congress a mere 29 
seats, by for the lowest number of MLAs it had ever had in the UP Assembly. Given 
the composition of the Assembly, both the Janata Dal and the Congress, as also the 
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four MLAs from the left parties, had little choice but to support a Yadav led SP-BSP 
government to keep the BJP out of power. ^Miile the Congress lost abc»ut 2.4 percent 
of the vote from 1992 elections, the BJP and the BSP gained about 2% each. The 
major loser was the Janata Dal whose share of vote dropped from 18.8% in 1991 to 
12.2% in 1993, most of its loss benefited the SP, which ha<i won 12.5% of the votes in 
1991, but now managed 18%. 
Table No. 11: Political Parties Share of Seats & Votes Percentage during 1993 UP Assembly 
Elections 
Parties 
Biharatiya Janata Party 
Samajwadi Party 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
Congress 
Janata Dal 
Seats (Won) 
177 
109 
67 
29 
27 
Votes Percentage 
33.4% 
25.83% 
11.11% 
-
12.2% 
Source; Pranjoy Guha Thakurta, Shankar Raghuraman, "Divided We Stand: India in a Time of Coalitions", Sage, New Delhi 
(2007), p. 248. 
In this way, Coalition Government was formed by SP-BSP and UP Assembly 
was constituted. But the first day of the Assembly was started with the violent 
incident between BJP MLAs on one hand and SP-BSP MLAs on the other. 
• Kanshi Ram's electoral strategy of the forming Coalition Government became 
true even with the lack of the potential for longevity. But in spite of such 
attempt to improve from, above conflicting forces that were inlierently opposed 
to each other and had conflicting interests. With the realization of unnatural 
alliance, attempts were made by Ijoth parties for the successful survival of 
their alliance like: division of seats between them, yet contradictions or 
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clashes prevailed and emerged as a threat to the existence of the alliance, 
which proved to be the ground of failure of such power-alliance, that were: 
• First point which proved to be the major ground for the collapse of alliance 
was the "same block of votes" Dalits, Backwards, while BSP's was of Dalits. 
But the contradictions started between these partners of same alliance when 
Mulayam Singh appeared to be the gainer and emerged as the dominant 
partner in the coalition by taking credit of the appointment of Urdu teachers, 
reservations in schools and inducting the backwards specially Yadavs in State 
Police Force; and Public Accounts Committee (PAC).''* 
Old-aged rivalry between Dalits and OBCs stands as a challenge in the way of 
successful survival of the alliance and a series of hostilities between tlie two coalition 
partners reached the alliance up to the point of collapse wth the final act of BSP, its 
withdrawal of support to Mulayam Singh led UP's Coalition Government. Before 
final ending the politics going on were the ijcts played by Kanshi Ram and Mayawati 
of using public platforms to bring Mulayam Singh Yadav's move towards 
strengthening his claim as the champion of OBCs in the state before public. This was 
proved with Mulayam Singh's decision in 2000 to extend the reservation for OBCs in 
government jobs to the hill districts of the state, now, known as Uttanikhand, tiiis area 
was the most dominated by upper- castes mainly with Brahmins and Rajputs, while 
Dalits too had a significant presence, though less than in the plains, and the OBCs 
were conspicuous by their absence. The attempts to introduce reseivations in these 
areas, were, therefore, viewed as just another instance of people fi-om the plains trymg 
to exploit the hill folk. 
Another act for which BSP criticized the SP was to engineer a split in the 
BSlP's rank, particularly among the Muslim and non-Dalit MLAs of the party which 
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was seen in the May, 1995. In these elections, the SP usc;d muscle power not just to 
defeat the BJP and Congress candidates, but also BSP candidates/^ 
Finally, all contradictions, clashes and conflicts, ttie fighting grounds between 
these two coalitions partners- 1993 UP elections came to an end (only in the sense of 
fall of Coalition Government) by the withdrawal of BSP's support on 1*' June, 1995 
but administrative crisis emerged in UP's political scene as Mulayam Singh 
Gov(;mment in UP dismissed while Mayawati claimed to form the Government with 
the help of BJP. So, she was given the tune of two weeks to prove her majority in the 
House, 'Legislative Assembly'.'^ Meanw h^ile Government banned all political 
meetings and rallies throughout the state till fiirther order to maintain peace. But on 
9 June, 1995 UP's Governor, Moti Lai Vora refused to give more time than 15 days 
to Mayawati to prove her majority. So, on hme 19- 20,1995 the day was scheduled to 
be f(3r voting. 
But in this power-politics, the main sufferer may be said to BSP as of its 
internal split. Its own MLAs revolted against it and supported Mulayam Singh's party 
on 2"'' June, 1995. While 25 BSP MLAs formed rival party under former Union 
Ministers Raj Bahadur known as "Ash BSP" later on called as 'BSP Raj Bahadur'.'^ 
But 10 out of 25 BSP MLAs, Raj Bahadur faction, returned to their parent party on 4* 
June, 1995,'^  Finally, Mayawati secured the outside support of the BJP. So, Governor 
dismissed Mulayam Singh led Coalition Government and a new Government, with 
Mayawati as Chief-Minister, came into existence. 
B. IBahujan Samaj Party's Ilnd Phase of Coalition Politics in Uttar Pradesh: 
The great beneficiary of the SP-BSP alliance breakup was BJP. Such an alliance was 
perceived by the BJP as a threat to its supremacy or power control. But with the SP-
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BSP alliance breakup on 1*' June, 1995 it stated that it wanted to keep Mulayam Singh 
Yadaiv's Government out of power but the intention was to capture BSP's vote bank. 
So, with the withdrawal of the SP- BSP Coalition Era, 1993 characterized with 
the Mandir- Mandal issues, a new strategy was adopted by BSP to v»dden its social 
base and acquire political power. Though tliis time also it was in coalition but with 
changed partner from SP to BJP and this second coalitional phase was termed as 
"Posit- bafaujan Phase". Because the strategies adopted by BSP during this phase, to 
capture political power were: 
* Coalitions with upper-caste parties; and 
«» Tickets to non-Dalit candidates 
Post-bahujan, in terms of its changed Bahujan (SCs, STs, OBCs and Muslims) 
ideology to Post-bahujan ideology, includes upper castes and non-Dailts, may be said 
as the phase of 'Modernization.' With the changed s&ategy, it formed Coalition 
Government with BJP on 3'"'' June, 1995 Mayawati as the Chief Minister. The 
distinctive point between the two coalition periods of BSP, with SP-1993 and BJP 
1995-97 is that in 1993 it had SP as coalition partner as a party of backwards who are 
also the constituent part of bahujan, while in 1995 its coalition with BJP showed its 
Post-bahujan strategy an alignment with upper caste paity, BJP. This changed move 
of the party was described by Mayawati a.s a temporary' and tactical method to gain 
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povr'er. 
In this context of 11"*^  phase of BSP coalition, it is clear that in the split 
betA'een two parties a major role was played by the BJP as it perceived the new 
alliance of victimized society as a great threat to its supremacy in power politics. 
Therefore, it became essential on the part of BJP to support BSP. Thus, in June, 1995 
Mayawati was given the role of Chief Minister of UP. Though she was the CM. but 
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the 1995 UP Government is properly known as a Joint Kanshi Ram- Mayawati 
Government as he was consulted by Mayawati on all major decisions. 
Being the Chief-Minister, Mayawati implemented a number of socio-
economic and cultural policies in the interest of Dalits particularly, and Muslims and 
OBCs. Her pw-Dalit policies became a contradictory point between BJP and BSP. 
For example: 
• High castes incumbents in the Chief Secretary and Chief-Minister's Principal 
Private Secretary Positions were replaced by Scheduled Caste officers. And 
SCs officers on different positions were being promoted. Such an act was 
criticized as 'merit had been replaced by casteism.' 
« She made resort to the device of transfers and disciplinary action against 
officers found delinquent in one aspect or another.^ ' 
As for as transfers of officials on a large number is concerned it was also 
stated that BSP supremo, Mayawati was taking BJP support only to attack on 
Mulayam Singh in political field. As his decisions were reserved at every level, his 
men were targeted- District Magistrates, "Superintendents of Police" (SPs) and 
officials, who were being used by politicians for their power play, were transferred. 
And "Samajwadi Party" (SP) ruled districts where there were criminals, political 
nexus system were ended." 
Another criticism regarding BSP during its period of power was in the context 
of illicit money which it exacted in the matter of obliging individual bureaucrats 
regarding their transfer or non-transfer may be said as misuse of public office or 
official corruption. 
Mayawati's style of administraition was also criticized for her most 
provocative gesture. In March 1994 during Mulayam Singh Goveimment Mayawati 
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cond(jmned Mahatma Gandhi as 'an enemy of Dalits and the Bahujan Samaj" 
atlarge.' Another gesture of her Government was to build a 'Parivartan Chowk' or 
revolution square in Lucknow that was to have huge status; of the great figures of anti-
Brahmin activism: Phule, Periyar, Ambedkar, Shahu Maharaj?^ Mayawati also 
organized Periyar Mela in Lucknow, despite BJP's opposition. As leaders of VHP and 
BaJKing Dal pressurized Mayawati not to go ahead with Periyar Mela in the city and 
requesting her to glorify another leader instead of E.V. Riamaswamy Periyar who had 
delit»erately hurt the Hindu sentiments by opposing idol worship on 13* September, 
1995.2' 
BSP-BJP coalition, 1995 as BSP's another strategy to capture power by 
aligning itself with upper-castes party, "Bharatiya Janata Party" (BJP). Here BSP's 
this move may also be said as a unique one because of its alignment with such party 
to whom BSP had always been in opposition. But such a move became also failed 
whea BJP withdrew its support from BSP as a result of Mayawati's own style of 
administration. Eventually, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) decided to withdrew its 
support to the four and a half month old BSP Government led by Mayawati under the 
sup(5rvision of Kanshi Ram. BJP's act was in pressure from its own state unit led by 
Kalyan Singh (former Chief Minister) to withdraw support to Mayawati regime. 
Otherwise, he would walkout from the party mih 70 MLAs. This was only because of 
the growing assertiveness of Mayawati, causing imease in BJP. And its growing 
appeal among the backwards in general and Dalits in particular. The growing position 
of BSP was perceived by Kalyan Singh as a threat to its support base, backwards. 
Though central leadership did not want to go for a breaJiup of the alliance, yet it had 
to wthdrawn its support to BSP because of Kalyan Singh's force to take such step 
which was essential for BJP to keep its parly united. 
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In this way, BSP Government supix)rted by BJP fell down when BJP 
withdiew its support to it in October, 1995. So, on 17* October, 1995 UP Chief 
Minister, Mayawati submitted her resignation to state Governor, Motilal Vora in 
Lucknow. He accepted Mayawati's resignation and her Cabinet but asked her to 
continue till arrangements were made to form the Government. In such a situation, 
Mulayam Singh Yadav told not to extend his support to BSP, And said his party was 
preparing for elections and people would decide about its next govenunent in Uttar 
Pradesh. On 18* October, 1995, Uttar Pradesh was placed under President's Rule and 
susp(;nsion of State Assembly took place, not dissolve. But the demands were made 
by BJP to dissolve the UP Assembly elections along with the forthcoming Lok Sabha 
polls. While it was the Samajwadi Party which said that centre is providing time to the 
BJP to form the government in state.^ ^ 
« 1996 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections: (Hung Assembly) 
Because of the BJP's move towards the BSP, as to withdraw its outside support 
from Mayawati Government, President's Rule played its role in UP since 1995 to 
1996 Assembly elections. This time UP Assembly elections had its own unique 
chapter in UP politics as it moved around various stages: 
• BJP's support to BSP; 
• 1996 pre-poll alliance with Congress; 
• Election result produced Hung Assembly in UP; 
• BSP-BJP Coalition arrangement-1997; 
• BSP's withdrawal of support-1997 etc. 
1996 UP Assembly elections showed a new type in political process in this 
stote with the shift of political focus. During this period, BSP had emerged an 
important political force of Dalits in UP. But BSP's focus during this election was not 
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on Dalits and Backwards, and to capture political power but was only raising voice 
against Mulayam Singh with the focus on 'Romesh Chandra Report. With this issue 
another focus was on to bring the support of the upper ceistes, botii the Thakurs and 
Brahmins. But the contradictory point was that the same section was also tried by the 
Uniteid Front as its vote bank, it was mainly concentrating on farmers, youths and 
Muslims. While Muslims were still with Miilayam Singh but a section of their elite 
leadeirship was inclining towards the Congress-BSP combine. Another caste, Most 
Backward Castes (MBCs) was being attracted by BJP, mainly the Kurmi vote-bank 
by projection of Kalyan Singh as the future Chief Minister. "^'^  
So, BSP's chapter of Coalition Politics during this period was started with the 
'Pre-poll alliance' with the Congress Party, which was an alliance of Post-Mandal, 
Post-Mandir phenomenon, only to increase the number of votes. This time BSP's 
strategy was to keep the party's Dalit constituency: 
» Intact by promising to make Mayawati the Chief Mmister; 
• By giving about 30% of its tickets to Dalits and backwards and a much lower 
percentage to the upper castes; and 
• Was trying to gain Muslim support by making anti-communalism a part of its 
election campaign by promismg them as it would not form way agreement with 
the Bharatiya Janata Party after the elections and gave tickets to 52 Muslims.'^ ^ 
During this period of President's Rule and before the holding of 1996 
Assembly elections; Romesh Bhandari was appointed as Governor of Uttar Pradesh 
on 16"' June, 1996 mainly favored by Prime Minister, Deve Gowda. Romesh Bhandari 
as a new appointed Governor was given certain specific tasks by Prime Minster: 
• To control the law and order situation in UP; and 
• To conduct free and fair polls in UP. 
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Regarding the elections, political parties were playing its caste-card strategy to 
woo the voters for achieving power. With this electoral politics the election dates 
were announced on 29* August, 1996 which was to be held in three phases. On 30* 
September, first phase of elections started vath no violence but during second phase 
some incidents of violence were reported in Muzaffamag;ar, Fatehnag,ar and Badaun 
Districts of UP. And not to reimpose the President's Rule, the essential condition was 
either a pre-poU alliance or even a near majority. But during election the U.P's 
political scene was as: 
• SP and BSP would not get together because of the personalities clash.^' This 
became very clear when BSP supremo, Kanshi Ram asserted on 18* July, he 
will never align with "Janata Dal" (ID) for the coming Assembly elections in 
UP if the latter continues to have an alliance with the Samajwadi Party of 
Defence Minsiter and former state CM, Mulayam Singh Yadav.^ ° 
<» There was a pre-poll alliance of BSP and Congress. In fact, Congress- BSP 
alliance for ensuring Assembly polls in 'Vnitod Front" announced much 
earlier. This provoked adverse reaction in the UF and a section of the 
Congress Party became unhappy because PV Nai'simha Rao has not t^en the 
Congress Working Committee into confidence l:)efore going to enter into an 
alliance with BSP. " 
Kanshi Ram asked Congress to filled 100 BraJmiins in 125 seats allotted to 
it, so as to attract the upper castes, from the BJP to Congress back. And he 
also divided the seats among the candidates of his own list; according to 
communitarian formula.^ ^ However, in 1996 assembly elections the BSP gave 
28 percent tickets to SCs, 24 per cent to OBCs, 18 percent to Muslims, and 
16.6 percent to upper castes candidates.' 
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And Congress had outside support to UF Government at Centre. So, it was 
expecting that "United Front" (UF) would support BSP-Congress alliance. 
• "United Front" (UF) comprising "Samajwadi Party" (SP), "Janata Dai" 
(JD), Left Front, Congress (T) and BKKP on one hand; and the Congress-
BSP alliance on other hand, both were opposing BJP; 
• Counting of votes started on 10"' October, 1996. 
In 1996 elections: BJP won 174 seats; SP won 110 seats, BSP won 67 seats while 
CongTCss 33. And the poll result proved it that no party or coalition had secured an 
absolute majority. 
Table No. 12:19% UP Assembly Elections Result in Terms of Political Groups 
Political Groups 
BJP-Samata Party 
SP-United Front 
BSP-Congress 
Independents 
Seats 
176 
134 
100 
14 
Source: Romesh Bhandari, "As I saw It", Har- Anand. New Delhi (1998), P- 65. 
Thus, three major parties were BJP, BSP and SP. And for any political 
stability in UP politics without two out of three getting together only a Government 
bas(2d on defectors could be formed. Conjjress-BSP alliance jointly had strength of 
100 MLAs while BJP have to depend upon split the Congress. It was expected that 
"United Front" (UF) Government would support Congress-BSP alliance with 
Mayawati as the Chief Minister but the hindrance in this strategy was the unreadiness 
of Mulayam Singh to support this alliance. So, UF also could not go against SP. 
During this period of BSP-Congress and UF talk, BJP remained busy in wooing the 
smaller parties and to break some larger p£uties. In this split game the Congress was in 
vuhierable condition as its 11 MLAs out of 33 would be adequate to meet the 
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provisions of the anti-defection laws because private discussions were going on 
between BJP and their MLAs. Tlie BSP's position was also susceptible. Its 67 MLAs 
were comprised of: 10 upper castes, 11 Muslims, 27 OBCs and 19 SCs. And BJP 
could split 10 upper castes members easily. And OBCs member could also be allured 
as Kalyan Singh belonged to a backward caste. 
Thus, with all these suspicious or tlireat perceived by Congress and BSP on 
the part of its MLAs of being split by B.fP to come in power, the dialogue was 
continued between the Congress and UF regarding the support to Congress-BSP 
alliance.^ '' On 12* October Congress Working Committee member, A.K. Antony says 
the U.F. should "read the writing on the will" and support the Congress- BSP alliance 
to form the government in UP if it 'believes in fair play'.^ ^ But this dialogue could not 
come to the conclusion because of the Mulayam Singh's opposition. And the situation 
of UP politics was that there was no single majority paity to form tlie Government, 
thouigh BJP was the single largest party.^ * Having seen thie BJP's largest votes the UF 
Steering Committee decided to ask all "secular parties" to write to the UP Governor to 
invite the BJP to form the government, as the people ha<J given a "clear-majority" to 
the secular parties dealing to a body blow to the communal forces. During such a 
critical situation, BSP's chief, Kanshi Ram, with a determined intention, said that the 
option seeking the BJP's support was open to his paj-ty, which was cle^ with a 
statsment, of Kanshi Ram, on the status of the Congress as an ally in case of an 
alliance with the BJP; that "If tlie BJP becomes our ally, the Congress cannot remain 
our ally." This would not mean a breach of trust as "Bahujan SamaJ" is in majority 
so, it must rule. ^' And the dangerous point at that time was the ending of President's 
Rule on 17* October, 1996 after 12 months. And President's Rule could not be 
extended as per the Constitutional provision. So, this was the critical situation and a 
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time for Governor to take the decision to invite the leader of the majority party to 
form liie Government but it could not be happened in the lack of majority party or any 
politi(;al group who by consensus has support of 213 members in the House. In this 
situation, Governor, Romesh Bhandari took the decision of the re-imposition of 
President's Rule. His decision was based on certain Constiitutional points as: 
• In Indian Constitution, any provisions in law to continue Presidential Rule 
beyond one year (which is expiring) is under Article 356(5) of the Constitution 
and such provision is not applicable tecause the Government has been able to 
hold elections and the election results have already been decL'ired, therefore, 
Article-356 (5) of the Constitution does not apply. 
So, a fresh proclamation under Article 356 on the expiry of the earlier 
proclamation would depend clearly on an assessment of the Governor that a situation 
has arisen as a result of present composition of the new Assembly in which he was of 
the opinion that the Government of the state could not be carried on in accordance 
witti the provisions of the Constitution. Ttie Governor reported to tJiat effect to the 
President. Then it would not be unconstitutional. 
However, on 16* October around 7:00 pm it was announced that the Cabinet 
had approved the re-promulgation of President's Rule. But the negative point for 
Governor was that he was criticized by BJP and Congress as well bscause Congress 
Coimnittee President of Uttar Pradesh said that from the day one, both BXP and 
"United Front" (UF) did not want that Congress-BSP Government would be formed. 
On, other side, BJP reacted violently against the proclamation of President's Rule in 
UP.^ ^ Leaders of the party took to the streets. Kalyan Singh and Kalraj Mishra 
miirched to the Raj Bhavan to handover a Memorandum to the Governor. Kalraj 
Mishra announced the launching of a weeklong agitation against the Governor 
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culminating in a rally on October 25''' and Kalyan Singh stated as **the murder of 
democracy." But in reality such a proclamation was made by the President, Shankar 
Dayal Sharma on the advice of Council of Ministers.'"' 
Thus, the 1996 election was a different phenomenon when BSP-Congress 
alliance summed up a phase of Mandal politics. This phase was characterized with the 
BSP's game plan of attracting the Brahmins; and absence of focus on tlie issues of the 
Dalits and exclusive concentration on Mualayam Singh much more th.'3n the BJP. As 
far as social base was concerned, Yadavs were with Mulayam and Muslims had not 
moved away from him. He was thinking to opt Janata Dal. While United Front was 
raising farmer's issues, BSP was trying to woo upper castes while BJP had the option 
to back to the Mandir Plank.'*' 
BSP-BJP CoaUtion Government in Uttar Pradesh: 1997 
This was the period of be-imposition of President's Rule in UP after 1996 
Hung-Assembly, when another chapter of BSP's coalition politics started again with 
BJP in 1997. This time it was 'Post-electoral alliance' preceded by 'Pre- electoral 
alliance' with Congress during 1996, UP Assembly elections. In the context of 
Assi^ mbly elections held in 1996 finally reached at its purposie (government 
formation) in March, 1997. It means 1996 election was followed by the continuation 
of President's Rule, which was imposed on the state in October 1995, because 
political parties could not form a government following a divide electoral verdict. 
Though BJP emerged as the largest party in the Assembly elections, yet it could not 
easily find coalition parties to govern with. After six months, the BJP arrived at an 
agreement with BSP."*^  
On 18* March, 1997 it was reported that an agreement had been reached 
between the BSP and BJP but with a new formula of administration that was "Power 
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Shuring Arrangement". On 19* March both BSP and BJ? leaders held a Joint Press 
Conference in Delhi. The uniqueness of such a new strategy was tliat each partner 
(paity) of coalition would fonn its own government with its own leader for six 
moiaths. And it was BSP which was to form the government under the Chief 
Ministership of Mayawati for first six months according to this arrangement, and to be 
followed by six months tenure under Kalyjin Singh. But the condition was put before 
BSIP by BJP that the SpeEdcer of the Legislative Assembly would be the BJP's 
nominee. This point became controversial when Kanshi Ram also demanded for the 
same but at last Kanshi Ram dropped this demand from his part. With this new unique 
formula the Coalition Government of BSP-BJP was to hQ formed on 19 March, 1997 
anci both parties announced that the government would be of coalition and have 
representation of both parties. Though the date was decided to the government 
formation by both parties, yet the question arises here that on what grounds the two 
opposite parties came closer and made it final to be aligned. So, the two parties' 
arguments regarding the coalition formation were: 
• As for as BSP's argument is concerned, it stated that it was expecting that 
Congress would be able to prevail upon the United Front (UF) to support a 
government led by her, particularly, Congress was supporting a government 
led by UF at the centre. And Congress President Sitaram Kesari had 
withdrawn support from the Deve Gowda goverrunent. 
• Another point was that both BSP and BJP did not wish that President Rule 
should continue; 
• And MLAs of both parties did not want to the re-election in UP; 
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«> Besides BSP's important argument was that President's Rule would be most 
advantageous to the SP, particularly, which could never be acceptable to BSP 
as being rival party. 
So, Mayawati thought these reasons may be appropriate in aligning with BJP 
as t)oth parties had a common compassion to come together. Being a two major 
parties coalition, it was obvious that BJP had also seen few similarities with BSP 
about the benefits of alignment: 
BJP wanted power at any cost and BJP was not able to split the sufficient 
number of MLAs even after the five months after Assembly elections. "Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh" (RSS) stated that Dalits support to BJP is essential to come 
into power. Due to these reasons, some possibility was seen by the both parties to 
forai a government in UP by coming closer. Kalyan Singh handed over a hand written 
letter signed jointly by him and Mayawati to the Governor. Both parties as combined 
had majority in the House (Legislative Assembly) to fonn the government, such as: 
• Bharatiya Janata Party -174 MLAs with, 02 MLAs of Samata Party and 
06 MLAs of Independents. 
• Bahujan Samaj Party - 67MLAs 
In this way the total strength of both parties was 249 in 425 member's Assembly. 
Table No. 13: Parties and Number of MLAs in BSP-BJP Coalition in UP 1997 
Political Parties 
Bharatiya Janata Party 
Seimata Party (with BJP) 
Independents (with BJP) 
Bahujan Samaj Party (on other side) 
MLAs 
174 
02 
06 
67 
Source; Romesh Bhandari, "As 1 saw ir, Har- Anand, New Mhi (W8), pp. 52-137 
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With BSP- BJP claim of government formation the date of 'swearing in 
ceremony' was decided to be on 21^ * March, 1997 which was arranged in K.D. Babu 
Stadium in afternoon. And 26* March was liie date when Cabinet Ministers took the 
oath of the office, mdividually and Ministers of States could be asked to take oath in a 
group of 8 or 10. But due to objection by some Ministers it was decided to take oath 
individually. Another clash started regarding the distribution of portfolios as each 
party wanted to have the more important portfolios. An understanding was reached 
betv/een two parties that once the change- over took place, it would remain as they 
were. During this distribution, Mayawati kept the major portfolios: 
* General administration 
Home 
Election 
Finance 
Industrial development 
Civil Aviation 
Appointments 
Energy 
Information 
Excise 
Health 
Education 
Irrigation 
With the distribution of Portfolios the functioning of Coalition Government 
started under the Chief-Ministership of Mayawati on the basis of 'Power Sharing 
Formula.' 
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Mayawati Tenure: As a Period of Pro-Dalit Polices and Programmes: 
Being the Chief Minister of Utttr Pradesh, she had given the vast 
administrative powers. She recognized her legitimate p(3wer and us<^ it firstly in 
giving "Swahhiman" (self-respect) to the Dalits that could be achieved by 
eulogizing Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the form of constructing Ambedkar Parks, 
Ambedkar Villages and Statues etc.'*^  Popularizing Dr. Ambedkar was not new, 
Kanshi Ram has also popularized the heroes and social reformers of different Dalit 
castes; and Mayawati, a close associate of Kanshi Ram, when became the CM. she 
created Ambedkar village, Buddha Park and Ravidas Ghats etc.'" 
So, Mayawati's main priority at this time was to complete Ae "Ambedkar 
Udyan" the park which was started during the first Chief Ministership of Mayawati in 
1995 and it was remained incomplete after her resignation then. And funds were also 
not provided during President's Rule for tliis project which cost touched a level of 
over Rs. 100 crores. Funds were embarked through the Contingency Fund. When an 
offi<:er fi*om Finance Department made some queries, he was transferred. And two 
BJP leaders: Kalraj Mishra was; handlmg PWD and Lalji Tondon was in charge of 
Urban Development, both cooperated on this project. Only these two BJP leaders 
were responsible for the handling money and expenditure. This point become positive 
for Mayawati because during Kalyan Singh tenure a case was registered against 
Mayawati for such a huge expenditure then Mayawati demanded a CBI probe as she 
was not directly given any approval on this project but it was done through the leaders 
of BJP itself. Besides this Park, a number of Ambedkar statues were erected 
throughout the state. 
But the important point of these Pro-Dalit acts of Mayawati was its being 
controversial and a weakening point for BSP- BJP Allijince. As on one side BSP was 
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strengthening its support base among Dalits but on other side BJP was losing the 
support of upper-castes. 
• Transfers and postings of officers also became sax issue between these two 
partners as transfers were made in three categories: transfer of those officers 
belonging to the SCs and were loyal to Mayawati and officers who were 
known to be supporters of Mulayam Singh Yadav therefore, could not be 
trusted. And those who were prepared to pay a price for their posts. 
• The implementation of SC /ST Act v/as another factor in the suirvival of BSP-
BJP alliance. Having certain very harsh provisions, it was alleged by upper 
castes that this Act was being falsely implicated against them and they are 
bemg prosecuted under the very rigid provisions of the Act.'*^  
This issue was used by Mayawati as a ground to vdthdraw its support from the 
coalition after completing its tenure. She said that her partners in the BJP were not 
cooperating with her party's attempt to implement a Ism (Dalit Act) which aimed at 
prevention of atrocities against those belonging to the lower castes.''^  
BJl* Perceived BSF as a Threat: All the pro Dalit policies of BSP created a fear 
among BJP leaders regarding the BJP image, its vote bank weakening and transfer of 
po^ver to BJP by Mayawati. Tliis was Kalyan Singh who perceived that BJP image 
taken a severe beating as its traditional vote bank had be-come disillusioned, it leading 
the party towards disintegration and allijmce had only benefitted to BSP. Such a 
perception by Kalyan Singh was not baseless; this fear was created in him as he had 
doubt that BSP would not transfer Chief IVlinistership to him easily which proved to 
be true later on. 
• Change of Speaker wth the change in the Chief Ministership also became a 
ground in BSP-BJP alliance. 
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• Another condition put before BJP by BSP v,^ as that assurance to the 
continuity of BSP policies and programs after BJP took over the power. 
This issue divided the BJP's view; a section of BJP was ready for this 
accommodation while another was opposed to it. In spite of the division of 
view on this issue BJP made public announcement regarding the continuity 
of these programs and policies and for not tranijferring any officers except 
in respect of necessary function md reasons. 
• On Speaker's issue, Mayawati made it clear her points for this demand. 
Due to the danger regarding the split in MLAs of her party and other parties 
by BJP leader Kalyan Singh after being Chief Minister; this demand was 
made by Mayawati. But on this issue BJP leader L.K Advani, Atal Behari 
Vajpayee in an intensive discussion with Kanshi Ram and Mayawati gave 
full assurance to Kanshi Ram that BJP would not try to break the BSP. 
Meantime when the BSP was asl^ dng for this demand, the then Speaker of 
the assembly Kesari Nath Tripatlii sad that he would not resign imder any 
circumstances. But this issue WJJS solved with discussion. And this was 
Rajnath Singh, UP President of tlie BJP stated that the coalition would have 
to continue as in the event it breaks it would mean President's Rule. 
The resuh of all these assurances miide by BJP was that Mayawati then started 
to })repare herself for the changeover. It was the date on 20 September, 1997 when 
governor was handed over a letter of resignation by Mayawati and with a statement as 
Kalyan Singh would be the new Chief Minister. Then swearing in ceremony was 
organized in K.D. Babu Stadium on 21'' September, 1997 and Kalayn Smgh taken 
over the power.'*^  
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Kal}'an Singh's Tenure: A Period in Response to Mayawati's Acts: 
As for as Kalyan Singh taken over povf&t in September 1997, he utilized his 
period of power against the BSP, such as: one of the first acts of the new government 
was to issue a Government Order popularly known as 'Go', wherein all district' 
authorities were directed to see that there w£is no abuse of SC/ST Act 1989.'** The Go 
was issued the day after Kalyan Singh was sworn in namely on 22"** September, 1997. 
It stated that state Government was committed to stop crime against the members of 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. At the same time it was intention of the state 
government to ensure that the provisions of SC/ST Act are not misused. The provision 
of tJiis act was very severe. Punishment is required to be quick through Special 
Courts. It was the statement of Kalyan Singh that what she had b»een domg was 
arbitrary and loaded in favor of the SC/ST castes. 
In this way, in just over two weeks since Kalyan Singh took over, the relations 
had soured to an extent that differences appeared to have become irreconcilable. 
Kanshi Ram had a different perception than Mayawati, he did not want any break in 
the coalition. On 29* September, 1997 he made a statement in Bangalore that the BJP 
gov(;mment would continue for six months. He realized that he could become a 
political outcaste if he was seen to have broken the alliance with the BJP. On other 
hand Kalyan Singh was not prepared to compromise on any cost, he had to restore the 
image of the BJP while Mayawati seen the continuity of coalition as a major problem 
for herself as she was being charged with corruption. Secondly, the Muslun MLAs 
were feeling shaky as the alliance with the BJP could mean that they would not win 
again. Both BJP and SP were waiting for BSP MLAs to break away. 
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*X* Breakup of Alliance: 
All these clashes resulted into the breakup of BSP-BJP alliance 1997 with 
Mayawati's statement that she had consulted with Kanshi Ram to withdraw 
support and wanted the dissolution of the Assembly but the view at central 
level was that dissolution and promulgation of President's Rule was not 
possible. According to 'Bomai' judgment, the government in power would 
have to be given a chance to prove its majority on the floor of the House. 
Dissolution also could only be done by Parliament and till then the Assembly 
would have to be kept in suspended animation, if the government failed to 
secure a vote of confidence. There v/as another school of thought also which 
argued that the Bomai judgment did not apply in this case as it was a coalition 
which is in power, not a single party. If a coalition broke, the government in 
power had no right to claim to seek a vote of confidence, as this would be only 
encouraging horse-trading. But on 19* October, 1997 Mayawati said that they 
would be prepared for giving an opportunity to Kalyan Singh for a floor test. 
And she handed over a letter to the governor stating that she was withdrawing 
support from the BJP. She listed out all reasons which had led her and her 
party to having to take tliis decision: 
• The BJP had violated all the assurances given to the BSP. 
• Kalyan Singh government had done everything to hit at Mayawati personally and 
to destroy BSP."*^  However, the 28 days old Coalition Government of BSP-BJP 
came to an end on 19* October, 1997. The fall of this coalition was due to two 
highly volatile leaderships whose mutual antagonism did not characterized with an 
understanding and to have co-ordination essential for the success of coalition 
model in the state.^ " Under these circumstances she demanded that the Legislative 
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Assembly should be dissolved and the President's Rule be imposed. So, due to the 
withdrawal of support by Mayawati, Kalyan Singh being the CM. of UP was 
given the time to prove his majority on the floor of the House, and for that 
purpose convene a session of the Assembly on 21** October, 1997.The Vote of 
Confidence was to take place at 12 noon. Till then the press had only reported that 
19 MLAs from the Congress had formed a new group. While SP was very certain 
that no one would break from their side, At 12 o'clock Assembly was convened 
but with a very undisciplined and disordered manner v/hich could be seen as many 
of the MLAs were bleeding. In this session, Mayav/ati, Pramod Tiwari, Dhani 
PLam Verma and others demanded that the President's Rule be imposed. As a 
Governor, Romesh Bhandari recommended imposition of President's Rule more 
on ethical and moral grounds than a breakdown of Constitutional machinery. 
But the main point, related to this matter of Vote of Confidence, was the 
splitting of MLAs from other parties by Kalyan Singh. To survive politically in 
]3ower Kalyan Singh made defections as: 
• 22 MLAs defected from the Congress (I). They had split into two phases: the 
first group of 19 was recognized by the SpeaJier on the 20 evening, and 
another three MLAs had gone later. 
• Three MLAs were split from JMiaita Dal 
• In the Assembly itself, some BSP MLAs had gone over to the BJP side. 
The Speaker announced that 222 MLAs had voted in favor of the BJP. And 
the decision of Speaker could only be challenged in a Court of law. Later on it was 
known that 12 BSP MLAs had voted for the BJP and one MLA abstained. If 12 BSP 
MLAs who had defected in clear violation of the Anti defection lav^ r, had adhered to 
th(; party whip, the Kalyan Singh government would have lost the Vote of 
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Confidence. Thus, Kalyan Singh Government survived but at the cost of the morality 
of politics. 
Though defections were made by Kalyan Singh government and it survived 
too, yet controversy raised as both Congress and BSP maintained that these were 
illegjil defections and attracted the provisions of the 'Anti-Defection laws' and ail the 
defecting members should be disqualified. But the main point was that as for as 
Con j^ress (I) MLAs were concerned, there were two points: 
• The defections were not in conformity with the Constitution of the Congress 
(I).There should have been a meeting of Congress (I) party in accordance with 
the prescribed procedure, a split could have taken place. Thereafter alone it 
would be considered as a split. 
« Whereas 19 MLAs had announced the formation of the "Loktimtrik Congress 
Party" and they exceeded one tihird of the total strength, the other three who 
had joined later had to be viewed as lanother defections. 
And as for as BSP was concerned, it had strength of 67 MLAs and 12 had 
defected, and supported the BJP in the Vote of Confidence, and later also became 
members of the Council of Ministers. Here, the members were well short of the 23 
required to make one third of the strength of the BSP legislators. But Speaker was 
contending that the defection is ongoing process. Only 12 however, were visible, 
while the remaining 11 remained invisible. Even then the facade was kept up that the 
defections were within the purview of the anti-defection law. According to law, an 
official decision in regard to defections vests with the Speaker. If UP Assembly 
Sp(;aker would disqualify 12 BSP MLAs, the BJP government would collapse. But 
Speaker was delaying decision and taldng recourse; to various provisions and 
flexibilities that these are under the law. And he had held that all the defections were 
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valid.*' Though the purpose of the Anti Deftjctions Act-1985 was to end the trend of 
defections in our polity but state Assembly's Speaker gave a new interpretation of the 
Act on the status of the 12 BSP MLAs who voted with the BSP on October 21'', 1997 
to save the Kalyan Singh Government. However, such type of opportunistic 
defections by elected members have represented the worst form of political 
immiDrality." Thus, Kalyan Singh government had survived in spite of the best efforts 
of the Congress and the BSP to keep their members together. 
On 26"' October, 1997 Chief Minister, Kalyan Singh gave the governor a list 
of 760 MLAs who were to be made ministers. He included: 
<• all the 22 defectors from the Congress 
« all the 12 BSP defectors 
» all the 3 Janata Dal 
« one from Samata Party 
'» Two independents & rest from the BJP 
And Governor approved the list md swearing was to take place at 4 pm. 
Among three Ministers Raja Bhaiya was one of them who had a long record and 
having a history sheeter with No -A-163, and was to be sworn as a Cabinet Minister. 
The total strength of the UP Council of Ministers stood at 93, while normal strength 
of Ministry in UP has been between 40 arid 50. For e.g. 43 Ministere sworn in with 
Mayawati as a Chief Minister, 43 were i^ wom in as replacement or up-gradation, 
another 70 were sworn in on the 27* October. This made a total of 158 Ministers 
while in terms of cost, it was estimated that the new Cabinet would entail an annual 
liability of Rs. 100 crores on the state budget. But simmering discontent amongst 
those who had defected and supported the Kalyan Singh government started from the 
day that the Council of Ministers was expanded on 27* October, \991 as most were 
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unliappy with their portfolios. Again thes« happenings; led to the instability in UP 
power politics or instability of the goveiTiment in UP. As it was the day of 12* 
December 1997, it was came to know that some efforts were being made to form 
another government." But on 21*" February, 1998 the leaders of Loktantrik Congress 
informed Romesh Bhandari, then governor of UP about their decision to withdraw 
suftport from the BJP goveniment in ibe state and stated their claim to form 
government with the support of other parlies: Samajwadi Party, BSP and Congress; 
and these parties also informed to support the leader, Jagdambika Pal of the 
Lolktantrik Congress to form government.^ '' Jagdambika Pal had been elected as MLA 
on the ticket of Congress (I) group, which was breaking group of Congress. He fought 
election separately against the parent party in 1996 Assembly elections. He along with 
other member of Congress (T) group had merged with the Congress (I) when N.D. 
Tewari had been re-admitted into the Congress Party. Jagdambika Pal had the 
majority of the Loktantrik Congress and also the entire Janata Dal break way group. 
And he had letter of support from other parties with him. The entire group reached to 
Raj Bhavan with the 10 members from Loktantrik Congress making a 12. Mayawati 
herself came over to Raj Bhavan and she not only given her willingness to support 
Jagdambika Pal in writing, but wished to ensure that there should be no doubt in 
respect of her intentions while Mulayam Singh Yadav also telephoned the governor 
and said that his party had given a letter of support and he would be sending Ahmad 
Hassan to be personally present to show the support of the to the SP to the group led 
by Jagdambika Pal. And on the part of Congress, top Congress leiiders telephoned 
froim Delhi for their support to Jagdambika Pal and CPM, CPS were; also supporting 
Jagdambika Pal. 
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Kalyan Singh arrived in Raj Bhavzin accompanied the BJP president, Raj Nath 
Singh and five or six of his Cabinet colleagues fi*om the BJP, Chsiudhary Narendra 
Singh of the break way BSP group Vivek Singh of Loktantrik Congress. They had 
aheady sent a telegram to the president stating that Kalyan Singh should be given the 
opportunity to test his strength on the floor of the House. Both Vivek Singh and 
Virendra Singh wanted to meet the governor. Both ministers told that they were 
joining Jagdambika Pal. Vivek Singh said that even though Kalyan Singh had offered 
to elevate him to the Cabinet rank, yet he would prefer to leave the Kalyan Singh 
government. But at 7 p.m. governor was infonned that the President had written a 
letter to the Prime Minister expressing the view that Kalyan Singh be given the 
opportunity of verifying his assembly strength through a test on the floor of the 
House. But the main challenge was before the governor was that he should invite 
Jagdambika Pal to form the Government or to give an oipportunity to Kalyan Singh to 
prove his majority again on the floor of House, as stated by the President. In this hard 
situation governor, Romesh Bhandari was in responsibility to take a decision as under 
Article 163-164 of the Constitution. Provision under tWs Article em]powers Governor 
un(ier his exclusive jurisdiction. The choice of the Chief Minister falls within the 
exclusive power of the Governor and it has been the consistent view of the various 
Hij?h Court as well as Honourable Supreme Court that the court in exercise of its 
jurisdiction under Article- 226 of the Con;5titution of India carmot generally interfere 
with the discretionary power of the Governor. And before taldng a decision, 
Governor, Romesh Bhandari consulted lawyers who had been dealing with 
Constitutional matters: 
> R.N. Trivedi — a former Advocate General & 
> S.C. Mishra — President of Allahabad Bar Association. 
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And it was the view of both lawyers that the discretion was entirely that of 
Go\'emor, so he must act as he thinks fit and the decision that he would take, cannot 
be questioned. Thus, in keeping view the provisions of the Constitution and in 
consultation with lawyers, Governor, Romesh Bhandari took the final decision and 
sent a letter to Kalyan Singh that he was being dismissed. And invited Jagdamlaika 
Pal to form a Government and asked him to prove his majority on 24 February, 
1998. Jagdambika Pal gave to the Governor a list of 18 members to be sworn in, 17 
were former Ministers of Kalyan Singh Government and one was fi"om BKKP. And 
oath taking ceremony was arranged at very short notice jmd Jj^dambika Pal taken the 
oatli for Chief Minister. '^ However, Kalyan Singh government was dismissed and 
Jag(3ambika Pal was sworn in as the Chief Minister. Wliile the next day, most of the 
ML As of Loktantrik Congress, led by Naresh Agrawal, and switched their support 
back to the BJP. A division Bench of the UP High Court: restored ttie Kalyan Singh 
Government, in its judgement on 21*' Febniary, 1998. It stayed the dismissal order of 
the Kalymi Singh Government and ordered the status quo ante. But this judgment was 
challenged in the Supreme Couit. The Supreme Court in its judgment, on 24* 
February, 1998 directed the Speaker of Legislative Assembly to hold a "Composite 
Floor Test" in the assembly. Until the declairation of the result of the floor test in, both 
Kalyan Singh and Jagdambika Pal remained the Chief Ministers. ITie result of the 
floor test held on 26* February, 1998.^ ^ 
But for this a special session of the Uttar Pradesh assembly be summoned for 
on 26 February, 1998 to have a composite floor test betvv^ een the contending parties in 
order to see which out of the two claimants of Chief Ministership has a majority in the 
House and processing in the Assembly would be peaceful. Result of the composite 
test would be announced by the Speaker Jaithfiilly. And in the intenegnum no major 
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decisions would be made by the fimctioning government except attending to routine 
matter. The Supreme Court judgment, while not accepting the legality of the Kalyan 
Singji with this judgment, a u turn was made by the defectors. Such as: Naresh 
Aggarwal was back with Kalyan Singh while it was the statement of Vivek Singh that 
governor had offered him Rs 1 crore to jom Jagdambika Pal. In this way, Kalyan 
Sinjjh had brought back all his defecting ministers. And iJiis was Atal Bihari Vajpaye 
who went to Rashtrapati Bhavan and demanded the Governor's dismissal and 
delegation from supporting parties make similar demands. But former Prime Minister, 
Chandra Shekhar favored the decision of the governor and said that 'preservation of 
deniiocracy' was not confirmed to merely siifeguard the individual position of a Chief 
Minister, it had wider implications mcluding the free and fair elections and civilized 
behaviour by the people in authority. 
In response to such demand, governor write a letter to the Prime Minister, 
requesting him that he should be given an opportunity to explain his action. But he 
never received a reply. In press it was published that the Cabinet had considered the 
letter and had decided that the new government could take a decision on it. The major 
point of all these happenings was that the Governor, Romesh Bhaiidari was being 
criticized for his decision and was demanded for his resignation in response to his 
criticism. Governor's points were: 
• This main concern was to ensure political stability in the state, and not to 
create any situation of a fresh polls in UP in the delay of taking decision, law 
and order problem could be created. 
So, he has only two options either to give time to Kalyan Singh government to 
swear in a new government. So, Governor decided to call Jagdambika Pal to form a 
new government because of certain factors: 
113 
« Kalyan Singh government was a Coalition Government comprised the BJP 
and Samata Party with the support of defectors from the Congress (1), the BSP 
and the Janata Dal. 
« Out of 22 MLAs that had joined the Kalyan Singh government, 15 were 
physically presented in Raj Bhavan in addition. Raja Ram Pandey and Ram 
Pal Rajvanshi of the break way Janata Dal had also teamed up with 
Jagdambika Pal. 17 Ministers of Kaiyan Singh government had broken away 
from him and were physically present. So, from a total strength of 222 which 
Kalyan Singh government enjoyed, 17 had defected bringing the strength 
down to 205 at the maximum. Kalyan Singh was clearly in Minority. 
Thus, the voting took place on 26* February, 19^ )8 Kalyan Singh government 
secured 225 votes as opposed to 196 Jagdambika Pal governor reported this matter to 
the President as earlier strength of BJP was 222, it had gone up by more MLAs of as 
more MLAs of BSP had been over by the BJP sometimes in December, 1997. These 
Ministers became the great beneficiaries as by voting for Kalyan Singh government, 
they ensured that they would become Ministers.^ ^ 
However, Uttar Pradesh political system during 1990s decade had been of 
political instability and President's Rule for several times. Different governments 
were formed under different leaderships of distinct parties by itself or in an agreement 
with other parties. 
Table No. 14: Tenure of GoverDments in Uttar Pradesh in the l*>90s 
Governments 
Kallyan Singh 
President's Rule 
Mulayam Singh 
Political Party 
BJP 
-
SP-BSP 
Duration 
June 24 to December 4,1992 
December 4,1992 to June 3,1993 
June4,1993 to June 3,1995 
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Mayawati 
President's Rule 
President's Rule 
Mayawati 
Kalj^ an Singh 
Kalyan Singh 
R.P. Gupta 
Rajiiath Singh 
58 „ „ .. „ 
BJP-BSP 
-
-
BJP-BSP 
BJP 
BJP 
BJP 
BJP 
June 3,1995 to October 17,1995 
October 18,1995 to October 17,1996 
October 17, 1996 to March 21,1997 
March 21,1997 to September 20,1997 
September 21, 1997 to February 21, 1998 
February 22,1997 to November 12,1999 
November 12,1999 to October 28,2000 
October 29,2000 
Source; Sudha Pai, "Electoral Identity Politics in Uttar Prad«h: Hung Assembly Again", Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. XXXVll, No. 14, April 6,2002, p. 1337. 
Again, it was the 2002 Assembly election in Uttar Pradesh, when BJP 
provided its support to Bahujaji Samaj Psirty (BSP). The 2002 assembly elections 
were the first since 1991 when BJP did not win a plurality of the assembly seats. 
Though "Samajwadi Party" (SP) won the plurality of seats, yet it could not form a 
government due to the opposition of both tiiie BJP and the BSP. This situation brought 
the President's Rule in Uttar Pradesh which was lifted only when both parties: BJP 
and BSP resolved to form a Coalition Govemment.^ ^ Election result of 2002 assembly 
election created a situation of uncertainty in UP's political system due to the lack of 
majority party. In this election of Uttar Pradesh, the winner of the most seats was the 
provincial, Mandal, OBC-based 'Samajwadli Party.' And the runner up was its enemy, 
the provincial Mandal leaning, Dalit-based 'Bahujan Samaj Party'. While BJP came 
third even conversion from Mandir to Mandal.^ " The lack of majoritj^  party produced 
'Hung Assembly' in February, 2002 as in the 1996 elections. The result show that the 
BJl' has experienced a sharp decline reaching a low of only 88 seats compared to 174 
in 1996 elections. The Samajwadi Party (SP) and Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) have 
improved considerably on their earlier performance, means, SP obtained 147 seats 
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and BSP 97 compared to 110 and 67 seats ecirlier whereas the Congress Party dropped 
to only 26 seats as compared to 33 in the 1996 Assembly elections. 
Table No. 15: Number of Seats Won by Major Political Parties in UP 2002 Assembly Elections 
Political Parties 
Samajwadi Party 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
Bharatiya Janata Party 
Congress 
No. of Seats 
147 
97 
88 
26 
Source; Sudha Pai, "Electoral Identity Politics in Uttar Pradesh: Hung Assembly Again", Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. XXXVll, No. 14, April 6,2002, p. 1337. 
February 2002 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh gave a blow to the BJP's 
ambitions to consolidate its position as the only alternative to the Conj^ ress in national 
politics. However, an attempt was made to ensure that Mulayam Singh Yadav's SP 
would not be able to form the next government in the state, despite emerging as the 
single - largest party in the Assembly. With this intention, party leaders were 
conducting negotiations with Mayawati, the BSP leader. This negotiation led to the 
botJi parties understanding on power sharing in the state. This time it was agreed that 
Mayawati would head a Coalition Government with the BJP and smaller groups and 
individuals as jimior partners. But this arr<mgement with BSP was not acceptable to 
the leaders of the BJP in UP including Rajnath Singh, whose argument was that the 
power sharing alliance with a Dalit based party would alienate many of the BJP's 
supporters - the upper castes. But these leaders had to support BSP because of the 
BJP's central leadership. But soon contradictions started between both parties which 
resulted into the decision of Mayawati government to recommend dissolution of the 
assembly and the holding of fresh election. After the BJP-BSP alliance broke, on 
August, 28 UP governor Vishnu Kant Shasitri asked Mulayam Singh Yadav to present 
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him with a list of MLAs who would support his claim to become Chief Minister. 
However, SP presented a list of 205 out of 1^^05 MLAs, including MLAs belonging to 
the Congress, the RLD, Kalyan Singh RKP and small parties. In fact, it also included 
14 BSP MLAs. Thus, Mulayam Singh Yadav sworn as Chief Minister for the third 
time.^ ^ 
Thus, it can be said that BSP, Bahujan Samaj Party of downtrodden and 
oppressed section of society started its journey as a social movement and gradually 
transformed into a political one, completely in 1984 with the origin of BSP. Since 
then it has gone through various phases of its progress as: 
» The phase of 'Isolation'- the period of 1984 to 1993 when BSP had a 
distinguished character as a Dalit P^ irty but more as a social movement of the 
lower section of society which throughout this period remained untouched 
with another political paity by adopting isolation policy with a hostile attitude 
towards upper castes parties termed them as 'manuwadV. It showed BSP's 
opposition to Hindutva and caste based atrocities specially Congress. As 
Kanshi Ram in his treatise he termed the period in which SCs elite attached 
with Congress Party as 'Chamcha Age' as these elites are sellijig their interests 
of their community for personal advancement, said them as Chamar and put a 
target to form a social alliance of Dalits and backward castes to fight against 
their common enemy upper-castes. Mobilize the backwaid caste for its 
political motive to achieve political power, Kanshi Ram and Mayawati both 
campaign through 80s demanding the implementation of the Mandal 
Commission report for which a series of demonstrations and meeting were 
organized by both of them across North India agitating for the reservation m 
higher education and government jobs recommended by Mandal Commission. 
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Mayawati and Kanshi Ram's agitation was for the welfare of Baickward Castes 
was because this community is a core component of the Bahujan Samaj. With 
attempts to won the backwards, ESP leaders Kanshi Ram and Mayawati also 
made efforts to mobilize Muslim community by holding various meetings in 
villages of North India termed as. "Bhaichara Banao Programmes". Its great 
examples is of 15 December,1987 meeting held in Delhi's Jama Masjid 
where Mayawati asked Muslims to join Dalits and Backward Castes alliance 
in a an electoral fight against the upper castes dominated politics by whom 2% 
Muslims are given government jobs. 
So, it was the general election of 1989 which had given a ground to both 
leaders to test their efiforts of making an alliance of Dalits, Backwards, and Muslims 
minorities in North India, when BSP got a little but a significant success by winning 3 
seats in Parliament Bijnore, Azamgarh and Phillaur in Punjab. While in UP Assembly 
elections held in the same year 13 seats were won by BSP. 
• The successfiil efforts in the form of seats winning both in Parliament and U.P 
Assembly shows the BSP's strengtli and period of isolation politics, where it 
alone without a parties support made an entry into the power politics era.^ ^ 
• A share that became the process of politicization which eventiially mobilized 
various marginalized weaker section of society and brought them to the 
political arena. With this process every single social group became politicized 
giving birth to various political parties as the rise of 'Bahuj;m Samaj Party' 
(BSP) and 'Samajwadi Party' (SP) in UP in 1990s but 'exclmivisV in nature 
because of their confined electoral support to particular caste groups, 
particularly in 1990s. 
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Second phase started on in 1990s. UP has seen a transformation in its political 
scene since 1990s, in the form of huge frajpnentation of political paities. The main 
reason may be said is of 'identity politics' which gave a birth to the number of 
identity-based political parties stood respective sections of society. And it has also 
created instability in political system. In this fragmented scenario 'Bahujan Samaj 
Party? (BSP)' has emerged as a party of and Bahujan and now claimed or redefining 
itself as the party of 'Sarvqfan' (a party of all sections of society). And it is trying to 
woo the votes of upper castes also which was anti to the upper castes Ciirlier. 
In this competitive electoral scenario, the main aim of each and every party is 
to come into the main stream of politics i.e. by acquiring and maintaining power. This 
power politics has forced the parties to adopt various electoral strategies. Forming 
theii: coalition or alliances is one of the strategies which was used by BSP when for 
the iSrst tune it came into coalition with Samajwadi Party in 1993.^ ^ 
With their coalition a Bahujan phase started m UP that was an electoral 
alliiince between the Bahujan Samaj Party and Samajwjidi Party to the formation of 
Mul ayam Singh Yadav led government. But soon contradictions started between them 
because of the historic clash of their vote banks: Dalits and OBCs. The resuh of this 
electoral alliance came in the form of the end of their government. This type of 
electoral alliance cannot survive for a long term as the longevity of a political 
arrsmgement mostly depends upon the social coalitions also at grass root level that 
provide strength to the coalition. The only phenomena of a social coalition was lacked 
m BSP-SP electoral alliance in 1993.^ ^ 
After Bahujan Phase the phase which was started in UP Itnown as 'Post-
Bahujan Phase' when BSP came into an alliance with upper caste parties as BJP, a 
manmadi party, for time to time as in 1995, 1998, 2002 etc. BJP supported BSP in 
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1995 when SP-BSP coalition fell down and again in 1996 UP Assembly elections 
when both BJP-BSP came closer because of their respective mterests and reasons. 
1996 UP Assembly election scenario was different from earlier period as this time 
Mandal- Mandir issue was not highlighted to woo various sections of society. During 
this election the electoral fight was among three contenders: Mayawati, Mulayam and 
Kaly£in Singh. But due to the absence of ajay majority party or any group acqmred 
adequate number of legislatives to form a Coalition Government, BSP and BJP joined 
each other that was a "Post-electoral alliance' with a majority to form a government. 
The BJP motive behind joining BSP was to enlarge its base among the SCs. For this it 
was essential for BJP to woo the BSP and projected itself a Dalit friendly so that it 
could woo the Dalit, OBC and Muslim vote bank. BJP's this strategy created internal 
rift among its leaders such as Advani did not ready to accept that the era of single 
party government is over and this strategy of alliance may be against the interest of 
the piarty. But BJP's motive to broaden its electoral base required the support of other 
parties in the form of alliance formation to come into power which gave birth to the 
BSP-BJP alliance with the proposal of Cliief Ministership of BSP.** But alliance 
between enemies created various clashes; in fact such m alliance may be termed as 
"unnatural alliance " because the two opposite parties v/ere aligned with disfrust on 
each other.^ ^ 
A coalition analysis of party system is presented by Lawrence Dodd (1967) he 
has examined the durability of Coalition Government looking at the conditions which 
enable stable Coalition Government exist. In his view minimum winning coalitions 
are more likely to endure than either over or undersized groupings, he has suggested 
thr<;e intervening factors relating to the structure of party competition: the degree of 
cleavage conflict, fractionalization and stability. The degree of cleavage conflict 
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influences the extent to which parties are willmg to bargain over coalition 
meml3ership, while instability and fractionalization affect the certainty of information 
and hence the likelihood of a satisfactory (or Stable) outcome. In Indian context, 
Wyatl (1999:10-11) has used Dodd's analysis to explain the failure of parties in 
Uttar Pradesh to form mutually beneficial electoral alliances and government 
coalitions. He suggested that parties appealing to antagonistic caste constituencies 
(the BSP and SP) have added constraints on their ability to form coalitions imposed, 
when these would be unpopular among their core support group. 
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Cfiapter - TMrd 
Ideotogicdshift of<3afiujan 
Scmaj <PartyJrom (BaHujan to 
Sarvajan 
IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT OF BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY FROM 
BAHUJAN TO SARVAJAN 
Indian society got an experience of social revolution on having political consequences 
after getting freedom, which resulted into the transformation of political power from 
twice-bom upper caste to lower castes groups, known in India as the Other Backward 
Classes (OBCs) and the Dalits (former untouchables). This was the period of early 
post-independence elections when social prestige translated reality into political 
powe;r. During this period upper-caste patrons who contained about a fifth of the 
population could tell their lower-caste dependents that how they should vote. In this 
way, such type of directed elections produced state and national cabinets dominated 
by cfificials from upper-caste backgrounds but now the OBCs as well as Dalits 
togeiiher about two third of the population have displaced the upper-CEiste in the seats 
of power in many state cabinets.' One of such transformation is visible in the origm in 
Bahujan Samaj Party: BSP as of downtrodden, humiliated section of society, aiming 
at to give them the equal status in society with other privileged classes of social 
hierarchical order and started its task of bringing change iin social order by awakening 
these ignorant people (Scheduled Castes) to utilize their majority strength with other 
deprived sections: Backwards and Minorities (Muslims) to acquire political power, 
the only way to change their life and uplift their social staitus. 
One of the important point which is to be clear here that during the period of 
1984-98 BSP performed as an * ethnic party', a party which represents itself as a 
champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or set of category to the 
exclusion of others and this kind of representation becomes its strategy of mobilizing 
voters based on the principal of ascription, exclusion and centrality. However, on this 
basis, BSP for this period may be categorized as an ethnic party because BSP had the 
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long term goal, the political consolidation of caste and religious minorities in India 
collecjtively constitute a majority of the population, with an attitude of opposition to 
the Hindu upper-castes and it drew a separation line betM e^en Scheduled Castes; and 
its tai-get constituency were Scheduled Castes? 
Thus, the party since coming into existence in 1984 till now it has passed 
througji three distinct phases of electoral politics. First one remained till mid nineties 
with mainly a focus on 'Bahujan Samaj" comprising Dalits, Backw£ird Castes and 
Minorities; and it was a period characterized with clash or a type of hate against upper 
castes, and support to the Mandal classes: Backward Castes including Yadavs; and 
with all these characterization this first phase reached at its zenith with the formation 
of a 'Post-electoral alliance' with Mulayam Singh Vaclav's 'Samajwadi Party' in 
1993-Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections when both parties got success in forming a 
coalition government in UP. The start of second phase of the party took place with the 
brealldng of social and political relation betv\?een these two BSP and SP that ended the 
Coalition Government in 1995.' However, fix)m here i.e. mid 1990, a new trend 
started in UP politics where parties realized that if they would not have support from 
other castes and ethnic blocks, their vote bank could not be expanded. This realization 
made them ready to gave their tickets to candidates belonging to other castes or 
reli§;ious groups in 1996 Assembly Elections such as; BSP has given tickets to 
Bralimins and Muslims, BJP to Dalits and backwards, and the SP to upper caste and 
Dalits.^ After this since 1998, the party has begun to eliminate its line of exclusion 
bet^ veen the bahujan and the Hindu upper-castes and tiiis elimination process is its 
trarsformation from an ethnic party to a 'multiethnicparty* means a party that makes 
appeal related to ethnicity central to its mobilizing strategy but have a neutral or 
equidistance toward all relevant categories on the dimensions of ethnicity. So, the 
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founder of BSP Kanshi Ram and a great leader, Miss Mayawati a<lopted a new 
strategy to woo a particular section of upper-castes Hindus: 'Brahmins' but not with a 
direct approach to them, in fact, by convincing their political leader iis Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee from Bharatiya Janata Party and P.V. Narsimha Rao from Congress. Later 
on, sJince late nineties the party distributed a number of tickets in state as well as 
parliaimentary polls to upper to castes and intermediate castes candidate but without 
any social alliance between party's vote banks.^ 
Table No. 16: BSP Tickets to Upper Cast(js Groups in 2002 UP Assembly Polls 
Castes 
Brahmins 
Thakurs 
Vaishyas 
Kyastha 
No. of Tickets 
37 
36 
06 
03 
Source: Kumari Mayawati, "My Struggle Filled Life and the Jotimey of Bahujan Movement" (Hindi), Vol. Ill, BSP Central 
Office, New Delhi (2008), p. 792. 
On the other side other castes and religious communities had been given tickets like 
OBCs 122 and Muslims 857 
Thus, because of its policy of switching over from Bahujan Samaj to Sarvajan 
Samaj, BSP gained support from all caste groups and Muslims as well. For e.g. it 
gaiiiiedl4.7 percent more Dalit votes, while 7 percentage points among both the OBC 
and Muslims voters and amongst the upper caste by 2.2 percentage point. 
Table No. 17: Shift in Castes Support to BSP between 1999 and 2iQ02: 
Castes 
Upper castes 
OBC 
SC 
Muslims 
2002 
4.8 
15.3 
73.2 
9.0 
1999 
2.6 
8.3 
58.5 
1.7 
Gains/Loss 
+2.2 
+7.0 
+14.7 
+7.3 
Source: A.K. Verma, "UP Assembly Elections; Caste Dominates Ideology", Economic and Political Wedcly, Vol. XXXVIl, No. 
21, May 25,2002, pp. 1978-1979. 
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Above data show that preferences of various castes for BSP have changed more 
positively in 2002 Assembly elections in comparison to 1999 Lok Sabhai elections.* 
Gradually, BSP moved towards third phase where its electoral strategy has been 
changed from appeal to the upper castes sections directly, mainly 'Brahmins' and 
'Banias'. Mayawati encouraged these people to join hands with the Dalits and the 
pooKT backward castes to fight with the rising domination of landed, prosperous 
castes such as Thakurs, Yadavs, Jats, Kurmis, and Lodhs representing muscle power 
such a new electoral politics, introduced by Mayawati to vi^ oo the upper castes people, 
is known as: "Social Engineering** ^ Q strategy to make the BSP not only the party of 
bahujan samaj but a party representing the entire sections of society from lower to 
upper castes specially 'Brahmins' and 'Banias' in spite of their privileged position 
decided by birth, they are in a weak and insecure condition. 
One of the factors responsible for its emergence, is the weak position of 
Brahmins in two national parties: Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party because 
Congress became irrelevant in Uttar Pradesh while on other side BJP's influence was 
only among the Thakurs, Kurmi and Lodh leaders who occupied powerful position in 
BJP, In this electoral politics 'Brahmins' remained as an uninfluencing vote bank 
neitlier for BJP nor Congress had a stronger position in the state. Such type of 
neglected position was not only faced by Brahmins but .another upper caste 'Banias' 
who were also not given any importance by these political parties. Dominant classes 
as Thakurs, Yadav, Kurmi and Lodh were enjoying muscle and money power over 
other classes. However, Brahmins and Banias became the victims of this muscle and 
money power of these prosperous and privileged classes imder the shelter of 
Bhiiratiya Janata Party and in this prevailed situation of UP the BSP leader Miss 
Mayawati turned towards a new electoral strategy of shifting the emphasis of the 
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movement from majority to one tliat encompasses to the v,rhole society i.e. 'Sarvajan 
Samaj.' It indicates the BSP's shift of ideoloj^ from the welfare of Bahujan Samaj to 
the Sarvajan Samaj that means welfare of the all sections of society not of a particular 
community,^  and this ideology can be seen in the thought of Kanshi Ram that 
"Assemblies should reflect the composition of society. ""^  
This new strategy was formulated two and hdf years before the 2007 
Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh on the advice of the BSP's legal counsel, 'Satish 
Chandra Mishra' who played a commendable job being the member of the party in 
takmg a bold move to overturn the anti Bnjhminical position of the party." So, he 
may called as the main architect of this policy.'^  This new plan of Mishra was based 
on thie insecurity among the predominant community and the challenge posed by the 
rising economic and political sti-ength of the intermediate castes: Yaidavs and Jats, 
specially. This perceived feeling of insecurity increased more when some of the 
intermediate castes joined with aggressive landowning upper castes: Thakurs; BJP, 
the piarty to which Brahmins shifted their jdlegiance after the collapse of the Congress 
Part]/, was overrun by backwards castes leaders, Kalyan Singh and Vinay Katiyar as 
well as Thakurs as Rajnath Singh, who were not much concerned with Brahmins' 
problems. Thus, politically vulnerable condition of Brahmin community gave birth to 
the Tdea' in Satish Mishra's thought: the idea to revive the old Congress alliance 
betVi^ een the top and bottom ranges of the castes but vath a remarkable difference 
betv/een the Congress led 'Social Alliance' and BSP's 'Social Engineering' and the 
distinct point is that in past, Congress Party, run by Bralimins extended its patronage 
to Scheduled Castes with promise to provide them protection and prosperity, but now, 
the situation is in its reversed order, where Brahmins are in a condition of hope from 
BSP, a party of pre-exploited sections. Such an idea of Mishra convinced Mayawati to 
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have an alliance with 'Brahmins' who constituted 10% of the electorate that would 
also be help&l in influencing the Bania comimunity who were being oppressed by the 
landed mafia. The implementation of this idea started with the 'Brahmin Sammelans' 
and for this purpose a 'Maha Sammelan' (Grand Meeting) was organized on 9* June, 
2005 in the state capital, Lucknow. By orgEinizing this meeting, BSP imparted a new 
dimension to the caste- oriented politics of Uttar Pradesh by showing its growing 
influence among the Brahmin community''* and this m(Kting was a historical one 
where Brahmins paid homage to Mayawati, a lower caste origin; and she in return 
gave assurance of protection to them.'^  During her speech, Miss Mayawati blamed the 
manuwadi parties and media to play negative role against the Bahujan Samaj Party's 
ideology so that upper castes people could not join Bahujjm Party, as is written by her 
in autobiography: "My Struggle Filled Life And The Journey of Bahujan Movement", 
Vol. 2. (Hindi)" Not only had this but she eilso made it clear that upper caste parties 
gave a slogan: "Tilak, Taraju our Talwar; Inko Maro Jute Char" in the name of BSP 
to bring upper castes people £igainst BSP and she also said that the blame of 
opposition parties on BSP being anti-upper caste and Hindu religion, is also not true; 
and to clarify this, she said that our party is not against the Hindu religion except 
those parts which are said about the Bahujan Samaj in Hindu religion and are against 
the self respect of these depressed sections of society. To make her statement more 
influential she also repeated the statement of Dr. AmbedJkar given by him during the 
presentation of Hindu Code Bill on 24* February, 1949: 
"If you people, means upper castes people, want to safe Hindu system, 
Hindu culture, and Hindu society, whatever weaknesses had been 
originated, do not he hesitating to reform them. This bill wants to reform 
only those organs that had been defaulted, nothing else than it " 
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But here, it is necessary to be clear certain points that differentiate Kanshi 
Ram or his Bahujan Samaj Party fiom B.R. Ambedkar, though Dalit Movement in UP 
was inspired by Ambedkar. We find difference between the ideologies of both 
regarding the caste because Ambedkar believed in the 'abolition of the caste system' 
as he propagated in his book 'Annihilation of Caste', for him it was vital for Dalit 
emanicipation but contrary to him, Kanshi Ram and Mayawati have favored the 
awakening of Dalit and backward identities. They have promoted the caste system in 
order to mobilize Dalits towards the restoration of their caste identit/ to transform 
society into a 'Samtamulak Samaj' (equal society) in which all castes would be seen 
equally and each having its own caste ideology. However, he believed in a strategy 
for Dalits to use their castes as a means or tool to emjmcipate themselves until a 
casteless society was formed. Miss Mayawati, during her speech, presented view 
before the upper castes people that if they change their manuwadi thinking and 
cooperate in bringing social change by abolishing unequal social order, these upper 
caste; people would be given honor and respect by Bahujan Samaj Party. Such a 
changed society would be in the interest of all castes and communities and nation. 
In this way, in these unique meetings Brahmins paid homage to Mayawati and she in 
retujn they were assured by her protection find along with these meetings "Bhaichara 
Samdtis" or brotherhood organizations were opened in every villages that were jointly 
run by Dalits and Brahmins.'^  
Regarding her party's ideology Miss Mayawati, in an interview on 12.4.2006, 
presented her view that 'we are for an equal social order. Social inequality and 
discrimination result in economic inequality; and if there is not any social inequality, 
if opportunities are truly equal, there would be no economic inequality also. Our aim 
is to establish a 'SamtamulakSamaj'{a. society based on equality). The Congress and 
132 
BJP twisted this to say that we are against upper castes but it is not trae in feet right 
from my first stint as Chief Minister, I have always ensured diversity in my ministries 
and the bureaucracy. I gave ticket to upper castes, made them Ministers each time, I 
formed a government. After my three stints in power, the fear that I am for a single 
community that I would discriminate against other conmiunities has been completely 
shed. Today, there is the complete trust between the BSP and the upper castes.'^ ^ 
Addressing a news conference. Miss Mayawati also said that, 'we are only opposed to 
Manu an manuwadi system which bred casteism in society, leading to harassments of 
the Bjihujan Samaj {Dalits)?^ It is still against manuwad that led to tlie division of 
society into four Varna while BSP wants to end and this discriminatory order which is 
only possible when upper castes will integrate with Dalits then mutual suspicion and 
hatred would end this would be called 'samajik parivartan' (social change). Since 
BSP is more a social revolution, a political movement than a political party so, it 
wants to bring in true equality which is m the interest of both country and society. 
But BSP's move towards upper castes gave a blow to the Congress Party 
which immediately called a conference of senior party members of Uttar Pradesh on 
June 18*, 2005 to plan a strategy to woo back Dalits as well as those who had drifted 
to other parties. During this conference, Union Minister, Mahavir Prasad criticized 
BSP' President, Mayawati for her party's approach towards upper castes, saying that 
BSP is a party that attacked upper castes earlier, is now going out to woo them. 
Another statement was given by UP Congress Chief, Salman Khursheed that the BSP 
waj; running out of its basic philosophy md is now turning to other communities 
unlike the Congress which had an "inclusivephilosophy".^ 
But such criticisms did not create the hindrance in the way of BSP's progress 
and it succeeded in achieving the support from all the section of society. However, in 
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this chamged ideological scenario, different social layers constitute the party and 
played important roles in the growth of the party; first layer representing Dalits, the 
backbone of the BSP's electoral support while second layer is backward castes 
comprising both Hindus and Muslims and third one is an emerging constituency of 
upper castes led by Brahmins and supported by Banias and Kayasthas. Thus, since 
1996 Assembly elections to 2007 Assembly elections an increased support of castes 
for BSP can be seen: 
Table No. 18: BSP Castes Support 1996 - 2007 
Year 
1996 
2002 
2007 
Upper Castes 
4% 
5% 
16% 
OBCs (Non Yadav) 
13% 
20% 
27% 
Muslims 
12% 
10% 
17% 
Dalits 
62% 
69% 
77% 
Source: AjoyBose, Behenji: A Political Biography of Mayawati", Penguin, India (2008), p, 231. 
Regairding BSP's support base an important factor has b(;en pointed out by a social 
scientist, Yogendra Yadav of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 
(CSDS) i.e. 'Poor Versus Rich' because among the core electoral base of BSP, Dalits 
majority are poor and even among upper castes and Backward Castes, the poorer 
sections have voted for BSP. 
Table No. 19: BSP's Class Based Support 
Castes 
Brahmin 
Rajput 
Jat 
Kurmi 
Yadav 
Rich 
12 
10 
11 
12 
05 
Poor 
27 
14 
22 
20 
05 
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Non-Yadav OBCs 
Lower OBCs 
Jatav 
Other Dalits 
Muslims 
!Z¥ 
27 
18 
73 
30 
12 
34 
30 
86 
56 
18 
Source: Ajoy Bose, Behenji: A Political Biography of Mayawati", Peni^uin, India (2008), p. 232. 
Mayawati embarked on her celebrated Brahmin rallies that were accompanied 
by Satish Chandra Mishra. These rallies touched over the 26 districts of UP.'^ ^ Before 
2007 assembly elections in UP a state level 'Brahmin Samaj Bhaichara Banao' (Caste 
Amity) officer's meeting was held on 11* November, 2006 in which Miss Mayawati 
said that Brahmin section has also been the victim of traditionalist party's exploitation 
because of which poverty and unemployment have occurred in Brahmin community. 
The main factor responsible for this is the wrong economic policy of Congress, BJP 
and their supporting parties who have always made their economic policies only in 
the interest of rich and industrialists ^^  but BSP, "Bahujan Samaj Party" with the 
objective of bringing social change and economic freedom, want to change the 
unequal social order based on 'manuwad,'' diat has also created economic inequality, 
so that a social order based on equality can be established in which humanity, would 
prevail. It would eliminate the inhuman activities like untouchability and casteism etc 
and a social order would not be against any religion or caste but in the interest of the 
nation. In pursuing such an objective, if upper caste people would cooperate then not 
only they will be respected but they would be given opportunities in respect of their 
work efficiency and their work for the party would be measured in accordance to their 
work efficiency and its result. '^ 
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The journey of BSP from Bahujan to Sarvajan was; not easy for it because at 
its first step, party tap the more socially committed among Brahminsi and through 
them made appeal to the larger community. The BSP needed Brahmins and other 
forward castes to come forward in providing their assistance and cooperation to BSP 
and they were responded by the party through allotting tickets, Rajya Sabha 
nomiiiations and ministerial berths. The induction of Satish Chandra Mishra, 
Advocate General in the BSP government played a major role in wooing Brahmins, as 
he a^ p-eed to canvass support among likeniinded Brahmins and coordinators were 
appointed to organize district level Brahmin's Maiha Sammelans (Brahmin 
Congregations).^ ^ And by 2007 there was a 'Brahmin Revolution' in UP. Mayawati 
was focusing on forming 'Bhaichara Banao Samitis' (Brotherhood Building 
Comimittees) in all the 403 Assembly constituencies and each Samiti structured down 
to title booth level constituting 300 Brahmins and 100 Dalits that was chaired by a 
Bralmiin and a Dalit General Secretary. Assembly area had division mto 25-30 
sectors and each sector had eight to ten booths. 
Besides Brahmin Maha sammelans Bahujan Samaj Party made attempts to woo 
other upper castes: Kshatriya, Vaishya and Kayastha communities as for as Kshatriya 
community is concerned, Miss Mayawati directed BSP leaders to associate the upper 
caste people, Thakurs also with the party and ally their fears that BSP's welfare 
agenda was for Dalits only but to bring equality in society, coming together of upper 
castes and Dalits is essential. Therefore, Thakurs are also being invited to the party 
and to achieve this objective Mayawati set the party's Thakur leaders the task of 
organizing district level meetings and convincing people that only BSP could fight for 
their interests. Three Thakur legislators: .Taiveer Singh (Barauli, Aligarh), O.P. Singh 
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(Sultaiipur) and Kuldeep Singh (Unnao) have been to hold meetings to spread BSP's 
30 
message. 
Other is the Bania community who constitute three per cent of the population. 
After the successful completion of Brahmin Maha Sammelan in Lucknow, BSP hold a 
'Bania Sammelan' in Agra on 17* July, 2005 in order to forge a tie with a powerful 
trading Vaishya Community in Uttar Pradesh. This decision to organize a Bania 
Sammelan was taken by BSP Supremo, Mayawati.^ ' It was stated by the BSPs 
national Spokesman, Sudhir Goel, the Chief Guest at Sammelan, Mayawati is trying 
to unite other OBC trading castes: Teiis, Sahus, Halwais, and Sonar etc who make up 
anotlier 10 per cent. Bania Sammelans were held by the BSP in Ag^ ,^ Allahabad, 
Menit, Muzaffar Nagar, Kanpur, Farukkhabad, Sant Kabir Nagar and Jhansi in order 
to woo these sections of the society, ^^  among which one was held on 28**' December, 
2006 in Lucknow where Miss Mayawati told about the permanent association of 
trading with her party and promised it security and political participation.^ ^ As 
pointed out by Goel, tradmg castes were the first victims of exploitation and 
kidnapping because of this reason security was a matter of great importance for them. 
The prevailed chaotic law and order situation gave emergence to tlie "coalition of 
victims." Being opportunistic in its approach BSP leader, Mayawati realized the 
importance of the consolidation of these victims or non-Yadav coalition into BSP 
which would be helpful to stood as victorious one.^ '* And also told that once the 
Vaishyas enter the BSP fold, the weaker sections of society, who are well entrenched 
in the party, would guard their interests. She also claimed that the controversial 
slogans of 'Tilak, taraju aur taluar, inko maro jute char' was coined not by the BSP 
but by the BJP and the Congress to defame the party, while BSP is not against any 
religion or caste but believe in creating a "Samtamulak Samaj" that is ''Egalitarian 
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Society." In this way, to bring more and more upper castes people into its fold, BSP 
has constituted "Bhaichara Baraho Committee" (Develop Brotherhood Committees) 
at every Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) constituency to forge an alliance 
directly with the castes or communities, not with the support from any political 
party?*' BSP sent directives to all its district Brahmin MLAs, ex MLAs and other 
leaders to mobilize their own community.^ ' 
Bahujan Samaj Party extended its influence among other ca.stes through a 
strategy of giving 'share in ticket distribution* on which basis BSP brought a 
revolution in UP electoral politics in 2007 Assembly elections. This strategy proved 
helpfol in attracting Brahmins and Vaishyas conamunities because Brahmins and 
Vaishyas as well as Dalits, the opposite groups became ready to come closer because 
of their common threat posed by the nexus formed by the dominant Other Backward 
Castes (OBCs) including the Yadavs and the Rajputs?^ 
Such a strategy was also reflected in party's priorities when Miss Mayawati 
said that 'after regaining power BSP would work for the upliftment of the SCs, STs, 
OBCs and Minorities and it would work for the welfai'e of these communities and 
give them an opportunity to move ahead on the social ladder. Apart from these 
sections of society, BSP would also tal:e care of tlie interest of the poor and 
unemployed belonging to the upper castes. Schemes would be launched for the 
welfare of farmers, labourers, lawyers, government employees and traders and this 
was made clear by her in an interview to "ITie Hindu" in April 2006, 
"The majority of the people in our country are poor. Even among the 
higher castes, it is a small percentage that is privileged, the rest are poor 
and have the same wants of roti, kapda, our malum (food, clothes and 
shelter). We are for an equal social order. Social inequality and 
discrimination result in economic inequality, if opportunities were truly 
equal, there would be no economic inequality. Our aim is to establish a 
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Samatamulak Samaj (a society based on equality). I am still against 
Manuwad. What is Manuwad? It is division of society into four Varnas. The 
BSP wants to end this discriminatory order, and we have succeeded to quite 
an extent. As upper castes integrate with Dalits, mutual suspicion and 
hatred will end. This is samajik parivartan (social change).'^^ 
From said statement it becomes obvious that BSP's aim is to make a society based on 
equality and to achieve this goal it would have to t^e the upper castes and Dalits 
togetlier to build a bigger sarva samaj (a society for all communities)/' Following 
this strategy Miss Mayawati distributed elections tickets in 2007 Assembly elections 
in following way: 
Table No. 20: The BSP Candidates and MLAs in 2007 in UP 
Ticket 
Elected 
u 
CQ 
O 
110 
51 
«3 
"3 Q 
93 
62 
CO 
86 
39 
J 
1 
61 
24 
cfi 
•3 
> 
14 
12 
0-
38 
18 
-^ ' 
m 
SI 
1 
0 
"3 
0 
H 
403 
206 
T 2 
Source; Paul Wallace, Ramashray Roy, "India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Comjwtition and Congress 
Continuity", Sage, New Delhi (2011), p. 145. 
About this ticket distribution Miss Mayawati said that she and her party 
merabers tried to get a majority. This ticket distribution is an effort: to achieve the 
support of all castes and communities with a focus of shifting from Bahujan to 
Sarvajan.^^ This transformed ideology of BSP, from exclusively Dalit to wooing all 
social classes, made possible for it to emerge as a majority party in 2007 Assembly 
elections of UP, a state where since 1991 no party could won majority in the House'^  
and so many times President's Rule had been imposed during this period in the state 
such as: 
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Table No. 21: Presideirt's Rule in Uttar Pradesh since 1992 - 2002 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Tenure 
06 December, 1992 to 
04 December, 1993 
18 October, 1995 Suspended and 27 
October, 1995 
17 October, 1996 to 21 March, 1997 
Legislative Assembly Suspended 
08 March, 2002 to 03 May, 2002 
Legislative Assembly Suspended 
Period 
Eleven months and 
twent)' nine days 
Nine days 
Five months md four days 
One month and twenty five days 
Source: Kumari Mayawati, "My Struggle Filled Life and the Journey of Bahujan Movement" (Hindi), Vol. Ill, BSP Central 
Office, New Delhi (2008), p. 1080. 
However, after a long ups and downs, BSP, on the basis of new strategy of 
Political representation according to numerical strength of castes ^ ^ secured a majority 
in tlie Uttar Pradesh Assembly with 51.2 per cent of votes polled."*^  During this 
election BSP received the support from all castes and communities for which it tried 
much since 2005 by approaching them directly specially upper castes. 
Table No. 22: Voting Pattern of the irP Castes and Communities in 2007 
Castes/Communities 
2007 
47 . 
Dalits 
77 
OBCs (lion Yadav) 
27 
Muslims 
17 
Upper Castes 
16 
Source; Paul Wallace, Ramashray Roy, "India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress 
Continuity", Sage, New Delhi (2011), p. 145. 
In this 15* Assembly elections of UP, BSP got an absolute majority of 206 
seats munch more than other parties. The number of seats won by major political 
parties and percentage of vote are give below: 
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Table No. 23: Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections Result - 2007 
Party 
INC 
BJP 
BSP 
CPI 
CPM 
NC:P 
SP 
R1.D 
Jaiiata Dal - United 
LT Congress 
Jajii Morcha 
Riishtriya Swabhiman Party 
Bliaratiya Jan Shakti 
UP United Democratic Front 
Rashtriya Parivartan Dal 
Other Parties 
Independents 
Total 
4 r : „ . . . „ .. 
Contested 
392 
349 
402 
21 
14 
44. 
392 
254 
16 
2 
118 
122 
65 
54 
14 
1238 
2574 
6071 
Won 
22 
50 
206 
0 
0 
0 
97 
10 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
2 
0 
9 
402 
Vote (per cent) 
8.56 
16.93 
30.46 
0.09 
0.31 
0.10 
25.45 
3.71 
0.43 
0.18 
0.60 
0.26 
0.24 
0.35 
0.21 
5.19 
6.97 
100 
Source: A.K. Verma, "Mayawati's Sandwich Coalition", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIl, No. 22, June 2.2007, p. 
2039. 
This resuh show that BJP was the biggest loser because its sesits declined from 
174 seats in 1996 and 88 in 2002 to 50 in 2007 while SP, which wa:s able to manage 
143 seats in the last elections, won 97 seats in 2007.''^  Thus, after getting victory in 
2007 elections, BSP Chief, Miss Mayawati assumed power of the state and became 
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the Chief Minister for a fourth term. She headed a 50 member jumbo ministry 
consisted of 19 Cabinet Ministers, 21 Ministers of State with independent charge, 9 
Ministers of State/^ Composition of new Council of Ministers was also based on 
social balance reflecting rainbow coalition such as Cabinet Ministers composed of 
eight Dalits, four Brahmins, four OBCs £ind one each from the Muslims, Bania, 
ThakuT and Bhumihar Communities. 
Table No. 24: Castes and Communities in Cabinet Ministers of Mayawati Government - 2007 
Caste & Community 
Dalits 
Brahmins 
OBCs 
Muslims 
Baniya 
Thjikur 
No. 
8 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
Bhijmihar • 1 
Source; Ajoy Bose, Behenji: A Political Biography of Mayawati", Penguin, India (2()08), p. 191. 
Wliile the Ministers of State with Independent charge included eleven Dalits, seven 
OElC members and four each from the Bralimin, Thakur and Muslim Commimities. 
7'abie No. 25: Castes and Commnnities in Ministers of State with Independent Charge - 2007 
Caiste & Community 
Dalits 
OBCs 
Brahmins 
Thakur 
Muslims 
51 .. _. . . . . 
No. 
11 
7 
4 
4 
4 
Source; Ajoy Bose, Behenji; A Political Biography of Mayawati", Penguin, India (2008), p. 191 
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However, BSP's victory in the UP elections 2007 can be seen in its long way 
process, started from an 'exclusivist* Dalit politics to Hnclmivisf politics/^ Its 
exclusivist ideology was started by its founder, Kanshi Ram who divided India's 
population into two group, 85 percent bahujans and 15 percent manuwadis. In this 
politics different castes and communities were brought closer in the name of common 
history of exclusion. Marching towards an inclusive ideology BSP leadership has 
included the upper castes with the slogan of 'Sarvajan' but in the start of this 
coalition of Dalit and Brahmins, Mayawati was not in an illusion of about the 
political commitment of upper caste to BSP, as she said in her speech on Jime 3, 
2005: 
"Bahujan Samaj should not trust the upper castes who are joining the 
party because ... it will take time to change their hearts. Hence they 
should not rely or trust the upper caste in the constituencies where the 
candidates are from the Bahujan caste. The upper castes will not cast 
their votes in favor of the Bahuajan caste candidate. But Bahujan caste 
votes should transfer their votes totally in favor of the upper castes 
candidates in every constituency where they are contesting on the BSP 
ticket, though in such constituencies also the upper castes will not vote en 
masse for the upper caste candidate contesting on the BSP ticket. But in 
this process, even if the upper caste candidate gets 2 to 3 per cent of the 
upper caste votes, the BSP as a party can enhance its tally from the per 
cent by 50 to 60 seats. This will give the BSP a chance to form a majority 
government for a full five years term in the state."' 
In this way, BSP got success in forming a coalition of Dalit - Brahmins and Muslims 
and through this it became victorious in establishing an independent Dalit political 
leadership. 
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Concfusion 
CONCLUSION 
India, after its freedom from the clutches of colonial power, had to face other internal 
problems like as social and economic backwardness of some sections of its society. 
Among them the most backwards were "Scheduled Castes" (SCs). The basic reasons 
for their backwardness were the prevailed inhuman activities in society like as 
'untouchability' and their 'impure' occupation for their livelihood. In this context, Dr. 
Aml)edkar's view was that, "The root cause of untouchability lies in a pronounced 
cultural or racial difference of contempt and hatred coupled with a close economic 
dependence of the inferior society on the superior one". In such a society birth in a 
particular caste determines their occupation. Caste, in the words of Martindale and 
Monachere, 'an aggregate of persons whose share of obligations and privileges is 
fixed by birth, sanctioned and supported by religion and magic, led to the 
discrimination and social injustice in society'. To tackle this discrimination and social 
injustice, the concept of 'affirmative action' originated in independent India, having 
an important position in Constitution. The importance of this concept lies in the fact 
that it is in the favour of 'Scheduled Castes' and 'Scheduled Tribes' as they were 
being discriminated for a long time on the grounds of their castes. It also provides 
them proportional representation i.e. reser\'ation accordiing to their proportion in the 
total population. These reservations are in the fields of education, employment and 
industry etc. Only by such attempt, a middle class of Scheduled Castes could emerge 
who at the time of independence, had the lowest literacy rates of all ethnic categories, 
and majority of them were in labour and service occupation. Despite these equitive 
measures, the condition of Dalits (SCs) did not improve on satisfactory level and they 
remained marginalized and discriminated on account of their caste. 
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This oppressed section of Indian society needed a support and a platform from 
wheris they could raise their voice against those inhumane activities and atrocities of 
which they were being subjected. Though various Social Movements were started for 
their cause and great leaders sacrificed their lives to give a digniiied life to these 
depRjssed sections m society, like Ambedkar and Kanshi Ram. But Ksmshi Ram was 
the i)erson who realized that the political empowerment of Dalits is the only way 
which could give them their due place and identity in society. To give practical touch 
to his thought he represented himself as the leader of Dalits and made efforts to create 
a homogeneous identity for the diverse Dalit castes that represent the lower level of 
caste hierarchy in Hindu religion. He believed that their representation in democratic 
power is the only means by which they could enjoy a respectfiil and dignijfied life in 
the society. Kanshi Ram united a large section of Dalits with other Minorities and 
OB(;;s who were earlier excluded from the democratic process of the country, and led 
the foundation of'Bahujan Samaj Party' (BSP) in April, 1984 under its shadow these 
people came together with a new political identity, crafted by Kanshi Ram, known as 
"bahujan identity". He established this paity with a belief that the exploited groups 
could obtain access to electoral power, aimed at to establish a just society based on 
the principles of equality and justice. He termed his constituency ais the "Bahujan 
Samaj" (majority community) constituting all those castes which were oppressed by 
the twice-born upper castes community. 
Originally, BSP has its roots in Social Movement as a struggle agamst 
'Brahminism' and aimed at to create awareness amongst these exploited sections to 
form a socio-political block. Its mission was to form a s and the way to this was the 
''bahujan rule". The first step, towards achievement of this rule was to organize the 
educated and employed people of these sections, was tal:en by Kanshi Ram in 1973 so 
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that iiiey could be motivated to pay b^k to the society; and it resiilted into the 
formation of "All India Backward and Minority Communities Employees Federation " 
(BAMCEF) in 1973, "Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti" (DS-4) in 1981; and 
finally "Bahujan Samaj Party" (BSP) in 1984 in UP. 
Since India's independence Congress was in a dominant position in the state 
UP £ind controlled its politics through the alliance of Brahmins, Dalits and Muslims. 
But since the mid-1980s both party system ajid the structure of parties had undergone 
a process of change. This change resulted into the transformation of single dominant 
part}' system into an unstable, fragmented party system. Due to tMs transformed 
nature of party system, two type of political parties emerged in UP: one form was 
"caste and community" based parties and second one was "religion biised" parties. It 
means that narrower and sectarian parties based on identities of caste, religion and 
region were emerged. Such type of transfonnation can be seen in the origm of BSP in 
UP which emerged as an 'identity based Dalit party' in 1984, because of the 
development of political awareness among Dalits. As an identity based political party, 
it challenged the hierarchical structures of social and political power dominated by 
upper castes and has contributed in strengthening Dalit identity. It has a clearly 
defined political agenda aimed at the political empowerment of the Dalits and some 
Most Backward Castes in UP. 
Uttar Pradesh, having lai'gest parliamentary constituencies in India, is neither a 
'two party system' state nor had any majority party which have its social presence and 
electoral power in all the regions of state. The reason behind this is the social structure 
of the state where a religion based party like BJP with its 'Hindutva' ideology is 
challenged by the 'caste based parties' SP and BSP. Furthermore, since caste is not a 
hegemonic construction in society, important sub-castes have been used by different 
178 
caste leaders for electoral victories. BSP is one among them whose titrgeted base is 
Dalit caste. But out of 66 Dalit castes, only four: Shoemsiker (Cobbler) caste known 
as Ravidasi or Harijan, Pasi, Dhobi and Kori (Weaver) are actively represented while 
rests are invisible. In fact,, the Chamar category in Uttar Pradesh, for example, 
includes four categories: Chamar, Dhusija, Jhusia, and Jatav whose members 
sometimes describe themselves collectively £is the Chamais and sometijmes emphasize 
their distinct identities. 'Cobbler Caste' that is the largest Dalit community in UP 
constitutes 56.20 percent of the total Scheduled Castes population i.e. 21.1 percent of 
the state's total population according to the 2001 census. However, it becomes a 
dominant Dalit sub-caste because of its numerical strength. Besides its numerical 
strength, their education during colonial power was another reason which brought this 
Dalit sub-caste in mainstream of the party. It also enabled them to get jobs on the 
basis of 'positive discrimination' in the country. Consequently, Chamar is the 
category of Scheduled Castes who modernized earliest even much before the 
emergence of BSP, a middle class within this caste had emerged and with the 
emergence of BSP they became politically more emjwwered and contributed to 
strengthen the democracy because they were among the first SCs elites to obtain posts 
wittiin the BSP and became dominant one making BSP successful in attracting 
Chamar support. Being dominant one, they prevented the incorporation of new elites 
from other Scheduled Caste categories. Though Constitutional provisions and their 
own political party, BSP, improved the position of Dalits, yet these could not provide 
similar status to other marginalized sub-cas;tes like Jogi, Nat, Musahar, Kanjar, Dom, 
Domar, Heia, Basor and Bansphor etc because of which they remained unbenefitted. 
It shows that in state we not only find discrimination between religions, castes but 
also sub- castes. 
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However, in this hierarchical social setup and diverse religions and castes, 
sub-castes, proliferation of political parties took place whose sole aim l)ecome pursuit 
of 'political power' on any basis. BSP is one of the examples of this which has 
becoifne a narrowly- based electoral party since the mid 1990s. Before this, it emerged 
as a radical Social Movement but it was the period mid-1990s since when it started to 
adopt various mobilization strategies through which it could achieve its aim of 
capturing state power or 'pursuit of power* that is central concern of politics. This 
transformation in BSP's politics is criticized by some observers for adopting an 
'opportunistic strategy' because such opportunistic attitude has replaced the party's 
earlier ideology oi Dalit identity. This was the period of 1985 to 1993 when BSP, a 
Dalit based party made attempts to mobili^ K the poor and underprivileged on caste 
line, as an ideology to break the existing system and criticized the mainstream parties 
as 'manmvadi' parties like BJP and Congress. However, during this period it 
repr(;sented itself as a 'secular' Dalit party, for which BSP can be categorized as an 
ethnic party. During this phase it adopted an 'isolationist' policy. 
After this first stage, BSP started an alliance game and became an opportunist 
party. This period started in 1993, from where UP politics took an important turn 
when for the first time BSP, a party headed by, run by and voted for by the lowly 
'untouchables' castes formed part of the winning coalition in a state election. This 
Assembly election was the aftermath of demolition of Babri masjid in December 6, 
1992 during the rule of Bharatiya Janata Party but this incidence led to the fall of BJP 
government. In this situation political parties got an opportunity to play commimai 
politics in state, hi this way when 1993 Assembly elections was to be held communal 
politics was already in its ftiU height that dividend the society on communal lines 
and an instability occurred in political sphere. However, during this Assembly 
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elections in 1993 BSP joined hands with Bsickward Caste party, the SP to establish 
the rule of Bahujan Samaj consisting of Dalits, Backwards, Tribals and Minorities. 
But only after sixteen months tliis electoral unity failed due to the lack of social 
alliance between these two opposite constituencies' castes of these panics. Then BSP 
reali2:ed that it was not capable to receive sufficient support from the Backward 
Castes who did not concern for Dalits so, the BSP came closer to the 'manuwadi'BJP 
with a hope that this alliance would be more workable than the SP - BSP alliance 
because between these two: BSP and BJP clashes are not as sharp as between the 
Backw^ds and Dalits. So, BSP, in this Posit-bahujan phase, decided to compromise 
with its radical goals and capture state power by any means. Following this strategy 
BSP entered into coalitions with BJP in 1995, 1997 and 2002 under thie leadership of 
Mayawati. These coalitions were not based on any common ideology but only were a 
real politics: the 'pursuit of power' throuj^ h extending its vote base among other 
cast<;s and communities irrespective of thieir past unfiiendly social relations and 
distinct ideologies. That is why the alliance of 1995 between BSP - BJP was 
described by Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee as a **miracle of democracy**. 
Another electoral strategy is visible in BSP since 2005, when BSP is 
competing for the votes of upper- castes, particularly Brahmins who aj-e moving away 
from the BJP and the Congress. It was ambition for electoral competitiveness and 
politics among parties which prepared it to go beyond its Dalit constituency by 
reac;hing out to new caste groups. The characteristic point of this mobilization strategy 
is that for this BSP is approaching directly to twice bom castes through various 
sammelans only in order to broaden its base so that it could help it in winning 
electoral war. Because of new political phenomenon this Dalit Bnahmin coalition, 
BSP became successful in forming its government by getting majority of votes in 
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2007 elections of Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly where since 1991 not a single 
party was able to acquire an absolute majority. But an important point which is to be 
discussed here that what was the reason which made it possible for Bnihmins, the top 
most in the caste hierarchy in Hindu religion to cast their votes in the favour of a party 
of Dalits, who are an outcaste in the caste ridden society of our country? The 
hierarchical Indian Vamashram society is made up of two major social blocks: 
constitute Brahmin, Kshatriya; and Vaishya, Shudras while 'untouchables' 
(Outcastes) known as Dalits are at the margin of the Varna order. Traditionally, 
Bratimins led Dwijas were in dominant position to rule but after independence due to 
the Mandal implementation and development of slogan of social justice, Shudras 
(Mandal Castes) got an opportunity to rule the society and on other hand Dalits were 
also being empowered, politically. And gradually Dalits, the outcastes, started to 
reject both Dwija's and Shudra's rule. This development resulted into the Hung 
Assemblies in UP where votes were divided among the 'Anti-Brahminkai Social 
Forces' represented by Mulayam Smgh's 'SP' and Miss Mayawati's 'BSP'; and a 
type of instability occurred in state's political sphere for a long period. But due to the 
competitive nature of politics BSP leader Mayawati started making efforts to build 
bridges between heterogeneous constituencies with the Brahmin votes and also bring 
the Muslims closer to the BSP. This was the revival of old Congress Social Alliance 
but this time under leadership of the Dalits, but with a major diflierence between 
Congress's Social Alliance and Bahujan Samaj Party's Social Engineering is that in 
Congress's mobilization strategy the real power was in the hands of Brahmins, upper 
caste while in present BSP's engineering formula the political power was in the 
possession of Dalits, the outcastes. In Ultar Pradesh, it can be sera that after the 
decline of Congress not only the trend of single majority party was ended but 
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in!5tability occurred in the states political sphere where one positive sign can be seen 
in the rise of Backwards and lower castes and in their empowered positions upto a 
laiger extent. This point shows the major turn in electoral politics in which such a 
sections of society became politically aware and mobilized for their cause that they 
transformed the nature of politics where dominant one were only upper castes giving 
no powerful and prestigious positions to other marginalized castes. 
But a negative aspect of this transformation is that since these sections are 
being mobilized for a great causes i.e. their upliftment and dignity or their identity but 
the; criterion, on which basis they are being mobilized are not democratic in nature, 
castes and communities. This has dividend the society into various constituencies and 
a Large number of political parties, with confined social base and narrower ideologies, 
have emerged. This has created the electoral war among parties of distinct nature. 
Such prevailed situation there is the lack of secular parties, accommodating the 
interests of large sections of society. Each one is busy in checking the other one's 
spreading constituencies. This is one of the reasons of the failure of the Congress 
Paity, in Uttar Pradesh, a secular one and placed it at the weakest position in electoral 
fight of major parties in UP. 
For the purpose to mobilize the heterogeneous constituencies under their fold 
parties have to set certain policies and proj^ammes in tlieir favour. Its example could 
be seen in Uttar Pradesh when Bahujan Saimaj Party launched a number of Vxo-Dalit 
Schemes like "Ambedkar Village ProgriEimme" (AVP) for which she made her 
statement clear that she was concerned with eth upliftment of 'only one section of 
society' that was Dalit. Such kind of favourable treatment was in order to consolidate 
the Dalit vote bank. During its distinct ruling periods it represented itself as the party 
of Dalits. While its competitor Samajwadi Party whose vote banks are Yadavs, 
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particularly and Muslims minority also. For Muslims mobilization purpose it started 
th<; appointment of Urdu teachers in government schools etc. Such type of electoral 
politics going on in the state aimed at the attainment of political power by using castes 
and community identities. It has resultedl into the lack of parties based on secular 
ideologies providing an effective political structure to state and strengthen democratic 
processes. Instead of this we find that type of political culture in state where we see 
the upsurge of political participation of people but without any sense of correct use of 
th€:ir democratic rights. Their rights are easily controlled by their so called elites in the 
name of caste and communities and by several schemes in their favour but what is the 
importance of such kind of programmes that have to be changed with the change in 
the government. In fact it should be of progressive nature for both state and its 
inhiabitants. 
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